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Who Sets the Media Agenda?  
News vs. Advertising  
Maria de los Ángeles Flores Gutiérrez, Ph.D. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2008 
Supervisor:  Maxwell E. McCombs  
Grounded in the theory of intra-media agenda-setting, this research will analyze the 
dynamic process among the Mexican national television networks during the 2006 presidential 
election campaign period. Specifically, what were the intra-media agenda-setting effects between 
the Mexican television media Televisa and TV Azteca during the 2006 presidential election 
campaign? The television content analysis data set is from a systematic random sample of 
national Mexican prime time television news programs broadcast during the official Instituto 
Federal Electoral's (Federal Electoral Institute) presidential campaign period, which runs from 
January 19 to June 28, 2006. The Mexican television newscasts that were analyzed are Televisa's 
El Noticiero con Joaquín López Dóriga, and TV Azteca's Hechos de la Noche. Overall, the 
results indicated that television news strongly influences a presidential candidate’s television 
political spots. The flow of communication between television news and a candidate’s television 
political spots was scrutinized in several time frames in order to examine the influence from a 
general perspective (3 months, then 2 months) into a specific (month by month) perspective. The 
outcome at the 3-month scale indicated that television news strongly influenced a candidate’s 
vii
political spots. The same pattern was observed at the two-month interval. Finally, the month-by-
month outcome also indicated that television news influenced a candidate’s political spots.  
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on the internationalization of the agenda setting theory. Specifically, 
this research examines the 2006 Mexican presidential election focusing on the intermedia agenda 
setting effect between Mexico’s major national television networks and the major presidential 
candidates’ television political advertisements. Intermedia agenda setting effects are understood 
as the dynamic process in which one medium of communication strongly influences the agenda 
of other media by suggesting which topics or candidate’s attributes are imperative to cover 
(McCombs, 2004). News organizations have a practice of reading, listening, and viewing other 
media outlets to compare news coverage of events, topics, and breaking news covered by other 
news organizations. By comparing news coverage, news organizations ensure comprehensive 
coverage of important as well as mundane news events. They gain also a sense of validation for 
their news judgment. Consequently, intermedia agenda setting seeks to determine which media 
garner an elite position among all media. More broadly, the key question that establishes the 
intermedia agenda setting assessment is “Who sets the media’s agenda?” McCombs (2004). 
 Six hypotheses guided this research on the agenda setting effect. Those are:  
• (H1) Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts presented the same election campaign issues
agenda to their viewers during the 2006 presidential election.
• (H2) Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts presented the same presidential candidate
attribute agenda to their viewers during the 2006 presidential election.
• (H3) Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts favored a particular presidential candidate
through their non-election coverage of public issues during the 2006 election.
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• (H4) Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s caudillismo cultural attribute prevailed over Felipe 
Calderón’s caudillismo cultural attribute in political advertising and television news.  
• (H5) Television news coverage of a presidential candidate’s platform and personal 
attributes is similar to coverage those presented in presidential candidates’ television 
advertising.  
• (H6) Television news influenced television political advertising during the 2006 
presidential election.  
These hypotheses were organized to follow McCombs’s response to the question: who sets 
the media agenda? His answer is known as the metaphorical onion of media agenda-setting. 
McCombs’ used an onion as a symbolic comparison between the dynamic of media agenda 
setting and the onion’s layers. There are three fundamental layers of the onion starting from 
the center. The first layer is news norms; second layer, other news media; and finally the 
third layer, news sources. In this dissertation each one of those layers are measured. That is, 
Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 of this study address the “news norms” perspective. Hypothesis 4 
discusses “news sources.” Hypotheses 5 and 6 focus on “other news media,” that is, 
intermedia agenda-setting across media. 
The primary methodology for this study was content analysis that was conducted by 
American and Mexican researchers who combined their investigative skills in the Mexico 2006 
Panel Study led by political science professor Chappell Lawson of Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (MIT). The present research has its groundwork in two sets of content analysis, one 
for the television newscasts and another for the candidates’ television political advertisements. 
The television newscasts content analysis data set came from a systematic random sample of 
Televisa’s El Noticiero con Joaquín López Dóriga that aired from 10:30 to 11:15PM (Central 
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Mexican Time) on Channel 2, and TV Azteca’s Hechos de la Noche that aired at the same time 
on Channel 7. Both newscasts were broadcast nationwide from Monday to Friday. This yielded a 
total of 1,348 news stories: 812 (60%) by Televisa, and 536 (40%) by TV Azteca. Both networks 
combined aired 222 election news stories, representing 16% of their total news content. Televisa 
aired 123 stories that represented 15% of its newscast content, and TV Azteca broadcast 99 news 
stories that represented 18% of its news coverage. 
The second data set regarding the presidential candidates’ political advertising content 
analysis came from a census of all the political television spots of the three main presidential 
candidates—Felipe Calderón, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), and Roberto Madrazo—
aired on Televisa and TV Azteca during the official IFE campaign period. This data set consisted 
of a total of 97 television political spots, including Calderón-PAN (55), Andrés AMLO-PRD 
(27), and Madrazo-PRI (16). 
There are four major contributions of this research to the body of agenda setting theory. 
First, continuing to test the agenda-setting effect in a non-U.S. context. Second, traditionally 
agenda setting studies have tested the effect on news media and advertisement separately, very 
rare are sstudies pitting this two election elements against it other. Currently, there are several 
Mexican communication intellectuals such as Raúl Trejo Delabre which argue that politicians 
have changed television ratings for voters (Trejo Delabre, 2001). That is, politicians allocate 
most of their time and economic resources into television political spots making which implies 
the idea of commodification of political candidates. This means a drastic change in the 
conception of each candidate’s campaign from politician into commercial product that can be 
sold to audiences/potential consumers like any other commercial good. During the 2006 election, 
the major presidential candidates devoted 80% to 87% of their total budget to political ads, 
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which is a new record; the idea that more publicity means winning was the rule of thumb for 
candidates and their political marketing advisors. This research tested this very idea. That is, this 
study carefully and in detail examines how effective the presidential candidate’s television 
political ads were, and if candidates’ enormous economic investment was worth it?   
The third contribution of this study to the body of agenda setting theory is an analysis of 
sources. In this study, the public opinion leader is known as caudillo that in Mexican culture is 
considered to be a personal attribute of a strong man, somebody who possess leadership 
charisma. This caudillo attribute is crucial for Mexican politicians because voters are not loyal to 
a particular political party. Voters favor the candidates who possess a leadership charisma, a 
candidate who voters consider to possess a caudillo personal attribute. Just as agenda setting  
theory suggests that frequent news coverage of a particular issue raises its importance to the 
public (McCombs, 2004), the same idea was tested here by observing sources instead of issues. 
In other words, the more frequently a particular candidate appears on the news as a source, the 
greater the importance of the candidate.  
In order for a candidate to posses the caudillo personal attribute, she/he should be 
frequently present in the media, because the constant participation of candidates as news sources 
improves their image in society. Candidates have two opportunities to build up their caudillo 
characteristic. One of them is through the news media, by being constantly cited by journalists. 
In this context, candidates do not have the control over the journalists’ final product. Another 
opportunity to build up the caudillo characteristic is by the candidate’s controlled exposure in 
political advertisements. In this context, each candidate has the power to choose to directly speak 
for themselves to voters by the use of sound bite or to just use a voice over in their spot. 
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 The final contribution of this research to the agenda setting theory is the innovation of 
comparing the agenda-setting effect of election news with the agenda-setting effect of 
nonelection news. In other words, this study looks at the traditional approach to the media 
agenda setting effect of examining news stories and presents an innovation by measuring the 
same effect in terms of indirect support to presidencial candidates by a comparison between 
nonelection news and each of the presidential candidate’s political platforms. This innovative 
indirect agenda setting effect is imperative to scrutinize in a society like Mexico where 
journalism generally suffers censorship and autocensorship. In addition, IFE lauched a campaign 
to monitor the election news reports of Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts. Nevertheless, the 
indirect support of nonelection news was not monitored by IFE. As a result, television networks 
had the possibility to intentionally or involuntarily support their favorite candidate via 
nonelection reporting. The next section explains another critical factor of the presidential 
election, negative television advertisments, and how this media product affected the electoral 
process.  
Negative Television Spots 
The electoral process is one of the benchmarks by which a democratic society is measured. An 
evaluation of the 2006 Mexican presidential election helps to describe how Mexico functions as 
a young democratic society. Voters, scholars, and journalists have called the 2006 presidential 
election one of the most controversial elections in modern times in Mexico. Negative political 
campaign advertising by several presidential candidates was often cited as a major problem with 
the election. The tone of the election was set by political advertisements that disseminated 
messages of fanatic confrontation between presidential candidates and political spots that were 
filled with negative attacks against political opponents regardless of whether the accusations 
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were true or false. The spots rarely focused on the presidential candidates’ public issue agenda, 
but frequently highlighted their personal attributes.  
This type of political communication generated a context of confusion and uncertainty for 
citizens. Never before had the citizens seen a political campaign waged to this extent in the 
Mexican media. As a consequence, the country became divided, disintegrating into political 
chaos before and after election day (July 2, 2006). This political polarization was the origin of a 
very serious postelectoral conflict that did not end with the inauguration of Felipe Calderón as 
the president of Mexico. On the contrary, the political division continued into Calderón’s 
presidency. The introduction of the negative campaign during the 2006 electoral process came at 
a high social and political cost for Mexicans and the democratic election process. This research 
examines the 2006 presidential election intermedia agenda-setting effects among television news 
and television political advertisement during the campaign period (January 19, 2006 to June 28, 
2006).  
The fact that in this election the three main presidential candidates devoted enormous 
amount of their budget to political advertising, especially television spots, raised a number of 
questions to investigate. This research examines how effective the political advertisments were 
in setting the media’s agenda. In addition, the present research explores the sociology of news in 
Mexican television networks by examining their news norms and the concept of caudillismo. 
Caudillo, the single form for strongmen, should be understood in this research as the public 
opinion leader. That is, the research analyzed who the strongest political leader in the media was. 
Typically in Mexico, candidate leadership charisma is more important than loyalty to a particular 
political party. Voters favor the candidate who possesses a strongman or caudillo persona. From 
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this perspective, this study also sought to discover who received the most coverage among all 
five presidential candidates. 
Election Results: The Starting Point of the Post-electoral Controversy 
All five candidates campaigned for 161 consecutive days. The official IFE campaign period ran 
from January 19, 2006 to June 28, 2006. Presidential candidates traveled around the country 
seeking voters and listening to their concerns. According to IFE, the general voting figures for 
the 2006 election were that over 71 million were registered voters, and 58.55% (over 41 million) 
of them cast their ballots. From that number of registered voters, 52% were women and 48% 
men (IFE, 2006h). The difference between registered voters and voter turnout was 41.44% (over 
29 million) (IFE, 2006e). The highest vote came from the voters abroad; the registered voters 
were 40,876,000, and 81% (33,131) of them went out and voted (IFE, 2006f).  
On July 7, 2006, IFE declared Felipe Calderón as the winner with 35.89% (15,000,284 
votes) over AMLO who obtained 35.31% (14,756,350 votes). The difference between the PAN 
and PRD candidates was very small 0.58% (Milenio, 2006). This is the second consecutive time 
that PAN won the presidential race. Nevertheless, its candidate faced a very serious political 
crisis, about 15 million voters supported Felipe Calderón, but another 15 million voted against 
him. This presented a political challenge. 
PAN’s Political Marketing Techniques 
Applications of political advertising and political marketing techniques first emerged in election 
campaigns in Mexico in 2000. Former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari incorporated a 
political advertising campaign after he was elected, not during the election campaign. Therefore, 
the first politician to fully incorporate a clear political marketing communication strategy in his 
campaign was Vicente Fox -PAN. In 2006, fellow party member Felipe Calderón-PAN followed 
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Fox’s example. While Fox’s media campaign was highly successful, Calderón’s was not. Of 
interest is the difference in percentage votes for the candidates. Fox (42.52%) won with 6.41 
percentage difference over the second place Francisco Labastida-PRI (36.11%) (IFE, 2000). In 
contrast, Calderón was very close (less than 1%) to his close follower container AMLO-PRD 
(IFE, 2006). In addition, Calderón faced vote fraud accusations and Fox received admiration for 
stopping 71 years of PRI ruling.  
One common denominator between both PAN presidential candidates was the 
participation of an American political marketing consultant, Dick Morris. Fox did not follow all 
Dick Morris’ recommendations, specifically his idea concerning news coverage. Morris does not 
view political news coverage as important. Political advertising in the media is what really 
matters according to Morris (Proceso, 2006). Of course, Fox did not accept all the 
recommendations of his political adviser, and he tried very hard to appear on both television 
news and political spots (Trejo Delabre, 2006). Fox has an outgoing personality; he was always 
ready for the press with a smile for the photojournalist and a succinct, clear sound bite for the 
news reporter. Up to this point, politicians were known by journalists for being loquacious, 
without really saying anything; as a consequence, reporters found it nightmarish to interview a 
politician, to cover his or her activities, and to attend press conferences. Fox changed political 
traditions by providing succinct comment on a public issue.  
After six years of the Fox presidency, the Mexican media become accustomed to an 
unprecedented freedom of speech that was prohibited under a PRI-led administration. Once Fox 
became president, one of the aspects that he changed drastically was the relationship between the 
president and the media. Fox tried to stay away from the traditional PRI relationship with the 
media. For example, during the PRI presidencies journalists assigned to cover the president 
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usually traveled as part of the president committee to events in the interior of Mexico as well as 
international travels. This action implied that the government paid for all the travel costs of 
journalists. Fox changed this tradition during his presidency; each media outlet that wished to 
cover the president’s activities in and out of the country had to cover its journalist expenses.  
Another interesting illustration was the management of Fox’s image as president. During 
the PRI regimen, the press office of the president was the only authorized agency to provide 
journalists with video and photograph material of the president. Fox also changed this fact. 
During his presidency, if a media outlet wished to obtain photos or video of the presidential 
activities, each one of them should provide its journalists with the equipment necessary to obtain 
graphics. Fox completely changed the relationship between the media and the political power, as 
journalist Alejando Ángeles (2002) wrote in the report Diarios: La Vida después del PRI 
(Newspapers: The Life after PRI). Ángeles noted: “There are no official numbers, but the 
calculations indicate that PRI governments devoted 500 million of U.S. dollars to buy 
advertisements in the media” (p. 1). In contrast under Fox, with the transparency law being 
current, the media was forced to make public its print, sale, circulation, and publicity 
information, although some media outlets don’t have the records. According to Ángeles, the total 
newspaper circulation is below 1 million copies, but some papers were struggling for survival 
because of the change of journalist approach. In the new millennium, “The democratic transition 
[of the 2000 election] left [several media outlets] defenseless in a market where what is 
important is the reader’s credibility as an element to attract advertisers (Pérez Espino, 2002, p. 
1).  
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In contrast, it seems that Calderón did follow Morris’s advice regarding news coverage. 
Overall, the relationship that Calderón had with the media was cool, distant, and sometimes 
difficult. Journalist Salvador Gacía Soto (2006) wrote in his El Universal’s column,  
During the campaign period several journalists who were covering the PAN candidate 
complained about feeling pressure and acts of censorship from Max Cortázar [Calderón’s 
press officer] to whom journalists also accused of ‘asking their heads’ [asking their boss 
to resign the reporter] of critical reporters or those who did not talk good things about the 
candidate. (p. 149)  
Even on the everyday reporting, Calderón’s press officer Max Cortázar’s relationship with 
journalists reflected the ones PRI presidents had with practices such as censorship, threats, and 
lack of freedom of speech. 
Calderón has a shy personality with the press. He follows PRI traditional speaking style 
that the media does not like and no longer is used to PRI press style. Calderón’s attitude toward 
the press is more similar to the PRI tradition than to the PAN style imposed by Fox. However, 
Calderón press style according to Mexican scholars Elías Aguilar García and Javier Sánchez 
Galicia (2003) is not recommended, “Governments do not function as hierarchies. They need 
legitimacy and agreements. The government who applies a successful communication strategy 
achieves popular support and accomplishes much more than a government that maintains their 
society misinformed” (p. 9). Hérnandez argues that journalism can be defined as the profession 
of confronting relevant public information that wants to transform reality. Therefore, journalism 
cannot exist in a society that is determined to be reinforcing the status quo by denying its very 
nature, because journalism practice is not to manipulate, harm, impost, etc. The aim of 
journalism is to serve the truth to benefit citizens (Hérnandez, 2005). Plurality in the media is a 
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sign of social advancement in freedom of speech and democracy. The media directly reflects the 
political context in a country. In this respect, the first anchorman in national television in Mexico 
Jacobo Zabludovsky (2007) remembers in a press interview that “during the PRI regimen, the 
press obey the political structure of one political party; the lack of plurality in politics led to the 
lack of plurality in the media” (Berruga Filloy, 2007, p. 50). The mass media whose purpose is to 
serve the ruler does create an authoritarian society and the media that ensure that all citizens have 
access to an open discussion does create a socially responsible society (Siebert, Peterson, & 
Schramm, 1956). 
In any case, El Universal indicated that responders to the question: “If today were the 
elections, who would you vote for?,” of the November 2005 poll showed a preference for AMLO 
(40%). He was the leader between the major presidential candidates, Felipe Calderón (33%) and 
Roberto Madrazo (21%) (El Universal, 2005). In January 2006, the results were very similar: 
AMLO (40%) still the leader followed by Calderón (35%) who increased by 2%, and Madrazo 
(26%) who increased by 5% (El Universal, 2006). In February, an El Universal poll documented 
that AMLO (39%) was still the leader, but lost 1% in relation to the previous month and 
Madrazo (25%) lost 1%. In contrast, Calderón (34%) increased 1% (El Universal, 2006). In 
March, AMLO (42%) increased his leadership by 2%, registering his highest pick. In contrast, 
Calderón (32%) and Madrazo (24%) decreased their popularity (El Universal, 2006).  
Instituto de Mercadotécnia y Opinión (IMO-Mexico) registered a similar parttern in its survey: 
AMLO was the leader with 37%, followed by Calderón with 26% and Madrazo with 19% (IMO, 
2006). In addition, Consulta Mitofsky: AMLO 37.5%, Calderón 30.6%, and Madrazo 28.8%; 
Marketing Político: AMLO 37%, Calderón 32%, and Madrazo 29%;  Ulises Beltrán y 
Asociados: AMLO 36%, Calderón 34%, and Madrazo 28% (Tello Díaz, 2006, p. 1). During the 
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Table 1: Responders to the question: “If today were the elections, who would you vote for?” 
 November  January February March  April May 
Madrazo 21% 26% 25% 24% 25% 21% 
AMLO 40% 40% 39% 42% 38% 35% 
Calderón 33% 35% 34% 32% 34% 39% 
Source: El Universal responders from November 2005 to May 2006. 
  
month of March, Calderón launched his negative campaign via a television advertisement known 
as “AMLO is dangerous for Mexico.” In April, El Universal reported that AMLO (38%) was 
still the leader of the presidential race, although his popularity went down by 4% in relation to 
the previous month; Calderón (34%), and Madrazo (25%) increased their popularity (El 
Universal, 2006j). Calderón negative campaigning worked out for him almost 2 months after it 
was launched when El Universal polls indicated during the month of May that he was the 
popular leader of the presidential race. El Universal conducted a survey on May 5 to 8, 2006; the 
results indicated that Calderón increased his popularity obtaining 39%, followed by AMLO 35%, 
and Madrazo 21% (El Universal, 2006i). Nevertheless, Calderón’s negative campaign was 
working by mid-May. However, by the end of June, Calderón’s popularity went down, 
preventing him from obtaining a conformable winning margin percentage on election day. The 
Calderón vote difference with AMLO was less then 1%. Overall, Roberto Madrazo’s highest 
popularity was registered in January 2006 (26%) very early in the campaign process. His lowest 
point was registered before the presidential general election even started in November 2005 
(21%) and in May 2006 (21%). AMLO’s highest popularity was reached in March (42%), the 
same month that PAN’s negative campaigning began. He reached his lowest popularity 2 months 
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after May (35%). Felipe Calderón registered his highest popularity during the month of May 
(39%) before the second presidential debate and his lower point in March (32%). 
Negative Campaigning Effect: What Went Wrong?  
It seems that in modern Mexican politics all that matters was media exposure without taking into 
consideration politicians’ leadership and social cost. The effects of the negative campaigning 
phenomenon in Mexico was unpredictable by many international and national political marketers 
specialists, especially by Dick Morris whose practices of negative campaigns in other Latin 
American countries also generated division in society. The consequences of that social behavior, 
however, had taken more time to build up and show up in society: for example, the case in 
Argentina of former president Fernando De La Rúa who ruled the country for 2 years (December 
10, 1999 to December 21, 2001) instead of 4 years. He contracted Morris to participate in his 
presidential campaign; Morris recommended a negative campaign, which facilitated De la Rúa 
victory in 1999. However, the political communication strategy left the country socially divided, 
which became more evident on his second year of presidency. According to journalist Fernando 
González (2001) of El Clarín (main Argentinean newspaper), De la Rúa’s popularity lasted 6 
months after a massive victory as candidate for the Alianza party; the main characteristic of his 
presidential period was, according to González, his lack of political leadership: “De la Rúa’s 
resignation did not surprise anybody. On the contrary, the anticipated resignation of the president 
brought comfort to society” (p. 1). At the time, Argentineans were worried about their severe 
economic crisis and the confrontation between the national police and a political group of the 
Peronismo political party that caused the death of 25 people and 400 wounded.  
In the case of Mexico, the PAN television political advertisement negative campaigning 
effect was immediately felt by society, even before election day arrived. Why was the negative 
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campaign effect in Mexico so quick to show up? There are three possible scenarios: (1) the 
second presidential debate aftermath, (2) IFE slow reaction to stop the presidential candidates’ 
negative campaign in the media as well as the voter-counting software scandal, and (3) President 
Vicente Fox’s public unconditional support to Felipe Calderón. All of those circumstances 
together created a context of distrust for Mexican voters. An uncertain political context almost 
automatically leads to a weak democracy situation.  
The second presidential debate could be considered as the starting point of Calderón’s 
weakness image. The second presidential debate was scheduled for June 6, 2006. During the 
national televised debate, AMLO accused Calderón of nepotism in granting governmental 
contracts when he was Secretary of Energy (2003-2004). AMLO pointed out the case of 
Calderón’s brother-in-law Diego Hildebrando Zavala Gómez del Campo and his business 
Hildebrando S.A. de C.V. that generated an income of 2,500 million of pesos, but did not pay 
taxes (Hérnandez, 2006a). Calderón denied the accusation, arguing that one of his campaign 
mottos was Manos Limpias (clean hands)—that means that he had not participated in any kind of 
corruption.  
The next day, Diego Zavala told the press that his company was up-to-date in terms of 
taxes, and that the governmental contracts represented only 16% of his company’s income in the 
case of Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) (State oil company). Zavala commented that his 
company received an income of 20 million of pesos in 2004 (Hérnandez, 2006a), and that 2005 
was his company’s more lucrative year, making 683 million of pesos of which only 10% were 
governmental sales (Ramos, 2006a). Nevertheless, the political magazine Proceso published that 
between 2004 and 2005, Zavala’s company had a profit of 100% after receiving 10 contracts 
with PEMEX for the total amount of 130 thousand U.S. dollars (Proceso, 2006d). In less than 48 
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hours, the war between PRD and PAN presidential candidates over Diego Zavala escalated to the 
television arena via paid political spots. PRD aired television commercials that revealed the 
evidence that they possessed against Margarita Zavala’s (Calderón’s wife) brother, and PAN 
aired advertising spots to dispute the allegations of corruption, Calderón declared that he had 
nothing to hide, and that he had never favored his relatives with governmental contracts (Saúl, 
2006b).  
The most controversial of PRD accusations against Calderón corruption behavior stated 
that one of Diego Zavala’s companies Metadata was contracted by IFE to design and implement 
a voter-counter computer software, which was a violation of the electoral law. Once again, 
Calderón and his brother-in-law, David Zavala, denied PRD’s claim. As a matter of fact, IFE 
organized a press conference to make the matter clear to voters: IFE council member Marco 
Antonio Gómez Alcanzar (2006) commented that his institution has not contracted with Diego 
Zavala or any of his companies (Flores, 2006b). A few days later, a contradictory version 
became known via a nationally distributed newspaper La Jornada that reported that Zavala 
celebrated 1,700 contracts with the government; one of them was with IFE. The electoral agency 
requested software that could be capable of locating double registrations, identity fraud in the 
national voters’ registration list. The business deal with IFE was made with Zavala’s company 
Indetix Incorporated and Sagem Défense Sécurite for the amount of 11 million U.S. dollars (La 
Jornada, 2006b).  
Moreover, less then 48 hours before election day, journalist Carmen Aristigui (2006) who 
hosts one of the highest ratings in morning newscast radio shows at the national level announced 
on the air that she received a tip from an anonymous source about an intranet webpage. 
Immediately, she visited the intranet web address http://200.77.234.173/intranet. Aristigui found 
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herself using the Redes por México (http://www.redespormexico.org.mx) network that was 
created on March 24, 2006, by Six Sigma Networks México S.A. de C.V., a technology business 
that received the Premio Nacional de Tecnología (national technology award) in 2004 (La 
Jornada, 2006b). Once on the Redes por México webpage, she entered the username 
“Hildebrando117” and the password “captura” (Artigues, 2006). Aristegui found that the intranet 
webpage confirmed PRD’s claims against Calderón. Among other things, the journalist found 
out that the site had a complete replica of IFE’s registered voters list that any person could be 
located within seconds, providing the website user with all kinds of voter’s personal information, 
such as photo, address, age, gender, vote region, and voting location. The journalist made the 
case that this information was for IFE’s use exclusively and that PAN was violating the electoral 
law by inappropriately using IFE’s confidential information. Suspiciously, it was just a few 
minutes after Aristegui’s breaking news went on the air via XEW (a radio station property of 
Televisa), the intranet website was shutdown.  
Immediately after the suspicions interruption, Aristegui began discussing the topic of 
Manos Limpias (Clean Hands) that had been Calderón’s campaign motto. The journalist started 
the discussion with a direct question to PAN candidate: “Are these the clean hands that cynically 
Calderón made reference to? Now, we can note the democratic advance of Mexico! No wonder a 
few days ago Calderón assured that he would win the election by 1.5 million of votes” 
(Aristegui, 2006, p. 1). At the same time, the Aristegui finding very much hurt Calderón’s image 
by portraying him and his brother-in-law David Zavala as dishonest. According to a statement 
made to Univisión by political analyst Alberto Barranco (2006), overall the Hildebrando case 
harmed PAN candidate “at the very least it has cost Calderón a loss in popularity on polls; a 
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diminution of this magnitude 2 weeks before election day could be definitive, hard to overcome” 
(Ramos, 2006a, 8:55).  
Furthermore, the Hildebrando case also damaged IFE’s reputation as well. The agency in 
charge of overseeing the election was strongly questioned. IFE president Luis Carlos Ugalde 
declared to Univision that its computer system was “bullet proofed”:  “The provability of any 
kind of irregularity on July 2 was zero; there was not a legal reason for any candidate to believe 
that votes were altered” (Ramos, 2006c, 12:35). Regardless of the second debate aftermath, 
Calderón had invested a high amount of money on electronic media political spots. It was just 
like political communication experts advised him under the understanding that a greater number 
of political advertising leads to victory. How does a political communication campaign so 
carefully designed end up in the middle of a fraud accusation? If Calderón followed each step of 
the political marketing recipe to victory, it just does not make sense to commit vote fraud. 
Nevertheless, why was the PRD vote fraud accusation so strong in society? After many years of 
being exposed to the idea of negative electoral practices done by PRI to ensure its electoral 
victory, the thought of vote fraud has always been present in Mexican voters’ minds. As a 
consequence, it’s very easy for voters to believe that a vote fraud could take place in an electoral 
process. Furthermore, regardless of popular beliefs on vote fraud, historically the 2006 election 
was the second occasion that a left-wing presidential candidate openly stated that he was 
cheated. The first time was in the 1988 election when Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas declared that he 
won the election, but the PRI presidential candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari cheated. 
The Accusation of Fraud 
It is important to remark that the Mexican election is based on the final value of the vote count—
that is the candidate who obtains more votes wins the election. In the night of July 2, 2006, IFE 
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president Luis Carlos Ugalde announced via national television that the preliminary counts 
indicated no winner, because the voting counts were very close. He encouraged presidential 
candidates to wait for the final count. Nevertheless, the two major presidential candidates 
overlooked Ugalde’s recommendation. Shortly after IFE’s announcement, two presidential 
candidates declared victory within a time difference of 13 minutes. At the heart of Mexico City’s 
Zócalo Plaza, AMLO announced that he was the election winner, and at PAN’s campaign 
headquarters, Calderón announced that he was the winner. 
After a few days, IFE president Luis Carlos Ugalde announced that the full count of votes 
was ready and that the results indicated that Calderón won the election. Immediately, Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador rejected IFE’s result, claiming that he was robbed of the presidency by 
fraud. Then, AMLO declared that IFE robbed 3 million votes. Researcher Segio Aguayo (2006) 
told Univision that AMLO’s accusation regarding the voters was because “IFE made a mistake 
on the night of July 2 [2006] because Ugalde [IFE’s president] forgot to declare that at that 
moment about 8% (about 3 million) votes were left to be counted” (Ramos, 2006c, 25:15). 
Therefore, the entire controversy regarding those votes was a miscommunication mistake from 
IFE that cost them a high credibility price under the eyes of Mexican voters, political parties, and 
presidential candidates. As a consequence of the IFE’s confusion, the Electoral Law dictates that 
the Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación (TEPJF) (Electoral Tribunal High 
Chamber) had to rule on the matter. 
Within the next few days, PRD presented 375 legal cases against IFE’s overseeing 
proceedings to TEPJF (Electoral Tribunal High Chamber). AMLO solicitation to TEPJF was a 
vote recount with the motto voto por voto (vote by vote). AMLO and the PRD party argued that 
they have evidence to prove the electoral vote fraud, such as videos of an unidentified man 
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stuffing votes into a ballot box (presumably to favor PAN) and evidence of several polling points 
that had more votes than registered voters. In addition, PRD argued that IFE’s computer software 
skewed the count of voters to favor PAN’s candidate. Since early August 2006, tens of thousands 
of AMLO supporters had been camping out in the center of Mexico City to demand a full vote 
recount. Protesters camped out on Reforma—Mexico’s main street—and on Zócalo Plaza for 7 
consecutive weeks. 
In the middle of a postelectoral fraud scandal, during an academic meeting of 60 Mexican 
scientists1 and 1 American, the majority of the scientists argued that in the 2006 election, IFE’s 
statistical results were virtually impossible to generate in such a clean statistical graphic like the 
one IFE generated. Among them was UNAM researcher with a doctorate in physics Luis 
Mochán (2006), who declared to the media that IFE preliminary electoral statistics results were 
full of inconsistencies. He tested the IFE preliminary electoral program known in Spanish by 
PREP results with the Law of Benford, a statistical distribution that describes the probability of 
appearance of digits. This law had been previously used to evaluate several electoral processes in 
other countries, such as Venezuela and the United States. Mochán found that IFE numbers did 
not follow the Law of Benford distribution, and that the difference between the observed results 
and the expected results was not the product of chance alone (Mochán, 2006). “The night of the 
election, the candidate from the National Action Party (Partido Acción Nacional, PAN) argued 
that he had been above his opponent during the whole process as if this information irrefutably 
1 Some of them are: Dr. Javier Aguillón Martínez-Instituto de Ingeniería UNAM, Lic. Emiliano Calderón-Facultrad 
de Ciencias UNAM, Dr.Silvia Gómez-El Colegio de México, Dr. Manuel Fernández Guasti-Universidad Autónoma 
Metropolitana, Dr. Luis Horacio Gutiérrez-UAM Iztapalapa, Matemático Martín Hardy-Consultor en Sistemas, Ing. 
Gerardo Horvilleur-Consultor en Sistemas, Dr. Wolf Luis Mochán-Centro de Ciencias Físicas UNAM, Dr. Victor 
Romero Rochín, Instituto de Física UNAM, Dr. Gerardo Ruíz-Centro de Ciencias de la Atmósfera UNAM, Dr. 
Jaime Ruiz García-Intituto de Física-Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Postosí, Dr. Víctor Manuel Velasco-
  20
proved his triumph. This argument has been repeated subsequently in the media. The implication 
is, obviously, false” (Mochán, 2006, p. 1). A separate study using the Law of Benford was 
conducted at Cornell University by American scholar Walter R. Mebane; his conclusion was 
similar with Mochán’s. Therefore, Mebane (2006) stated that the vote-by-vote recount was 
necessary to answer any questions about IFE’s statistical results. 
Other scientists implemented other statistical theories to test IFE’s results, UNAM 
researcher and Doctorate in Physics Víctor Romero Rochín (2006) conducted a separate study 
using a different statistical test and reached the same conclusion as the previous two scholars. 
According to Romero Rochín findings, IFE’s PREP statistics had many anomalies,  such as the 
lack of the stabilization of PRD and PAN accumulative percentages along with the unusual 
sampling system of PREP consisting of 300,000 votes. Romero Rochín affirmed that there was a 
statistical possibility of data manipulation in IFE’s computer system, because “the evolution of 
the counted votes has a statistical behavior that is not normal and improbable” (Romero Rochín, 
2006, p. 2).  
UNAM researcher Miguel de Icaza (2006), who is a doctor in physics, conducted a 
separate study with the method of basic arithmetic and probability; he concluded that there was a 
considerable amount of inconsistency in IFE’s data. His results showed a comparison between 
IFE total amount of registered voters (71 million) against Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografíca e Informática (INEGI) registration of population over 18 years old, (63 million), a 
difference of 8 million people. As a consequence, his question was: Where are the 8 million 
registered voters without a physical body? He concludes that this fact completely changes the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Instituto de Geofísica UNAM, Dr. Juan Carlos Villa Soto-CEIICH-UNAM, and Jorge Zavala-Centro de Ciencias de 
la Atmósfera UNAM. 
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election results, because those registered voters correspond to persons who do not physically 
exist. Therefore, the participation level of each castilla (voting site) should be lower under the 
logic that those citizens who do not exit cannot vote. In addition, de Icaza argues that in the event 
that names had been added to the IFE registration list, the result would be the creation of two 
citizens’ participation indexes: one with the real life citizens and another with the add-on persons 
without body and face (de Icaza, 2006). The main data difference between IFE and INEGI is 
their sample of population used to collect their information. In the case of IFE, each citizen 
voluntarily has to register when he or she reaches 18 years of age. In contrast, INEGI uses a 
census sampling, a door-by-door population count.  
UNAM Mathematics professor Bolívar Huerta (2006) conducted a separate study using 
the computer software analysis method. He concluded that the vote difference between Calderón 
and AMLO was what Huerta called the “Hildebrando virus.” The difference between the 
presidential candidates was about 2 votes per castilla; therefore, in order to modify the result, it 
was necessary to put 21 votes favoring a particular candidate in 10% of the casillas.  “We are 
talking about a very small amount of votes that could be easily manipulated from within IFE’s 
computer system” (Flores, 2006, p. 1). Huerta stated that all computer systems are not 100% 
secure, they are vulnerable: “The problem is that computer virus cannot be audited, because they 
are born, grown, and die according with their utility and function [in the software without 
leaving a trace]” (2006, p. 1). The scientist stated that the vote-by-vote recount would show the 
same results because the “Hildebrando virus” would became active again.  
In contrast, very well known Mexican intellectual writer Carlos Fuentes (2006) 
commented to Univision that “fraud cannot take place, the institutions can’t allow it” (Ramos, 
2006c, 8:56). In addition, Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) professor 
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Javier Aparicio (2006) stated that there was not a cyber fraud in the election, because it is useless 
to modify the flow of the data, what matters was the total sum of the data (Sarmiento, 2006a, 
27:42). 
Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación Ruling 
September 5, 2006, was the deadline for the TEPJF—IFE’s federal electoral tribunal—to rule. 
Mexico’s highest electoral court backed IFE’s original election result by ruling in favor of Felipe 
Calderón. In addition, the electoral tribunal ruled that the 2006 elections were legitimate and 
rejected the challenges presented by the PRD party. Among other things, PRD presented 
evidence (video) to prove how voters had been illegally introduced or removed from ballot boxes 
and tallies had been falsified. Moreover, PRD demanded the electoral tribunal to order a vote-by-
vote full recount. The left-wing party stated that Vicente Fox’s open support to Calderón broke 
the electoral law. Fox was considered to be the president of change, a president who had the 
responsibility to stay neutral during the electoral process. PRD senator Carlos Navarrete (2006) 
commented in a television interview, “They [PAN] cannot ask us to respect the president [Fox] if 
he did not behave like such” (Sarmiento, 2006b, 18:43). 
PRD condemned PAN’s “AMLO Dangerous for Mexico” negative media campaign 
against his presidential candidate financially paid by several business firms. The cause of the 
dirtiness to escalate lays in the long time that legal procedures take as PRI representative at IFE 
Felipe Solís Acero (2006) told Sergio Sarmiento at his television program La Entrevista that:  
IFE had the legal faculties to stop the dirty war [negative television advertisements], the 
problem was the timing. The legal procedures take time, these are not immediately done. 
In this case the Electoral Tribunal provided IFE with an express course of action to stop 
the television spots. (26:27).  
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As a consequence, in many instances the legal procedures became obsolete to prevent society 
from dividing because by the time a political party received IFE’s notification, the political spot 
was already taken  off of the airwaves.  
Another of those PRD challenges was the intervention of foreign citizens in the PAN 
campaign that violates the Mexican constitution. Calderón denied the accusation. However, on 
November 7, 2005, before the election year, reporter Raúl Tortolero interviewed Dick Morris. 
During their conversation, Morris described the PAN negative campaign strategy against AMLO 
from his viewpoint: “The PRD would be a disaster for Mexico, the country would go in the same 
direction as [Hugo] Chávez and [Fidel] Castro” (p. 1). In short, AMLO is a danger to Mexico. 
Furthermore, on March 9, 2007, after the election had passed, American political marketer Dick 
Morris went public about his direct intervention in Calderón’s campaign during an international 
forum held in Miami, Florida. The forum was attended by Mexican legislators, among them 
former IFE council member Jaime Cárdenas (2007), who told the Mexican press that he 
considered Morris’ confession an unambiguous reason to penalize PAN party for breaking the 
law (Gil Olmos, 2007a). Article 33 of the constitution prohibits the interference of any foreigner 
in internal political matters. PRD representative to IFE Horacio Durate (2007) commented to 
reporters that the Morris revelation is a proof of the violations committed by Calderón during the 
election campaign of 2006, and Morris’ participation showed that the Mexican state was 
subordinated to foreign interests (Gil Olmos, 2007a).  
TEPJF failed to produce an outcome that all presidential candidates, political parties, and 
voters considered socially reasonable. The highest electoral tribunal, which was founded 10 
years ago, had to face the history of fraud and uncertainty that Mexican citizens had been 
exposed to for many years. According to several law experts, the TEPJF ruling was well 
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executed. Director of the Law college of the Universidad Anáhuac del Sur, Salvador Nava 
(2006), told the press that the ruling was outstanding, that the tribunal acted according to the 
evidence that was presented to them in legal writing (Sarmiento, 2006c, 5:00). UNAM juridical 
researcher Pedro Salazar (2006) explained that tribunals gain people’s trust with the logic of 
explanations that they include in the ruling’s fine legal writing. The TEPJF ruling created a final 
point for the legal procedures. However, the problem was that it did not finalize the postelectoral 
conflict at the social level.  
Why did a segment of the population feel a sort of dissatisfaction with the TEPJF ruling? 
The answer is that it is a matter of points of views and social belief systems. For scholars who 
focus on political science, the ruling was acceptable. In contrast, for scholars who focus on social 
science, the ruling failed to calm down emotions and bring order to the postelectoral chaos. 
Lawyer Julio Scherer Ibarra (2007) argued that the very nature of the rule was puzzling.  
TEPJF’s stated a ruling report, not a jurisdictional sentence, meaning in judiciary terms 
the electoral process was not finalized properly. That is, the type of ruling did not fulfill 
the requirements that the constitution demands; therefore, Felipe Calderón has no 
legitimacy to function as president of Mexico. (p. 93)  
Journalist Jorge Alcocer (2006) believes that the TEPJF ruling was in accord with the 
constitution: that the court worked with the evidence presented to them, that if PRD presented its 
evidence wrong, it’s a different matter (Sarmiento, 2006d). Also, political science professor 
Benito Nacif (2006) argued that the problem arose from how PRD evidence was presented to the 
tribunal, because the electoral court cannot open the casillas (voting sites boxes) that are not part 
of the legal written evidence presented by PRD; therefore, the vote-by-vote request on the streets 
was not possible because it was not presented in writing to the tribunal (Sarmiento, 2006e).   
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As a sign of protest against IFE’s electoral tribunal ruling and president-elect Calderón, 
on November 20, 2006, a mass rally of AMLO supporters congregated at Mexico City’s Zócalo 
to elect PRD presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador as Mexico’s “legitimate 
president.” The country’s alternative president is head of a parallel government. The event was 
symbolic; it had no constitutional value. He has no executive power. However, for AMLO’s 
supporters who believe he was cheated, the event provided them a psychological hold-up. The 
López Obrador presidency has its own political agenda that includes the continuation of his 
peaceful civil resistance movement in opposition to Calderón’s government.  
During the event, AMLO introduced the collaborators of the legitimate government. 
Some of them are well-known politicians and intellectuals. A few days after the “legitimate 
president” came to power, PRD members went public, stating that they intended to disrupt the 
inauguration ceremony of Felipe Calderón. PRD representatives knew that the December 1st, 
2006, congressional session was crucial for Calderón’s rising to power. If the chamber failed to 
assemble the minimum attendance required by law, the Calderón inauguration had to be canceled 
and congress had to name an interim president. This is the second time in Mexican history that 
the Aztec nation has two presidents. Between 1914 and 1915, Mexico had two presidents: 
Eulalio Gutiérrez Ortíz elected during the Aguascalientes convention and Venustriano Carranza 
who did not recognize the Aguascalientes agreement and declared himself President of Mexico.  
PRD vs. PAN: The Failure to Achieve Legislative Agreement 
On November 28, 2006, just a few days before Calderón’s inauguration ceremony 
scheduled for December 1, 2006, PRD and PAN deputies were the protagonists of a battle to take 
control over their chamber’s main podium. The war started in the middle of a regular session, in 
front of several journalists who were present to cover the legislative session. All the conflict was 
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taped by journalists and later broadcasted nationwide via electronic newscasts and newspapers 
websites. 
That PAN/PRD physical battle begin at about 1:00PM during a regular congressional 
session when a group of PAN deputies—Nicolás Morales, Francisco Domínguez, and Gregorio 
Contreras—walked to the front of the chamber blocking the right stairway to the main chamber 
podium. Those stairs are located in front of the PRD deputy’s chamber chairs. At the same time, 
another group of PAN members located themselves in front of the PRD chamber chairs. PAN 
legislators were slowly taking over the right side access to the podium. Immediately, PRD 
deputy Susana Monreal, who was sitting in the main podium at the left-hand side of the speaker, 
requested him to order PAN legislators to go back to their chairs and clear the area near the 
podium. The Speaker of the House Jorge Zermeño-PAN did not pay attention to her request and 
continued the session. Jorge Zermeño’s lack of action provoked the battle. 
Approximately 15 minutes after Monreal’s request, PRD deputy Cuauthémoc Sandoval 
walked to the front podium to deliver a message to Monreal. He was intercepted by PAN Nicolás 
Morales who grabbed him by the tie and threw punches all over his body. Both representatives 
fell down the stairs, and Sandoval was received with kicks by PAN legislators who were 
standing at the end of the stairs converting the Chamber of Deputies into a wrestling arena. 
Almost instantly, members of the PAN and PRD deputies jumped out of their chairs and ran to 
help their fellow members.  
At that time, approximately 40 elements of the Estado Mayor Presidencial (EMP) 
(presidential military guard) appeared in the Chamber and began punching PRD deputies 
violating the constitution. As a result, several deputies were injured during the confrontation. 
Deputies were angry at Speaker of the House Jorge Zermeño-PAN, because it took him 30 
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minutes to declare a recess until 9:00PM. According to press, Zermeño’s delay to react seemed 
to be on purpose to give time to EMP to knock down PRD deputies. Zermeño reacted when he 
received a petition from PRD head of deputies Javier González Garza and PAN head of deputies 
Héctor Larios to end the session. Representatives of both parties took over the front podium of 
the Chamber with no intention of not moving until December 2, 2006.  
PAN deputy Xavier Maawad (2006) in an interview with the press declared that he was 
only following orders because at noon, he received the order to take control of the right access to 
the chamber’s podium, since it was a rumor that PRD deputies were planning to take control of 
the chamber that same day and we had to stop them (Cervantes, 2006b). In the chamber, PAN 
representatives had signs displaying the message, “No one above the constitution.” In response, 
PRD deputies and senators were holding signs with messages about “electoral fraud,” “vote by 
vote,” “no one knows who are they working for,” we are preventing Calderón from being sworn 
into office. Does PAN know that?” (Cervantes, 2006c). PRD legislators as well as their political 
party wanted the EMP out of the chamber. In a press conference held the same day, PRD general 
secretary Guadalupe Acosta Naranjo  (2006) protested against EMP, “What was the reason that 
EMP had to be present in Congress when neither the president nor the elected president was 
present? They had no one to protect” (Díaz, 2006a) According to PRD, the presidential military 
guard had no business in the Deputies chamber, and they were clearly violating the constitution. 
In contrast, PAN deputies were celebrating EMP intervention. PRI party president Mariano 
Palacios stated that both PAN and PRD with their behavior were hurting the dignity of political 
institutions. PRI would keep its distance because PRI would not contribute to extreme political 
division (Proal, 2006).  
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After approximately 8 hours of negotiation, the eight heads of the political parties have 
agreed on one item only: that was to take the press out of the chamber in an effort to minimize 
press coverage. The decision was rejected by members of the press who argued that they had 
nothing to do with the conflict that was provoked by the legislators, not journalists. By 9:44PM, 
no negotiation was reached between political party heads. PRD vice coordinator Juan N. Guerra 
(2006) explained that the only possible agreement that could take place is if PAN agrees to 
change the location of Calderón’s inauguration ceremony (Cervantes, 2006c). On the other hand, 
PAN deputy Manuel Minjarez (2006) affirmed that the change of location is not a solution to the 
conflict. He explained that in the event of agreeing more than likely, PRD would give notice of 
appeal to the National Supreme Court demanding Calderón illegitimacy for not being sworn in 
the legislative palace of San Lázaro where the deputies’ Chamber is located (Cervantes, 2006c). 
PAN senator Santiago Creel went further with his comments to the press by ensuring that no 
matter what happens, what political price they must pay, Calderón would be sworn in the 
Chamber (Proceso, 2006b). Deputies and journalists spent the night in the Deputies chamber. 
Legislators discussed the matter for 3 nights and 4 days. During that period of time, PAN and 
PRD representatives never left the chamber A point of agreement between all political party 
heads regarding the Calderón inauguration ceremony was never reached. Simply, legislators ran 
out of time.  
The Regression to an Authoritarian Media Regime 
On December 1, 2006, about 2 months after Felipe Calderón was declared winner of the 2006 
election, his inauguration ceremony was scheduled. Nevertheless, elected president Calderón 
was the protagonist of an embarrassing inauguration ceremony. During the early hours of the 
morning of December 1, 2006, most of the PAN and PRD representatives and senators were 
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situated in the front of the chamber. The two principal doors, located in the back of the chamber, 
which lead into the chamber, were locked from the inside with a barricade of chairs constructed 
by PRD representatives. In addition, in the front, the left door, which is located close to the 
central podium, was also in the possession of the PRD representatives. In contrast, PAN 
representatives were guarding the right back door located behind the flags very close to the 
chamber’s upper-level podium; but on the other side of that door in the outside of the Chamber, 
PRD senators constructed a barricade to prevent Felipe Calderón and President Vicente Fox from 
entering the Chamber. Commanding this front was PRD senator Carlos Navarrete (2006), who 
spoke over the phone with Calos Loret de Mola, main anchor of Televisa’s morning newscast 
Primero Noticias, “Our strategy is [was] to prevent legislators form entering the Chamber to 
provoke enough assistance at the time when the secretary of the Chamber is [was] taking 
attendance that will result in the cancellation of the session” (Loret de Mola, 2006a, 8:32). PRD 
legislators believed that their strategy had possibilities to be successful “because there is [was] an 
agreement in congress between political parties that the EMP would not interfere in this matter, 
only the 628 legislators” (Loret de Mola, 2006a, 8:35). Navarrete hoped that the legislative 
agreement would be honored. 
What no one in Mexico could imagine that morning was that the EMP was going to take 
a role in the PAN/PRD conflict. EMP using military practices took over by force the Chamber of 
Deputies, violating the Mexican constitution. This action represented an act of oppression; 
basically, the executive branch captured by force the legislative branch of government. EMP 
military has permission to carry and use weapons. In minutes, EMP destroyed the barricade that 
PRD senators had in place, initiating a confrontation with them, overlooking the senators’ 
constitutional juridical protection investiture. PRI senators, Fox, and Calderón used this back 
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door to access the chamber. The fact that they chose to enter the assembly room from the back, 
instead of entering in the front with pride and legitimacy like Fox did during his inauguration 
ceremony, minimized the glamour of the ceremony and clearly showed Calderón’s lack of ability 
to communicate with congress. 
EMP members dressed in black suits and red ties, not in their usual military uniform, 
formed a human wall around Calderón and Fox. In the middle of a complete disorder and lack of 
respect to both governmental branches, in an express ceremony—about 2:00 minutes long—
Calderón swore as President of Mexico. However, such a fast track ceremony had to skip some 
protocols, such as traditionally the elected president wears the presidential band around his chest 
at the moment when he swears to serve the country. Nevertheless, Calderón swore without 
wearing the band. He placed the band on his body afterwards. Also, protocol dictates that the 
speaker of the chamber is the person in charge of putting the band on the elected president, not 
the president himself. Fox was ready to place the band on Calderón, clearly breaking the 
tradition, when someone had to remind him of the protocol; and he passed the band to Zermeño. 
The event turned out to be a complete political chaos that created an even stronger political 
polarization.  
PAN senator Santiago Creel (2006) declared to Primero Noticias in a television interview 
that the disagreement was a matter of a simple fight: “The confrontation in the Chamber of the 
Deputies could be understood as the force of reason [PAN] vs. the physical force [PRD]” (Loret 
de Mola, 2006a, 8:32). On top of the severe questions raised during the postelectoral conflict 
about the whole electoral process as well as Calderón’s victory, the way in which the 
inauguration ceremony was handled by Fox and Calderón increased the perception of Calderón’s 
lack of political leadership among Mexicans. Far from adopting a conciliatory attitude by 
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beginning his presidential period by negotiating with opposition parties and bringing calm to the 
country, Calderón chose to send a verbal and nonverbal treating message to the opposition 
parties during his inauguration speech. Calderón approached the podium with a body language 
showing a cynical attitude. President Calderón’s first words were: “Si se puede!, Sí se pudo!” 
(We did it!).  
For some members of the audience, farther from being a victory phrase, it sounded like 
Calderón was making fun of PRD representatives and senators on their defeat in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Once again on the same day, instead of uniting political forces to work for Mexico’s 
advantage, Calderón was causing political polarization. In the past, the inauguration speech was 
traditionally held at the Chamber of Deputies, but the location of the event had to be changed 
because of the political turmoil in the Chamber. Calderón delivered his speech in front of an 
audience that consisted of mainly PAN members, international visitors, and his family. In this 
setting, Calderón showed a body language that portrayed him a bit more relaxed and happy than 
in the Chamber. Nevertheless, Felipe Calderón repeaded a previous speech at 0:10 AM of 
December 1, 2006, from Los Pinos, broadcasted nationwide in his first message to the nation, 
Calderón told Mexicans that “December 1 should mark the end of a political conflict and start a 
new phase of political relationship with the aim of putting national interest before political 
parties differences” (Calderón, 2006, 0:10). Calderón’s inauguration ceremony was witnessed 
first hand by members of the national and international media as well as several presidents from 
other countries and international personalities who experienced first hand the Congress’ chaotic 
situation.  
The press office of the presidency told the Mexican media to broadcast at 9:40 AM their 
official program for the event. The Centro de Producciones de Radio y Televisión de la 
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Presidencia de la República, a branch of the president’s press office, was in charge of the 
production. A male (Sergio) and female (Diane Pérez) host were constantly telling their audience 
about congress’ peaceful political context, Calderón’s “clean hands” anticorruption politician, 
showing images of Fox’s and Calderón cars approaching Congress. At one point, the 
transmission was interrupted; and without previous announcement, cameras showed a medium 
shot of Calderón and Fox inside the chamber at the upper main podium. The press office also 
controlled the sound; only the main microphone was open in an effort to avoid the chamber 
natural sound of the moment. The other cameras located inside the congress concentrated their 
shots on PAN legislators clapping for Calderón. Obviously, the office of the president program 
was a public relations demonstration with the purpose of favoring Calderón’s images. However, 
their information did not correspond to the facts that the media was reporting on moments before 
their program started.  
In terms of the relationship between the media and presidential candidates, each electoral 
process represents the opportunity for the continuation or change of the current relationship 
between the current president and the media. One of the strongest questions after Calderón’s 
victory was his plan to relate to the media. The relationship became evident to Mexicans when 
the office of the press of the president produced the special program to report on Calderón’s 
inauguration ceremony. That is, the relationship between the media and the Calderón presidency 
followed the same pattern as they did during the PRI presidencies. This means that Calderón did 
not continue Fox’s relationship with the media. Under Calderón’s presidency, his press office 
controls: photo, video image, sound, and website (http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/en/). 
However, the next six years will make evident the level of censorship imposed by the Calderón 
presidency to the media. One of the most evident differences between the media and PAN 
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presidents is in terms of their way to explain Mexican reality to the media. Fox’s imaginative 
community Foxilandía was created by him in his mind with the marketing technique of 
constantly repeating the same information over and over about Mexico’s situation. In contrast, 
Calderolandía is created by the press office of the president—which operates as a public 
relations agency—not by the president Calderón himself, imitating PRI presidencies relationship 
with the media.  
Furthermore, on that same date, December 1, 2006, a congregation of 100,000 persons at 
Zócalo went to the streets to walk with Andrés Manuel López Obrador to Congress in protest of 
Calderón’s inauguration. Very few national media outlets reported on the event, following the 
president press office’s suggestion. However, the international media, such as Univision’s 
journalist Jorge Ramos (2006), presented in his report an interview about how Mexican citizens 
feel about their national media. For example, Pedro Gómez (2006) a peasant who participated in 
AMLO protest, commented, “Television does not inform Mexicans; on the contrary they 
misinform. They [television] do not cover all the events like this one” (Ramos, 2006b, 4:44). 
Ramos reported that Mexico was a divided country with a new president who was capable of 
being sworn by force by taking over the congress. But he fulfilled a constitutional obligation. 
Sadly, Mexican media reputation among its consumers diminished going back six years to the 
old belief that media only informs what the president and the attorney general office let them 
report—that is, a censorship of media that was a standard procedure under the PRI presidencies. 
Nevertheless, some of the very few national media outlets that reported on AMLO’s protest 
march were Proceso, La Jornada, and Televisa.  
Once again, the media served as a common ground for politicians to discuss their 
different points of view. Late at night on December 1, 2006, after 68 hours of political conflict, 
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Televisa’s main news anchor Joaquín López Dóriga hosted and produced a special one-time 
discussion program Mesa Cambio de Poderes with the major political party leaders of both 
chambers of Congress. As the journalist mentioned in the opening of the show, his purpose was 
to provide a space for legislators to dialogue for the first time after the confrontation early on that 
same date. Televisa made history by providing the space for political parties to discuss important 
national matters. In the past, Televisa operated under a close policy where only the PRI had 
access to their newscast and their news programming. Each one of the legislators had the 
opportunity to express his or her viewpoint of recent events.  
PAN head in the chamber of deputies Héctor Larios (2006) shared his comments about 
Calderón’s inauguration ceremony; for him, the positive aspect was that Calderón was able to 
fulfill a constitutional requirement, and the negative for him was the high degree of violence and 
excess use of force. “The PRD violated the constitution with their behavior in the chamber and 
the PRI proposal to change location of the event was not useful because the PRD threat persisted 
wherever the event was going to take place” (López Dóriga, 2006b, 24:18). However, PRD head 
of the deputies Javier Gónzalez Garza (2006) replied to Larios that his political party did not 
break the constitution, that the insulted was his party; all they wanted was a vote recount.  
What happened in the chamber was a military occupation by the Estado Mayor 
Presidencial from the executive to the legislative; it was a political failure, because there 
were legislative agreements on the table to work out a peaceful inauguration ceremony, 
but PAN rejected it. (López Dóriga, 2006b. 12:32)  
Gónzalez Garza explained that what he and his follower PRD legislators did in the chamber was 
a pacific protest of an offense situation. PRI head of the deputies Emilio Gamboa Patrón (2006) 
also believed that the legislative political chaos was the indication of political failure: the 
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negotiation efforts failed. “It was a violent inauguration that harmed Mexico’s institutions and I 
hope not to see something like this again. Vicente Fox damaged Mexico, they [PAN] do not 
understand the political conditions under which Fox is ending his presidency that lead to 
violence in congress and in the streets ” (López Dóriga, 2006b, 4:45). 
The representative of the PAN party in the senate Santiago Creel commented that 
December 1 is to him the most difficult day of the political calendar of 2006. “The cause of this 
political dispute is [was] that we [PAN] feel when they [PRD] told the president that he is not 
legitimate. We cannot longer keep to an offence of the past [post electoral conflict]; we must 
look forward” (López Dóriga, 2006b, 15:13). The head of the PRD senators Carlos Navarrete 
(2006) also believed that December 1 represents the highest point of the political crises since 
July 2 of the same year.  
The institutions that maintained Mexico political stability for a long time were destroyed, 
I see a weak president [Calderón], a president of the minorities, a president questioned by 
a great number of society members [about his legitimacy] who decided to confuse 
congress and make his entry act to congress a sort of test which I cannot understand. 
(López Dóriga, 2006b, 5:52)  
PRI head in the Senate Manlio Fablio Beltrones commented that his party participated in 
the inauguration ceremony to support the electoral tribunal ruling. Nevertheless, to him the 
ceremony was an act of violence and an unpleasant experience, “It [the ceremony] represented 
the highest point of the political crisis after July 2, and I believe that we entered a new phase of 
political crisis” (López Dóriga, 2006b, 9:16). Fablio Beltrones expressed that there were other 
options to proceed to observe the constitution. He insisted, “Violence was present for a series of 
dissatisfactions that existed [in relation to the 2006 election process]” (López Dóriga, 2006b, 
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20:19). On a separate interview, PRI senator Jesús Murillo (2006) declared to the press that all 
this confrontation could be avoided. This unresolved discord “presented evidence of lack of 
reasoning, lack of intelligence, lack of political negotiation which indicated that the PRI senators 
proposal [change of location] was the correct way to avoid this conflict, because it was observing 
the law” (Loret de Mola, 2006a, 9:00). A violent inauguration ceremony, an unfortunate event, 
marked the initiation of the Calderón presidency: a president who had experienced difficulties to 
establish his political leadership in Mexico. 
As a result of the inauguration ceremony political chaos, a political advertising campaign 
in the media was initiated by the federal government. Calderón launched a political 
advertisement campaign in electronic media to expose himself as the new Mexican president. 
According to journalist Daniel Lizárraga (2007), Calderón required 39 days and 4 million pesos 
to make Mexicans believe that he was the new president. He contracted several businesses that 
specialize in public image, and public opinion surveys to design and produce his political 
marketing campaign that included several television spots that aired 75 times a day every day on 
national television networks. The invoice of those communication companies was paid with tax 
money. The Brazilian company who specializes in audience measurement, IBOPE, reported that 
from December 1, 2006 to June 24, 2007, the government aired 19,591 political spots in the 
electronic media (Etcétera, 2007b, p. 1). PRI deputy Emilio Gamboa Patrón (2006) commented 
in a television interview that Calderón should stop spending money on the mass media to pay for 
his political spots; he should use those monetary resources for education, health care, and 
housing that are in social programs to combat poverty (López Doriga 2006a). In addition, from 
the senate chamber podium, PRD deputy Andrés Lozano (2007) argued that Congress should put 
requirements and limits to government political advertising, it must stop the punishment and 
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prize system that operates for the media’s coverage of events. Calderón projected for the year 
2007 a political advertising expense of 3.7 million pesos (Etcétera, 2007b). Calderón paid no 
attention to Gamboa Patrón or Lozano’s comments by continuing his political advertising 
campaign until the polls showed a favorable result.  
Purpose of the Study 
The political crisis obliges us to take a hard look into the presidential campaign period to find out 
the political communication dynamic of each presidential candidate that led to a postelectoral 
day confrontation. This dissertation proposes to measure the intermedia agenda-setting effect 
between Mexico’s main national television networks—Televisa and TV Azteca—and political 
television advertising that was produced by the three major presidential candidates and their 
political party. Intermedia agenda-setting effects are understood as the dynamic process in which 
elite media strongly influence the agenda of other media outlets by suggesting which topics are 
important to cover (McCombs, 2004). News organizations have a practice of reading, listening, 
and viewing other media outlets to compare news coverage of events, topics, and breaking news 
covered by other news organizations. They also gain a sense of validation for their news 
judgment. There is also the question of the relationship between the news agenda and the 
political advertising agenda. Who influences whom? Consequently, intermedia agenda-setting 
seeks to determine which medium garners an elite position among all media.  
The research focused on a constructed week sample of two Mexican television newscasts: 
Televisa’s El Noticiero con Joaquín López Dóriga that aired from 10:30 to 11:15PM (Central 
Mexican Time) on Channel 2, and TV Azteca’s Hechos de la Noche that aired at the same time 
on Channel 7. Both newscasts were broadcast nationwide from Monday to Friday. In addition, 
there was a census of all the political spots that the three main presidential candidates aired on 
  38
Televisa and TV Azteca during the official IFE campaign period.This data set consisted of a total 
of 97 television political spots, including Felipe Calderón-PAN (55 political ads), Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)-PRD (27 political ads), and Roberto Madrazo-PRI (16 political 
ads).  
The research is presented in eight chapters: Chapter 2 presents the literature review of 
media, democracy, and agenda-setting theory with the purpose of explaining the role of 
television media and political advertising during the 2006 election. Chapter 3 presents the 2007 
electoral reform, which addressed a new role for the media during electoral periods. The 
problems that arose from the 2006 presidential elections in Mexico led to conflict between 
political parties, voters, media owners, and political analysts, and illuminated the need for 
immediate review of the electoral law. Chapter 4 presents an overview of the political 
communication strategy of several presidential candidates and other key political figures. 
Chapter 5 features the political communication innovations of the 2006 election, such as the 
political entertainment of the telenovela El Privilegio de Mandar, Lety, la Fea más Bella, and the 
comic show ¡Que Madre, tan Padre!. Chapter 6 presents a brief historical overview of the 
Electoral Law from 1824 to 2000. In Chapter 7, the content analysis methodology, research 
questions, and methodology of the data analysis for each of the research questions is presented. 
Chapter 8 presents the results of the intermedia agenda-setting effects between television news 
and political advertising; this chapter answered the key question: “Who set the agenda during the 
2006 election: news or political advertising?” Chapter 9 presents the discussion and 
recommendations about the impact of election news, general news, and political advertising 
during the 2006 election as a case study and in the democratic process. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical connections among the four perspectives that inform this 
study of the intermedia agenda-setting effect between national television news and television 
political advertisements during the 2006 Mexican presidential election. The chapter begins with 
a review of the relationship between political marketing and the globalization phenomenon 
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stating that the principal tool of the global economic system is advertising. As a consequence, 
political marketing is the most popular political communication element in the current Mexican 
political context. The second section discusses media democracy theory of how current media 
practices shift from being the fourth power in society to the number one power. The third section 
explores how agenda-setting theory is ideal to measure the political marketing effect because this 
theory takes into consideration the major characteristics of political marketing, which are public 
opinion polls, campaign messages, news content, political advertisements, and entertainment 
politics, among others. The final section presents a brief history of the contemporary television 
era and its electoral coverage. 
Agenda-Setting Theory 
Agenda-setting theory is ideal to measure political marketing effects because this theory takes 
into consideration the major characteristics of political marketing, which are public opinion 
polls, campaign messages, news content, political advertisements, and entertainment politics, 
among others. Agenda-setting theory is a cognitive theory that considers that the main aim of the 
media is to inform the public of events that are usually out of their touch. There is little doubt 
that people rely on these media agendas for information about their social and political 
environment. McCombs (2004) elaborated, "For nearly all of the concerns on the public agenda, 
citizens deal with a second-hand reality, a reality that is structured by journalists' reports about 
these events and situations" (p. 1). Nonetheless, "The media [do] not reflect reality [fully], but 
select certain aspects for coverage. They cover some stories and ignore others, giving greater 
attention to some issues rather than to others, and decide how to interpret and frame the issues 
that they cover" (Perloff, 1998, p. 210). Likewise, Weaver (1982) argued that the press filters 
and shapes reality the same way that a kaleidoscope filters and shapes light (p. 528). 
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Every society has numerous public issues and problems to address at any point in time. 
However, it is impossible for members of a society to act upon or even to acknowledge all of its 
concerns at once. This raises the question of how particular public issues come to be known and 
to capture society’s attention. Agenda-setting theory serves as a framework to discuss the 
attention that the media give to public issues at a particular time. The value of this theory is that 
it addresses how various social sectors, and the media in particular, make known and prioritize 
public issues (McCombs & Shaw, 1972).   
According to McCombs (2004), "Agenda-setting theory evolved from a description and 
explanation of the influence that mass communication has on public opinion about the issues of 
the day" (p. xii). As Severin and Tankard (2001) indicated, the media shape what is news on a 
particular time and date, and thus establish a public issue’s priority by the presentation of what is 
deemed the most important problem that a city, state, or nation is facing. Concomitantly, the 
absence of coverage is also significant by building a particular silent agenda. Overall, agenda-
setting theory works around the idea that the media don’t tell people what to think, but instead 
they do tell the public what to think about (Cohen, 1963). The core of agenda-setting theory 
establishes that "the media agenda influences the public agenda with the competing causal 
hypothesis that the public agenda influences the media agenda" (McCombs, 2004, p. 10). 
Agenda-setting theory encourages the careful examination of the process whereby public 
issues are discussed by the media in a specific order of relevance, according to their perceived 
significance, albeit the order of significance will change over time. McCombs (2004) explains 
that "for all news media, the repetition of a topic day after day is the most powerful message of 
all about its importance" (p. 2). It thus becomes useful for this line of research to identify who 
sets the media’s agenda during a particular period of time, such as a presidential campaign.  
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Intermedia agenda-setting effects are understood as the dynamic process in which elite 
media strongly influence the agenda of other media outlets by suggesting which topics are 
important to cover (McCombs, 2004). News organizations have a practice of reading, listening, 
and viewing other media outlets to compare news coverage of events, topics, and breaking news 
covered by other news organizations. By comparing news coverage, news organizations ensure 
comprehensive coverage of important as well as mundane news events. They gain also a sense of 
validation for their news judgment. Opinion leader media are those outlets that journalists 
consider of high prestige and use as a source of information. Those opinion leaders’ newspapers 
set a chain reaction in the media system (Noelle-Newman & Mathes, 1987). Consequently, 
intermedia agenda-setting seeks to determine which media garners an elite position among all 
media. Breed (1955) investigated why the daily newspapers’ content was so similar. His results 
indicated that small newspapers seek guidance from larger dailies and wire services. Likewise, 
Dimmick and Coit (1982) pointed out that the leaders of the media industry influence other 
media outlets news agenda decisions. A key question in the intermedia agenda-setting 
assessment is, “Who sets the media’s agenda?” McCombs (2004) stated that there are three 
possible answers to this question: first, journalistic news norms; second, other news media 
outlets; and third, external news sources.  
Previous research presents strong evidence of a high degree of homogeneity in the 
national media agenda. This pattern holds worldwide both in an election and nonelection setting, 
as indicated in several studies, such as the original Chapel Hill study which presented a mix of 
nine local and national news media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972); across the Atlantic in Spain 
where local newspapers and television during a municipal election presented a very similar 
agenda (López-Escobar, Llamas, McCombs, & Lennon, 1998); and in Japan, during an 
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nonelection setting where two major national newspapers presented a parallel agenda to their 
readers (Takeshita, 2002). These similarities of agenda do cause a greater effect as Lasorsa 
(1999) explained: “The more unified the media products are in creating the agenda across the 
community, the greater we should expect agenda-setting effects to be across the community” (p. 
164). Following this logic of agenda-setting effects, as a consequence, the audience should 
perceive the same list of issues to be their nation’s top priorities.  
This selection process of deciding which public issues are most important is how the 
media agenda develops. Fundamentally, the media act as gatekeepers, presenting a list of topics 
that they believe are the top priority for citizens. It is those topics that usually receive more 
coverage over a certain period of time. As Perloff (1998) suggested, "The news [does] not inject 
viewers with perspectives; [they suggest] that certain issues are more important than others, and 
people (some more than others) come to accept these interpretations and adjust their political 
priorities accordingly" (p. 219). This characteristic of the mass media helps shape public 
impressions and opinions regarding a specific public issue. Lasorsa (1997) defined media 
agenda-setting as a sociological process (how the media operates) that incorporates a 
psychological subprocess (how media producers and consumers process information), and this 
“psychological subprocess needs to be taken into account when trying to explain how the media 
agenda and the public agenda are created in a society, and how one influences the other” (p. 
156).  
The dependent variable in intermedia agenda-setting studies is the mass media news 
agenda (Rogers & Dearing, 1988). First, some research suggested that journalists’ individual 
political attitudes, values, and opinions play a role in determining the content of their report 
(Fiegel & Chaffee, 1971; Noelle-Neumann & Mathes, 1987; Snider, 1967; Warner, 1970; White, 
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1950; Whitlow, 1977). However, Weaver (1982) suggested that the journalists’ personal 
preferences are far from the sole determinants in this process. Other crucial factors that 
journalists take into account are the degree pf conflict; the importance of the event; and the 
cultural, physical, or psychological proximity with their audience (Galtung & Ruge, 1965; 
Schulz, 1976).  
Second, Breed (1955) and Brown (1979) argued that social controls influence the news 
selection process of the media. Their assumption was particularly accurate for the Mexican 
television news situation at its beginnings, especially during the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre event. 
During this time, the government censured Telesistema Mexicano news content. At the news 
organization level, there are executive and technical pressures on news editors that could 
determine the selection of events to cover (Robinson, 1973). Third, other research suggests that 
those companies and corporations that finance media organizations do affect media news content 
(Carroll, 1989; Donohew, 1967; Shoemaker, 1987; Warner 1971). Fourth, other studies propose 
that the media’s agenda is set by policy makers and the public (Berkowitz, 1987; Harmon, 1989; 
Lasorsa & Reese, 1990; Smith, 1979; Soloski, 1987).  
The aim of this research is to investigate the interplay between Televisa, TV Azteca, and 
the presidential candidates’ television political advertising throughout the 2006 election. This 
investigation examines which television outlet or candidate political spot campaign set the 
media’s agenda.  
There is evidence of the important role of intermedia agenda-setting in the 
communication dynamic among newspapers outlets. Gilbert, Eyal, McCombs, and Nicholas 
(1980) found that a single newspaper in the United States —The New York Times— frequently 
sets the media agenda for other dailies across the nation. This intermedia agenda-setting effect 
  45
can also be observed in research on a single issue. Breen (1997) investigated the media treatment 
of a socially deviant act—child sexual abuse— by members of the Catholic clergy between 1991 
and 1995. His research looked at the newspapers’ handling of the clergy in stories not directly 
connected to the child sexual abuse accusations against former Priest James Porter and Cardinal 
Joseph Bernardin. His findings indicated a strong intermedia agenda-setting effect of the 
negative events: “It appears that the media also create a significant slant on news according to 
their own schema” (Breen, p. 354). 
Du (2007) studied international intermedia influence by comparing the media agendas of 
newspapers across 11 countries. He found evidence of global intermedia influence; his 
hypothesis was supported in 20 of the 55 sets of comparisons. The highest significant correlation 
was between Canada and Argentina as well as Argentina and Australia. Nevertheless, Mexico’s 
media agenda was not associated with any other nation. Furthermore, there also is some evidence 
of the applicability of this theory in an intercultural context. Flores and McCombs (2007), who 
explored the intermedia agenda-setting effect between ethnic media outlets—Univision and 
Telemundo—during the 2004 U.S. presidential election, stated, “Ethnic voters and ethnic media 
have a particular set of public issues that creates a specific agenda, which is based on their 
system of beliefs” (p. 363). Their results indicated a strong correlation between the agendas of 
both television networks. This finding exemplifies Miller and Wanta (1996) proposal that ethnic 
media could create their own media agenda. 
Intermedia agenda-setting effect also can occur in a horizontal connection between 
different types of media outlets such as print and television. Protess and McCombs (1991) found 
that the directional influence of elite newspapers’ influence over local newspapers was present. 
Furthermore, the intermedia agenda-setting effect of elite newspapers affected local television as 
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well. Reese and Danielian (1989) observed the intermedia agenda-setting effect between The 
New York Times and television newscasts on a single issue, drugs, and found that newspaper 
influence on television coverage.  
During the 1976 U.S. election, a group of communication researchers—Weaver, Graber, 
McCombs, and Eyal— measured the media (newspapers—The Valley News, The Chicago 
Tribune, The News, and The Star—and TV —NBC, CBS, and ABC) agenda-setting effect for a 
full electoral year in cities in New Hampshire, Indiana, and Illinois. Their findings indicated that 
“media agenda-setting varies according to the time of the campaign, the kind of news medium 
being considered, the nature of the issues, and the orientation and characteristics of the voters” 
(Weaver, 1982, p. 540). In addition, these researchers found that the media agenda was strongly 
influenced by newspapers and followed by television networks, which in turn significantly 
influenced the voter’s agenda. This “two-step flow” of communication went from newspapers, to 
television, to voters. 
Noelle-Neumann & Mathes (1987) reported some important additional findings from the 
Halloran, Elliott, and Murdock (1970) study on how different media outlets covered a protest 
march against the Vietnam War in London, England. The authors’ results show that two prestige 
daily British papers—The Times and The Guardian—set the agenda for the other newspapers. In 
addition, those newspapers set the attribute agenda (particular aspects of the issue or event) 
emphasized in subsequent coverage. Furthermore, newspapers also set the newscasts’ (BBC and 
ITN) agenda: “When television began its coverage of the demonstration, it adapted the ‘image 
‘of the event which the press had established beforehand.” (Noelle-Newmann & Mathes, 1987, 
p. 401).  
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For many years, researchers have attempted to comprehend the social aspects that shape 
the media’s agenda. Golan (2006) assessed the interplay between The New York Times and three 
national television evening newscasts—ABC, NBC, and CBS—focusing on their international 
news agenda. His research period was from 1995 to 2000. Although international coverage of all 
three media outlets came from a limited number (15) of nations, his results indicated that 
television shaped their international news agenda after the newspaper. The author indicated that 
perhaps production time could play a role in the intermedia agenda-setting effect by the fact that 
the newspaper is published in the morning, and the newscasts aired in the evening. 
Directional influence of intermedia agenda-setting effects also can be found between the 
media and political advertisements. Bowers (1977) explored the relationship between political 
advertisements and election news in the 1976 U.S. election. He compared President Richard 
Nixon’s and Senator George McGovern’s political advertisement issue agenda with the 
newspaper and national TV news agendas. Bowers reported a low correlation for political ads 
and television news. Bowers stated, “a critical political communication characteristic for ads is 
that the political candidate has direct control over the content of his/her advertising messages, 
contrary to news media, where candidates have at best indirect control, hoping that their 
campaign activities will be reported in the news” (1977, p. 54).  
Roberts and McCombs (1994) examined the intermedia agenda-setting effect during the 
1990 Texas gubernatorial campaign between a local newspaper—Austin American Stateman—
and local television news—Austin, Texas affiliates: CBS-KTBC, ABC-KVUE, and NBC-
KXAN—and candidates—Republican Clayton Williams and Democrat Ann Richards—political 
advertisements. Their findings indicated that the impact of televised political advertisements on 
the television news agenda and newspaper agenda was significant, but stronger on the 
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newspaper. In this particular case, the claim that political advertisments can set the news agenda 
made by political marketing consultants was supported by the cross-lagged correlation analysis.  
A similar pattern was found during the 1995 Spanish election by López-Escobar, Llamas, 
McCombs, & Lennon (1998), who investigated the correspondence between the news media and 
political advertisements. This study found that political advertising strongly influenced the 
agenda of newspapers and television networks in regards to the candidates’ attributes. In 
contrast, McCombs & Min (2006) explored the attribute agenda represented in Democratic 
candidates’ ads (Dan Morales and Tony Sanchez) and media election coverage (one newspaper 
and four local television newscasts) during the 2002 primary gubernatorial election in Texas. The 
results indicated that the intermedia agenda-setting effect flows from the newspaper to television 
newscasts and from the media to political ads. Boyle (2001) examined the intermedia agenda-
setting effect between newspapers, television newscasts, and political advertisements during the 
1996 U.S. presidential election. His findings suggested that political advertisements influenced 
the newspaper and television news agendas.  
Chang (2007) compared the intermedia agenda-setting effect in two Taiwan presidential 
elections. His cross-lagged examination of the 1996 and 2004 Taiwan elections point out that the 
candidate-initiated agenda (press releases, press briefings, speeches, ads, campaign rallies) had a 
strong influence on the journalist-initiated agenda (China Times, United Daily News, Liberty 
Times): “The influence of the ad agenda might operate in two ways . . . first, without much 
awareness, reporters are sensitized to issues discussed in campaign ads. Second, reporters try to 
present campaign information to readers by covering issues discussed in campaign ads” (Chang, 
p. 5).  
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Intermedia agenda-setting effects can also occur between traditional and new media 
outlets. Lee (2004) studied the intermedia agenda-setting effect between traditional and online 
newspapers. His results pointed out that traditional newspapers influence online newspapers. 
Lee, Lancendorfer, and Lee (2005) investigated the flow of communication in the 2000 South 
Korean election between newspapers and internet bulletin boards. The authors found a reciprocal 
intermedia agenda-setting effect in issues and candidates’ attributes. Lim (2006) examined the 
causal relationship between the issue agenda of two online newspapers—Chosun Ilbo and 
JoongAng Ilbo—and one online wire news service—Yonhap News Agency. In print, the Chosun 
Ilbo is the largest newspaper of the country. His results indicated that online newspapers strongly 
influence the issue agenda for the online wire news service. 
In a more recent study on how news media content influences other media products, 
Sweetser, Golan, and Wanta (2008) examined the 2004 U.S. presidential election (John F. Kerry-
D and George W. Bush-R) focusing on the direction of influence between political 
advertisements, candidates’ blogs, and major television news networks. The innovation of this 
election was that political campaigns introduced blogs into their candidate’s Web site: 
“Campaigns positioned blogs as a direct link to campaign headquarters where supporters or 
interested parties could find out the most up-to-date information about what was going on with 
the campaign” (Sweetser et al., p. 200). The authors’ cross-lag analyses denote that the television 
news media strongly influence the candidates’ agenda.  
Moreover, during this same election Tedesco (2005) studied the influence between 
newspapers and a presidential candidate’s agenda, finding a “two step flow” that started with the 
Republican presidential candidate’s agenda moving over to the newspapers’ agenda and then to 
the Democratic candidate’s agenda. In short, the intermedia agenda-setting effect was from 
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Bush’s agenda to dailies to Kerry’s agenda. This study confirmed once again the assertion that 
the U.S. president, government officials, and powerful businesses are strong agenda setters 
(Gilbert, Eyal, McCombs, & Nicholas, 1980; Wanta, 1991; Wanta & Foote, 1994; Beinhoff, 
1995). 
The classic intermedia agenda-setting question—Who sets the media agenda?—will be 
answered in this dissertation research from three different perspectives:  News Norms, Other 
news media, and News sources. The Other news media section will include the advertising 
analysis. These perspectives will allow the researcher to analyze in depth the intermedia agenda-
setting effects during the 2006 Mexican election. The research project will focus on the two main 
television networks, Televisa and TV Azteca. The research project has two main goals: first, to 
contribute to the internationalization of the agenda-setting theory. That is, to expand the 
observation and measurement of agenda-setting effects beyond the U.S. context. The 
internationalization of agenda-setting theory will allow us to encounter new political, social, and 
cultural dynamics that will offer specific and unique situations to study and extend the theory. In 
this case, this study will analyze the communication dynamics of the 2006 Mexican presidential 
election. Second, the contribution of the project to the agenda-setting body of research is the 
opportunity to conduct research on the intermedia relationship among news and advertising. 
Traditional intermedia studies have focused mainly on news.  
In addition, this paper analyzed which one of the presidential candidates was the media’s 
leader, the type of opinion leader called caudillo. In Mexican modern politics, a presidential 
candidate’s personal leadership attributes are a fundamental fact to voters because a candidate’s 
charisma is more significant than loyalty to a particular political party. Voters have the tendency 
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to favor candidates who possess the personal characteristic of strongman/public opinion 
leader/caudillo.  
Political Marketing as a Global Phenomenon 
Globalization is an expansion of capitalism—not only industrial, but mainly financial—that 
involves consumers, the economy, advertising, and concentration of media ownership (Herman 
& McChesney, 1996). Obviously, the business/economic component is about establishing 
economic blocks and standardizing business procedures and criteria to conduct business among 
countries in order to make commercial exchange easier and faster. Capitalism is a homogenizing 
practice that encourages a consumer-focused society (Tomlinson, 1991). All of these changes in 
business dealings are ultimately creating a new type of consumer around the world: the neo-
consumer, people who can consume the same things anywhere on the globe. Globalization can 
be understood as a series of modifications in international economic practice that tend to create a 
single world market (Berger, 2000). Today’s world is experiencing a sort of commercial 
evangelization through the electronic media. Television is the main instrument of the new “neo-
consumer” mentality. The new world citizen is a person who can consume any product produced 
by the global supermarket (Esteinou Madrid, 2002). 
The neoliberal economy has transformed the identity of the Aztec nation. The social 
focus has shifted from collective to individualistic goals; money is the base for social reward as 
well as recognition and efficiency as the main human characteristic. The globalization dynamic 
involves drastic changes in economy, culture, symbolic products, and lifestyle. In terms of 
politics, the globalization era has demonstrated a tendency to shift political ideology to the right, 
also known as neoliberalism. According to communication scholar Enrique Sánchez Ruiz 
(2000), we are living in a time when the neoliberal ideology has transformed everything, all our 
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social world—economy, culture, politics—into merchandise. For Mexico, the neoliberal 
economic model marked the end of a paternalist government. The economic practices rapidly 
change from a national protectionist policy to an open international competition. This change 
implied less government participation in the economic transitions and the implementation of high 
technology during the economic transactions. Neoliberal Mexico pretends to homogenize all 
cultural manifestations, such as food, traditions, music, dance, fashion, and values, among other 
things (Esteinou Madrid, 2002). 
The other key component of globalization is the rise of global media culture. A member 
of the Frankfurt school, Theodore Adorno (1957), came up with the expression “cultural 
industry.” He argued that the industrialization of culture is harmful, because the mass production 
of art lowers its value and destroys elite culture. Adorno believed that a piece of art should be an 
original in order to retain its magnificence, value, and uniqueness. The term culture industry 
represents a critical position against the massive manufacturing of culture typical of the capitalist 
system. Like Adorno, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) has expressed concern over the cultural industries’ concentration of ownership. For 
Adorno and UNESCO, cultural merchandise should not subordinate the artist to consumer 
demands (Sinclair, 2001). UNESCO’s conceptualization of cultural industries is commonly used 
for policy purposes. Nicolas Garnham (1990) described the term cultural industries as referring 
to “those institutions in our society which employ the characteristic models of production and 
organization of industrial corporations to produce and disseminate symbols in the form of 
cultural goods and services, generally, although not exclusively, as commodities” (pp. 155-156). 
The principal component in cultural industries is cultural distribution, not production (Garnham, 
1990). Naturally, if a media corporation is capable of doing both things, the profitability is 
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maximized (Sinclair, 2001). During the 1980s, two other classifications came into the picture: 
One defined cultural industries as strong business that tells people what to think (Guback & 
Varis, 1986); the other emphasizes that cultural industries are one component of society that 
creates meaning (Sinclair, 1995). 
John Sinclair (2001) argues that there needs to be some explanation about what exactly 
cultural industries are: “If the ‘cultural industries’ are to be clarified, there must be some 
boundaries drawn between which industries are distinctively ‘cultural’ and which are not, and 
which cultural forms are distinctively industrialized, and which are not. Perhaps one of the limits 
could be that the private-owned media product could be classified as ‘mass culture’ and the 
programming created by state-owned media could be ‘high culture’ (p. 6). From this prespective, 
Televisa and TV Azteca are profit communication organizations that produce mass culture and 
mass newscasts. The product of global media culture is considered to be “culture” because it 
reinforces the formation of collective identities. However, for global media corporations, a 
cultural symbolic product is nothing more than merchandise, entertainment, and informational 
commodities that are frequently used to sell the audience to advertisers. Cultural industries have 
their own marketing systems, such as the star system and the film genres (Breton, 1982).  
In the globalized world, the key characteristic of the economic model is to sell a 
standardized product to all possible consumers around the globe. As a result, advertising is the 
central instrument of globalization, because it exposes products to potential consumers. Ratings 
are the principal regulator of media content by mirroring consumers/audience preferences. The 
key starting point to sell merchandise is through repetitively consumer exposure to the attributes 
of the product. This practice works well in products such as toothpaste, clothing, toys, cars, 
perfumes, food, beverages, and other consumable goods.  
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Under this line of reasoning, a candidate is not looking for voters, but for a place of 
preference in a market that is interested in buying his or her attributes. As a consequence, a 
candidate’s top priority is to gain advantage over “other political products,” not necessarily to 
expose their political platform. If a candidate presents his/her issue position, it could work in 
his/her favor, but also to his/her disadvantage; however, if a political candidate presents his/her 
personal attributes, the candidate puts himself/herself on safer ground. Therefore, political image 
specialists work to ensure the presidential candidate’s hair, clothing, teeth, glasses, even makeup 
are perfect in order for it to have just the “right look for selling.”  
With the appropriate political image and a strong political marketing strategy, a candidate 
is ready to be in demand, to become a “hot commodity” for consumers; in other words, to be 
very much a candidate in demand by voters. Perhaps, consumers were willing to buy presidential 
political campaign promises that may or may not materialize in the near future. Sadly, some 
presidential candidates were “political fictitious products” created by political campaigns’ 
marketing strategies, political advertising, and public opinion polls. Perhaps, a candidate was a 
chameleon that changed to fit market needs; and in some cases a candidate could also create an 
individual market depending on his or her media budget. Italian scholar Michelangelo Bovero 
(2006) stated that the globalization model has shifted politics to the right, to the neoliberal 
orientation; slowly pushing populism and nationalism out of the picture. He believes that after 
the turn of the century, the world has been infected by a virus that he calls Macrocefalia 
institucional; an executive head takes over the representative heads that are weak and with less 
political power. The diffusion of this political pathology is favored by the dissemination of a 
well-noticed negative phenomenon, the personalization of politics. To him, the electoral process 
has converted itself into a personal wresting fight to obtain the ultimate executive position, 
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which marks a vertical linear model of action. Under this virus, political parties’ ideologies and 
political platforms are not central any more. That is, there is a simplification of two political 
process that for Bovero means an impoverishment of democratic life.  
The shift from a pluralistic tendency into a dual tendency does increase the distance 
between a political system and civil society and increases voter abstention due to the reduction of 
options to vote for. Bovero stated that abstention is a central point for any electoral campaign; as 
if the election result was not in voters’ hands, but was in undecided voters. Therefore, election 
campaigns are oriented to conquer the undecided voters: “If I [candidate] cannot convince voters 
to vote for me, at the very least I [candidate] will try to persuade voters to avoid voting for my 
opponent by presenting him as a major threat” (Bovero, 2006, p. 1). The Italian scholar 
commented that the voters who react to this type of political game are usually uneducated voters, 
those who possess less of a democratic culture. Bovero identified the 2000 election in the United 
States as the starting point of a new type of electoral process whose key characteristics are: very 
close results among major candidates, controversy, and a strongly questioned electoral process. 
In the case of Latin America, Bovero suggested that it should shift from presidential government 
to a parliamentary type of government. 
The effect of globalization in Latin America would be unlike any around the world 
(Appadurai, 1996). The colonial world incorporated social change with the purpose of 
establishing a new system of beliefs with the rationale of erasing the old system. Abu-Lugohd 
(1989) suggested that there was a significant social system already in place prior to 1495. In the 
case of Mexico, his observation is correct. Aztecs, Olmecs, Mayans, Zapotec, and all other 
indigenous people already had a social, economic, religious, and labor system in place previous 
to Christopher Columbus’ “discovery” of the New Indias and Hernán Cortes’ conquest. When 
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the conquest happened and the colonial period began, a new territory was added to the Spanish 
Empire. For a few years, Mexican Indians openly resisted the new rules; but slowly by a matter 
of force, protection, or survival, both cultures blended together. The Spaniards were not able to 
completely erase the old system of beliefs. Instead, the resistance became invisible to European 
eyes, but was still very much alive. As Josepth Straubhaar (2002) explained, “Although colonial 
conquest provided a dramatic cataclysmic rupture of cultural patterns, it also becomes apparent 
that in most places much continuity was also maintained” (p. 9). In Mexico, most of the cultural 
continuity of the Indians’ cultural life was usually kept underground.  
Perhaps the moment that marked the shift from public to underground was when the 
Indian people first saw the Virgin of Guadalupe. There are many legends circulating about how 
she came to be Mexico’s and Latin America’s patron. One of them points out that an Indian 
named Juan Diego spoke with her several times. The Virgin asked him to go see the Bishop Fray 
Juan de Zumárraga to let him know that she wanted a church built on the Tepeyac hill. The 
bishop did not believe the Indian and asked for proof. The Virgin told Diego to pick up all the 
roses that he could accommodate in his guipil (clothes) and release them in front of the Bishop. 
On December 12, 1531, 10 years after the conquest, Diego followed her instructions; and when 
he released the roses, the Virgin’s image appeared painted on his clothes. Basilica de Guadalupe 
church was built in Mexico City. Inside the church, her image on the piece of fabric is still on 
display.  
The other legend speculates that the Virgin of Guadalupe came from Cacéres, Spain. The 
Spanish virgin has been venerated since the year 580. In this piece of art made from wood, she 
wears a very typical Spanish triangular dress and a gold crown; and is holding a little boy with 
her left arm and a gold rod on her right hand. The virgin was donated to the city by Pope 
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Gregory the Great to Bishop Leander of Sevilla. This virgin was very popular during Columbus’ 
time; apparently, Columbus had a replica with him, like other conquistadores did. The legend 
established that the virgin was found by a group of Indian craftsman, but it was damaged. This 
group of Indians repaired the virgin and changed a few things along the way. The Virgen de 
Guadalupe who appeared in Mexico was not black, but brown. Her facial features are Indian-
like. Her veil has a constellation that appears only on December 12. Her dress is full of náhualtl 
writing symbols, and a purple ribbon rounds her stomach that the Mexican Indian women used as 
a sign of pregnancy. She is surrounded by sunshine (the sun being a major Indian god), and she 
is standing over the moon. When one of the craftsmen presented the virgin, he called it 
“coatlallope,” which means “the one who steps on a snake”; but the Europeans overheard 
Guadalupe—a name that was already familiar to them. This virgin signified the unity of both 
worlds, the central common point for both cultures.  
Some Indian spiritual leaders explained that the Indian religious belief system is full of 
animal and flower representations. The roses that serve as an offering are the ones that mark the 
Indian goddess that is being honored. This is a perfect Mexican example of religious 
hybridization (García Canclini, 1995). As a result of two opposite cultural forces facing each 
other, a new cultural hybrid was created. Therefore, Mexico is in many aspects a hybrid nation. 
Religion arrangements [such as the Virgin of Guadalupe] are the basis for a precise and quick 
cultural change (Straubhaar, 2002b). After the Virgin of Guadalupe was integrated into colonial 
life, the conflicts between the Spanish and Indians diminished. “Most influential in many cases 
were new forms of religion, key aspects of cultural hybridization in many places, often specially 
referred to as religious synchronization between imported religions, like Christianly and local 
beliefs” (Straubhaar 2002b, p. 8). In other words, colonization reconstructed or constructed 
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indigenous identities beginning to circulate “global” patterns, glocalization (Robertson, 1995), 
such as the Virgin of Guadalupe. For example, this virgin was very important in Emilio 
Azcárraga’s life. As a matter of fact, his ashes were deposited in the Basilica’s mausoleum. 
Therefore, all the movies, television, and radio programs produced by Televisa or Churubusco 
film studios only represented Catholic religious traditions with special concentration on the 
Virgin of Guadalupe. In addition, whenever a television or radio character asked the Virgin for 
help, no matter what the request, most came true. Furthermore, every year on December 12, at 
5:00 am, a group of artists and celebrities sing the Happy Birthday song to the Virgin. This event 
is still being televised nationwide by Televisa every year. This constant presence of the virgin in 
the media reinforced the virgin’s global pattern status that was established in the colonial period 
among Latin American countries. 
In addition, the concentration of economic power in the United States is mostly in the 
hands of large organizations or corporations; while in Mexico and other Latin American 
countries, such a concentration is usually controlled by individuals (either by themselves or 
organized in closely knit groups, generally comprising members of a reduced elite only) (Rota & 
Galvan, 1987, p. 235). Conceptual dependency is even worse than the material one, even though 
such a form of dependency is probably a distinctive characteristic of the global state of 
dependency and of the Latin American condition as satellites or peripheral countries in relation 
to the structure of world power and domination (Rota & Galvan, p. 236). Mexican sociologist 
Pablo González Casanova (1963) has called this “internal colonialism.” This form of colonialism 
(conceived as the domination by a cacique—a local political boss or tyrant—over the rest of the 
population, helps to explain the gradual cultural impoverishment of the rural dwellers. This, in 
turn, makes their potential participation in modern technological activities an even more difficult 
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and alien enterprise compared to their participation if internal colonialism and other forms of 
oppression were absent. The political power is shifting from the elected governments to the 
global capital leadership (FIP, 2002). The globalization tendency is to change everything into 
merchandise, perhaps including presidential candidates: Can a candidate’s campaign be more 
centered in political marketing than in political communication strategy? In any case, the 
consequences are the same: a high dependency on political advertisements. Mexico has slowly 
adopted the American electoral model, reaching its peak in the 2000 election. The elements of 
the American electoral model adopted by the Aztec nation are: (1) the debates; (2) the 
interpretation of politicians as celebrities—an individualist/personal attributes approach instead 
of public issue-oriented; (3) the political advertisement, in electronic media with the spot as the 
primary element of the political campaign; (4) political marketers—who are foreign to the 
political science field—are the persons designing political campaign strategies. 
Political Advertising and Voter Turnout 
Currently in Mexico, there is a national tendency to believe that the higher the financial 
investment candidates devote to their media campaign strategy, the easier it is for them to 
achieve election victory and voters’ legitimacy. However, larger quantities of political spots in 
the media do not necessarily result in a higher turnout, according to communication scholar Raúl 
Trejo Delabre (2001) in his book Mediocracia Sin Mediaciones. He affirmed that political actors 
have found it easier to contract media spots than to devote themselves to develop proselytism 
activities. “In the Mexican electoral campaigns more media exposure does not necessarily 
signify higher voter turnout” (Trejo Delabre, p. 7).  
In the book, Trejo Delabre presents data regarding politicians and media exposure of the 
past five presidential elections. During the 1988 election—Carlos Salinas de Gortari-PRI, 
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Manuel Clouthier-PAN, and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas-Frente Democrático Nacional— Trejo 
Delabre conducted research on how Mexico’s national newspapers covered the election. His 
results indicated that PRI received almost 55%, Frente Democrático 17.4%, and PAN 12.3% of 
the coverage; nevertheless, on election day each party obtained the following voter turnout: PRI 
51%, Frente Democrático 27.6%, and PAN 16.8% (Trejo Delabre). That is, in the case of PRI, 
the party received 4% fewer voters’ turnout than the amount of coverage received by 
newspapers. In contrast, Frente Democrático and PAN, who used less media exposure than PRI, 
obtained a higher voter turnout. The Frente Democrático obtained a 10.2% higher voter turnout 
than their newspaper coverage percentage, and PAN received 4.5% higher voter turnout than its 
newspaper coverage. Therefore, in the 1988 election, a higher amount of media exposure did not 
necessarily produce higher amounts of voter turnout. Nevertheless, television election coverage 
directly favored the PRI candidate with 92%, and left the other candidates almost invisible, with 
Frente Democrático 4% and PAN 3.5% (Trejo Delabre). 
In the 1994 election—Ernesto Zedillo-PRI, Diego Fernández de Cevallos-PAN, and 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas-PRD—the television national media followed the same pattern as they 
did in the previous election. As tradition dictated, PRI gained the higher coverage in the Mexican 
media: national television 32%, radio 34%, and press 42%. The PRI voter turnout was 50.18% 
(Trejo Delabre, 2001). Even though PRI television and press coverage decreased from the 
previous election, the voter turnout stayed almost the same. In contrast, PAN increased its 
presence in television, but decreased in press coverage from the previous election. PAN gained 
national television coverage 17%, radio 19%, and press 12.3% (Trejo Delabre). PAN voter 
turnout was 26.7%, a 9.9% increase in relation to the previous election. PRD received 19% of the 
television news coverage, 23% in radio, and 21.3% in press (Trejo Delabre). In comparison with 
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the previous election, PRD increased in television news coverage by 15% and in press by 3.9%. 
In terms of voter turnout, PRD obtained 17% of voters, which represents a 10.6% decrease in 
relation to the 1988 election (IFE, 1994). 
In the 2000 election—Francisco Labastida-PRI, Vicente Fox-PAN, and Cuauhtémoc 
Cárdenas-PRD—almost the same media/voter turnout pattern was observed as in the previous 
election. That is, more media coverage does not necessarily translate into a higher voter turnout. 
PRI gained 40% of radio and television news coverage, PAN gained 27.4%, and PRD 20.1%. 
However, on television alone, the PAN candidate had a bit (2.6%) more coverage (30.7%) than 
the PRI candidate (28.1%) and PRD (23%). (Trejo Delabre, 2001). In comparison with the voter 
turnout, Fox had 42.5%, Labastida 36.1%, and Cárdenas 17% (IFE, 2000). This means that Fox 
who won the election got a voter turnout percentage higher than the news television coverage. 
This result reinforces the statement that more exposure in the media does not necessarily result in 
higher voter turnout. 
In a separate study, sociologist Luis Emilio Giménez Cacho (2005) presented the analysis 
of the budget increase that political parties have designated to the purchase of political 
advertising in television alone. The analysis focused on the three major political parties: PRI, 
PAN, and PRD. PRI devoted 14.6% in 1994, 59.4% in 1996, and 63.5% in 2000; the highest  
increase was 44.8% in 1997. That year was also the peak (29.2%) of political advertising 
expenses in television for PAN: 30.2% in 1994, 59.4% in 1997, and 63.5% in 2000. PRD 
presented the same tendency that PRI and PAN did in 1997 by elevating their television 
expenses by 42%, in 1994, 43.2% in 1997, and 41.7% in 2000. The 1997 election was not a 
presidential election, but included several state, municipal, and state congress elections. 
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Nevertheless, this election changed the election dynamic drastically, because major political 
parties significantly increased their television political spot purchases.  
 In addition, Manuel Alejandro Guerrero (2000) stated that according to IFE, during the 
1988 election the television and radio news coverage devoted 83.1% of their time to PRI, 3.1% 
to PAN, and 1.6% to PRD, although the opposition parties registered 50% of the votes cast. In 
the 1994 election, those numbers changed dramatically— 41% to PRI, 18.7% to PRD, and 
17.8% to PAN. PRI news coverage decreased by 42%. In contrast, PAN and PRD coverage 
increased up to a point that PRD became the second most covered political party during the 
election, rising up from the third spot in the previous election.  
This pattern continued during the 2006 election according to economist Luis Pazos 
(2007), who explained that in order to achieve electoral victory, a candidate perhaps should have 
a large media advertisement budget, but the candidate’s personality and the content of his or her 
propaganda material are factors that determine a victory or defeat. “Calderón was the candidate 
who spent the smallest amount of money and won the election” (Pazos, p. 1).  
Nevertheless, in order for elections to be resolved in the media, the media itself needs to 
be the number one source of information for voters, but it is not. Director of the Reforma survey 
division Alejandro Moreno (2003) found that family and friends are the number one source of 
information among Mexican voters. Moreover, the media lacks credibility among voters. 
According to his polling results, “One-fifth of the electorate gets their political information from 
television, but they do not believe what they see or hear” (Moreno, p. 196). The lack of 
credibility that a media outlet could have does weaken its social leadership in the country and its 
influence over voters. Nevertheless, political marketers use the media for its fast turnaround 
results in the public opinion polls. Perhaps the question is not so much about how much Mexican 
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voters trust national television newscasts, or if their use of television newscasts is their primary 
source of information. At this point, if political advertising works, it is because the commercial 
media have accomplished their purpose for persuasion and understanding. As a consequence, 
voters do accept television spots as true advertisements.  
Journalism books characterize media outlets as telling stories about society and what is 
important to society members. However, media became protagonists during the electoral process. 
During the presidential campaign periods, it was clear for scholars Laura Islas Reyes and Luis 
Miguel Carriedo (2006) how television networks indirectly and directly favor a particular 
presidential candidate, because the networks play a protagonist role in the electoral process. 
From their point of view, Televisa supported PAN candidate Calderón, and TV Azteca supported 
AMLO.  
Raúl Trejo Delabre (2007) argued that politicians have stopped making politics by 
assuming that the mass media is their only possible space to expose their campaigns to voters. In 
his view, the quest for voters has shifted into the quest for ratings, replacing citizens with 
viewers. The marketing domination over politics alone, with the replacement of ideas for images, 
is the main characteristic of today’s politics dynamics. Politicians should be careful about media 
overexposure because sometimes citizens do not like it (Trejo Delabre, 2007b, p. 1). He has a 
point: Voters could eventually become tired of the political advertisements and vote for another 
candidate who did not bother them as much during their favorite shows. 
Political analyst Oscar Casillas (2006) argued that the media are not the only ones 
responsible to construct democracy in a society. The media is an important component, but only 
an element. Moreover, a nation cannot construct a strong democracy without the media and 
journalists who have the civic responsibility of keeping voters informed. Media and journalists 
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must establish the relevance of the electoral process, provide information to voters, and provide 
additional information for those voters who have already made their minds up about candidates 
in order to support the construction of a strong democracy. Nevertheless, the media election 
content must incorporate diverse voices on political ideology as well as political preference, 
diverse viewpoints, and news topic perspectives. Casillas suggested an additional ingredient to 
the journalistic mix that should be present in any electoral coverage: plurality. “Plurality 
constructs a counterweight process of information . . . oblige journalists to elevate their quality of 
news gathering, news writing, and transition [dissemination] of newsworthy events” (Casillas, p. 
54). 
Communication scholar Jorge Calles Santillana (2003) stated that candidates’ political 
campaigns are doing a poor job in presenting proposals to resolve social problems. The arrival of 
political marketing in Mexican politics had made political parties and candidates pay more 
attention to communication strategies than to politics itself. For Calles, politics as a social 
practice has lost its aim because the two factors that rule elections in Mexico are electoral 
preferences and political marketing. Political campaigns during the 2003 election “were 
conducted over the idea that what is important is to obtain the [political] power, not what is 
possible to construct through the power positions” (p. 173).  
If negative campaigns continue showing no civic attitude to voters, Mexico could not 
achieve democracy, because without civility there is no democracy, wrote journalist Alejandro 
Pérez Utera (2006). The lack of credibility would eventually generate uncertainty in voters’ 
minds. The 2006 election could be summed up in one question: Could AMLO win or not win the 
presidency? The function of political marketing is not understood fully, stated Alvaro de 
Gasperín Sampieri and Armando Torres Rodríguez (1999), because it is creating in public 
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opinion a false image regarding social problems, opening a window of empty ideology and 
political proposals to answer those public issues that required an urgent response. Instead of 
bringing citizens close to the country’s political-electoral reality, political marketing constructs 
the idea of a reality that has nothing to do with a citizen/voter (De Gasperín Sampieri & Torres 
Rodríguez).   
Xavier Ávila Guzmán (2002) agreed with the idea that political marketing is only one 
component of political communication; the current erroneous notion of political marketing is 
pushing political communication’s core value “strategy” to second place. According to Ávila 
Guzmán, political marketing is often confused with the aim of political communication. Political 
communication serves to create agreements that aid a country in its political advancement. 
Politics has lost its center, said Carlos Ossa (2001), who accepted as true the idea that politics 
dies in the media, because it allows the media to interrupt their constructive labor of 
argumentation.   
Political marketing does not work in third-world countries because of its limitations, 
commented Universidad de las Ámericas at Puebla (UDLA) professor José Cisneros Espinoza 
(2003). He explained that the first limitation is its distance from social obligations. When 
political marketing management is legitimate, it generates at the starting point violence and at the 
ending point misery.  “Political marketing deals with a client without questioning its social 
objectives; it is just like any company dedicated to profit. Simply, the immediate profit is change 
with voters’ turnout or the political image agreement of the sponsor [candidate]” (Cisneros 
Espinoza, 2003, p. 80). In other words, the public issues agenda and political ideology of the 
candidate are not significant for political marketers. The second limitation is the inhibition of 
civic participation, because for political marketers audiences are receptors of a persuasive 
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message that directs them to have favorable opinions about the candidate/sponsor and favorable 
voter turnout. The audience/voters are not viewed as a component of an interactive relationship. 
Cisneros Espinoza believes that this type of political communication model works in a linear line 
from the emission/sponsor/candidate down to the receptor/audience/voter. This is just like a 
hegemonic process (Gramsci, 1985) where the information and system of belief flow from the 
elite members of society to the disadvantaged citizens who are used to this type of linear 
communication flow. Nevertheless, political stability requires a constant interaction between 
politicians and citizens, continuing communication to achieve agreements and maintain a 
democratic country. 
In addition, negative political campaigning does not work in Mexico. According to 
communication scholar Juan Francisco Escobedo (2006a),  
Governmental communication cannot be reduced to a run against time and 
political adversaries to win public opinion acceptance; governmental 
communication is not a matter of money or press control. Political communication 
is a symbolic cultural battle, an act of persuasion, establishment of a series of 
identity references, generation of legitimacy and generation of social capital. (p. 
3)  
Political communication is about creating a context of acceptance, trust, respect, legality, 
freedom of speech, and democracy.  
Political marketing is only one aspect of political communication, but in Mexico some 
politicians believe that political marketing poses the same meaning as political communication. 
Scholar Javier Sánchez Galicia (2003) argued that to achieve success in electoral campaigns, it is 
fundamental to think, decide, act, and communicate because political and communication 
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strategies are fundamental to win an election; but not everybody perceived political 
communication relevance in the same way because political marketing is currently dominating 
the spectrum in Mexico. For Sánchez Galicia, the frequent electoral campaign errors are the 
following: (1) Lack of organization—usually the candidate decides on the people who would 
collaborate based on reasons other than their personal capacity for the position. Usually, there is 
not a detailed task list for each staff member. (2) Lack of campaign strategy—on some 
occasions, the campaign strategy does exist, but only a few staff members are familiar with the 
information; some other times, it does not exist at all. As a result, staff members (and sometimes 
candidates) do not have a clear objective to follow, and this gap in knowledge is also reflected in 
voters’ minds when at the end of the campaign period the voters are not able to recall what the 
election was about, or what were the five main public issues discussed. (3) Lack of effective 
political communication—usually the campaign exposes the public issues that the candidate 
wants to talk about, but not the public issues that the voter wants to be resolved. Many political 
candidates believe that their first objective is advertising, not a political communication strategy. 
Candidates pay more attention to opponents’ comments than promoting their own issues’ agenda 
to voters.  
Sánchez Galicia (2003) believed that each country should develop a political 
communication model according to its own political culture characteristics. Therefore, for 
Mexico, he proposes the “Public Communication Model” that consists of several key concepts, 
such as political marketing is a tool, a political image should incorporate elements of emotion 
and reasoning, the central theme of the campaign which constitutes the reason to vote for a 
particular candidate should be repeated in every message that the candidate sends to voters 
everywhere in meetings, interviews, political advertisements, and webpages, among others. 
  68
Furthermore, Gabino Vázquez Robles (1998) proposed the pluralistic model—another political 
communication model for Mexico—that consisted of changing the role of the voter by 
suggesting that voters could convert themselves in the emergence of a political message and 
directly collaborate in the discussion (cited by Sánchez Galicia, p. 23, 2003). It is important to 
identify the reasons why political marketing and negative campaigning do not work in Mexico in 
order to create a new political communication model that works well in the Aztec nation.  
Former IFE general director, Arturo Núñez, commented that the mass media is the top 
priority for any electoral campaign in Mexico (Loera, 2005, p. 6). “There is not another way!,” 
said political researcher Leo Zuckermann in a country with such an expansive territory and 70 
million potential voters; the election’s victory is gained in the media (Avizu, 2006a, p. 1). José 
Cisneros Espinoza (2003) observed that all political candidates must have the service of a 
political marketer adviser because today’s election campaigns around the world have the 
tendency to follow the American electoral format. David Shirk (2005) argued that in Mexico, 
“mass media—and the money that buys airtime and short attention spans—is clearly one of the 
most important driving forces in modern democracy” (p. 236).  
Alberto Pérez Obeso and Gladys Martínez Fombona (2003) believed that it is important 
to understand the function of public opinion polls as statistical measurement tools to provide 
information, but they are not by any means a prediction instrument, especially when people are 
basing their decisions on just one poll. Aimée Vega (2003) stated results of surveys and public 
opinion polls elaborate the candidates’ and mass media owners’ interests. Mexico has also 
relegated classic political responsibilities from political institutions to the television media and 
the elaboration of surveys and public opinion polls are put down to a candidate’s interest. 
Journalist Carlos Tello Díaz (2006) stated that public opinion polls do mark the character of the 
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election, but at the same time they do not guarantee anything; they could be wrong (p. 1). In 
Mexico, public opinion polls have experienced some problems because people are not used to 
this type of instrument. Some of the difficulties are: (1) people are not used to speak their minds; 
instead, interviewers would answer survey questions according to who is asking the questions. In 
1999, Gallup pollsters were instructed to wear an identification label and were required not to 
wear any combination of colors that might suggest support or affiliation to a certain political 
party (Domínguez & McCann, 1996, p. 227). For example, if the person who is conducting the 
survey identifies her/himself as a PRI representative, then all the answers will favor PRI. That is, 
people are afraid of talking. (2) Mexicans do not like to be interviewed at home, only on the 
streets. (3) “One difficulty is a basic distrust of the political system. In the past, some people 
were reluctant to answer questions, lest there be official reprisal against those who criticized the 
government” (Grayson, 2000, p. 65). Furthermore, scholar Cuauhtémoc Arista (2006) observed 
that surveys are a necessary instrument to find out to what extent the televised monologue has 
modified people’s options; that is, to convert campaign audiences into an element compatible 
with the electoral campaign strategies. Politics as an object to be consumed (“Consumers of 
Democracy”) is how Ramón Guillermo Aveledo (1999) labeled the current political marketing 
phenomenon. He affirmed that politics is no longer a citizen’s product. Because voters/audiences 
receive/are exposed to politics, they make choices among politicians who are presented in the 
media; voters no longer create politics. From his viewpoint, society is shifting from a democracy 
based on words and ideas to a democracy based on images.  
It seems as if political marketers are under the impression that the audience will be 
persuaded to vote for a particular candidate by exposing the nominee as many times as they can 
in the media via political advertisements. However, the reality is that voters understand the 
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content of political advertisement according to their own personal filters—experience, system of 
beliefs, political ideology, family. Political advertisements do not function as a great persuasive 
power or fulfil the assumption that voters are tremendously susceptible to political spots. Those 
theories—the bullet theory (Schramm, 1971; and the hypodermic needle theory (Berlo, 1960)—
that describe the great power of the media on audiences are part of the past. Other theories—
social constructivist (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989)—suggest that audiences are selective in their 
interpretation/readings of media messages; a communication message does not produce the same 
effect on all members of an audience.  
Videocracia and Mediocracia 
Currently, in Mexico, political life is centered in the media and not in society as it used to be in 
the past during the PRI era. The frequent use of political marketing along with the new 
relationship between the government and the media has captured the attention of Mexican 
intellectuals. Writer Carlos Fuentes (2006) wrote, “In other times [71 years of PRI ruling], 
commercial television was a soldier of the government, but this time, the government is the 
soldier of the networks” (p. 1). That is, during the PRI era, the government dictated media 
programming and content; now the media function the other way around, with the media 
dictating politics. Communication scholar Javier Esteinou Madrid named Fox’s political 
communication strategy telecracia (tele=television, cracia=democracy) and videocracia 
(video=video, and cracia=democracy) to describe the relationship between images and 
democracy. Raúl Trejo Delabre named the phenomenon mediocracia (medio=media, 
cracia=democracy) Other intellectuals around the world have called this political occurrence 
media democracy (Sarcinelli, 1998), media society (Saxer, 1998), and mediacracy (De Virieu, 
1990; Schechter & Schatz, 2001). Even so, the meaning of each of those terms is the same; it is a 
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new political regime with its own set of rules. This new regime can be understood as “the 
colonization of politics by the rules of the media system” (Meyer, 2002, p. 98). In other words, 
the political dynamics shifted to be part of popular culture as Thomas Meyer (2002) stated: “In 
the course of the colonization of the political system by the rules of media discourses, a 
substantial part of politics tends to follow the same trend. To that degree politics itself becomes 
politainment, a form of popular culture” (p. 99). That is, the logic of media absorbed political 
logic. The media does legitimize politicians by making their image familiar to their audiences. 
As a consequence, political participation, political reflection, and political parties are no longer 
significant; Mexico is shifting from a party democracy to a media democracy. Political actors are 
aware of the importance of media exposure, up to the point that if politicians consider that they 
have not exposed themselves frequently in the media, their careers are over. Moreover, the Aztec 
nation has its unique television media ownership characteristic. Mexico is considered to be ruled 
by a duopoly of two television networks, Televisa (that controls 80% of the market) and TV 
Azteca (that controls the remaining 20%), automatically eliminating plurality of voices. Overall, 
at the end of the day, we all know that monopolies do interfere in democracy. 
Nonetheless, the responsibility of the press in Mexico lies in the constitution, basically on 
Articles 6 and 7. Article 6 establishes freedom of speech by stating that the expression of ideas 
would not be reason for judicial persecution unless it directly attacks the moral values, personal 
rights, and interruption of public order (Constitution, 1917). There are many forms of 
interpretation of the law; it is not very specific. Article 7 presents that same ambiguous 
characteristic. Article 7 talks about the freedom of the press—the print press—stating that there 
is freedom to write and publish any kind of material, with the limitation of respecting private 
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lives, morality, and the public peace. No authority has the right to censor the press, establish a 
fine for journalists or publishers, or kidnap their printing machinery (Constitution, 1917).  
Mexico has a Ley de Imprenta (print law) that became active on April 15, 1917. Scholar 
Miguel Carbonell (2003) commented that the law needs to be updated to incorporate major 
journalistic rights, such as the right to reply, regulations for governmental advertisement, 
adherence to international human rights treaties, among others. Recently, there was a 
modification in the electoral law COFIPE to incorporate the right to reply and governmental 
advertisement regulation, but the constitution or the print law was not modified. In addition, 
Miguel Carbonell pointed out that no one should confuse the meaning of freedom of speech, 
“Freedom of speech is not a freedom to tell lies and defame people” (p. 3). Nevertheless, there 
are some other aspects of the journalistic practices that need to be regulated by the constitution, 
such as protection of sources, protection of the journalist’s right to protect sources, electronic 
web-based print media, among others. 
In practice, however, the law has not been the regulator of political power and the media. 
The mass media exercise a strong influence in politics and democracy. According to Raul Trejo 
Delabre (2004), Mexico has a media system that contradicts McLuchan’s assumption that the 
media are an extension of people. In the Aztec nation, it works the other way around: People are 
an extension of the media, specifically television. Trejo Delabre argued that in this globalized 
world, there is a new form of government taking place in contemporary society. This new 
government formula is known as mediocracia; that is: 
 A new government structure fully dominated by the mass media. During the past 
thirty years [the media industry] emerged in nations full of information [with 
more money for production of content] that now disseminated globally through 
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national frontiers under the light of entertainment content. Television networks, 
computer corporations, and telecommunications companies make up fewer than a 
dozen big global corporate conglomerates that have captured citizens’ targets 
marked around the world. (p. 21)  
President Fox’s governing style, where media was at its center, along with a new media 
government regime where the media legitimized politicians’ leadership by appearing as news 
sources, news topics, and political advertising. The conception is that the media have the power 
to fabricate candidates, govern a political debate, and reconvert politics in a sort of media matter. 
Former senator Manuel Barlett Díaz (2007) considered that the media in Mexico has several 
abilities, such as: (1) the construction and deconstruction of public images, politicians, and 
political candidates; (2) transform mediocre people into great thinkers; (3) and magically make 
uncomfortable social and political personalities vanish. 
The mass media are fundamental in democracy, because an informed citizen can develop 
a strong opinion about which candidate to vote for. In Mexico, television is one of the 
communication outlets that is most important for the development and socialization of 
democratic values (Ortega Ramírez, 2006). Democracy requires informed citizens. Where 
freedom of speech and the right to be informed are not tolerated, democracy cannot exist. The 
mass media could the democracy’s worst enemies (Aveledo, 1999). Independent critical media is 
necessary to preserve democracy. 
Argentinean political science scholar Alberto Fohrig (2006) commented that the mass 
media are not the fifth power in Latin America; they are the first power. In the case of Mexico, 
he commented that, generally, newscasts concentrate their reporting on candidates’ personal 
qualities and negative campaigning, creating the phenomenon of the personalization of politics. 
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That is, it is more important to cover the fights between political candidates than their political 
platform. As a consequence, political campaigns are turning into a type of entertainment show. 
The politics reporting has shifted hard news to soft news, although it is the same topic—politics. 
Nowadays, in Mexico, the press is no longer the fourth power; it is one of the main social 
structures of the first power (Hernández, 2005). In the current globalization era, the mass media 
owners are not interested in being the fourth power that is in charge of observing and correcting 
democracy’s malfunctions and creating a better political system. According to Ignacio Ramonet 
(2006), in the name of freedom of speech, the global media are the ones who battle against those 
programs that defend the interest of a collective group of citizens.  
It is important to understand how the relationship between political power and the media 
have changed over the Fox presidency in order to understand the news shift of journalistic 
practices. In the past, the written press in Mexico did not depend on subscribers on direct sales, 
but did depend on government advertisements; the electronic press works with the licenses that 
the government authorizes (Trejo Delabre, 2000). It is common that the government buys 
publicity in newspaper outlets with low or no professional quality. As Trejo Delabre explains, 
the majority of the governmental ads appeared mixed with the regular news, because the press 
makes no indication of the governmental information.   
Mexican television was used to operate under an authoritarian political regimen. 
However, under Fox, networks have had no will to accept their social responsibility in the 
democratic process. In some cases, networks don’t know how to participate, according to Ortega 
Ramírez (2006). He pointed out that television has the liberty to inform and express opinion to 
influence society or to criticize governmental actions, but not always do networks exercise their 
freedom with responsibility and professionalism. Ortega Ramírez has a point: Some of the 
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reports do not present a balanced tone. Sensationalism is their priority, not investigative 
reporting. Some journalists used a very restricted number of sources in their reports. Nowadays, 
politicians are aware that the most scandalous declaration will make its way to the newscast. 
Brief History of the Television Era and Its Electoral Coverage 
In order to understand how the Mexican television works, it is important to know the history of 
the medium. In the 1950s during the recently introduced television era, Telesistema Mexicano 
(TSM)—now Televisa—started to produce newscasts. The first were Noticiero General Motors 
and Su Diario Nescafé that were produced by a national daily and broadcasted by TSM. 
Basically at this time, the newscast was named after its most important advertiser sponsor, 
General Motors and the coffee company Nescafé. That is, TMS did not have full editorial 
control. The relationship between Televisa and the government was cordial until 1968, the year 
of the Tlatelolco Massacre. On October 2, for the first time the PRI government recognized that 
in order to regain social control, support from the mass media, particularly Televisa, was 
required (Fernández & Paxman, 2000). For the first time during the Gustavo Díaz Ordaz 
presidency (1964-1970), the government began to closely observe the information that 
Telesistema distributed in its national newscasts. Up to this point, the newscast was the 
responsibility of third parties—mostly newspapers. But after the Tlatelolco Massacre, Emilio 
Azcárraga Milmo decided to produce its own newscasts, called 24 Horas. As a consequence, 
national tragedies or political emergency situations that the government wanted to keep invisible 
were low priority news on the 24 Horas newscast as well. Therefore, the agenda was built up on 
what items remained silent and which not? The silence public issues were the important national 
matters.  
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The newscast was broadcast in the afternoon and at night; 24 Horas was the newscast 
that remained on air for the longest time—28 years—in television history. Jacobo Zabludovsky 
was its news director and main anchor. His news style was to incorporate more foreign news 
than domestic reports on 24 Horas. Zabludovsky’s newscast outline consisted of starting with 
stories about the president, then international news, and everything else. Everything else 
encapsulated segments like horoscopes, poetry, sports, bull fights, among others. In terms of his 
editorial line, his company’s internal policies were favorable coverage of the president as a 
priority. As a result, Mexicans were better informed about what was going on elsewhere, but not 
in their own country. At the same time without doubt, the president was the number one agenda-
setter in Televisa’s 24 Horas newscast.  
Several years later, the television media industry faced possible expropriation for the 
third time during the 71 years of the PRI governments. The first warning sign that the Mexican 
television industry received was in 1972. Early in the Luis Echeverría Álvarez (1970-1976) 
presidency, many Latin American and Mexican intellectuals called private television the caja 
idiota (the idiot box), making the statement that private television content was promoting an 
overstated consumerism habit among viewers. The principal promoters of this—attracted to 
Emilio Azcarraga’s company, then known as Telesistema Mexicano-TSM—were the newspapers 
Excelsior and Ovaciones. Echeverría operated under a populist political ideology. The president 
and some of his secretaries believed that the private television owners did not care about the 
adverse effects that their programming was causing on the youth. In addition, the government 
alleged that their programming offered no educational value. The television licensees argued that 
the government, by law, already had the right to use 12.5% of its airtime. Nevertheless, the 
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government hardly used it; the maximum amount of utilization was 2.9% (Fernández & Paxman, 
2000).  
On June 18, 1972, the president and some of the secretaries asked several media owners 
to show up at Los Pinos for a meeting regarding the caja idiota controversy. During the 
discussion, there was a point that it seemed impossible to reach an understanding. The president 
called upon playwright Miguel Sabido to propose an alternative. He then presented a mixed 
model of television. In the combined educational and commercial television model, the 
government television networks will seek social/educational content, and the privately owned 
media will do the same within their profitable boundaries. In other words, as Sabido (2002) 
explained, “television programming that will offer social/educational content without sacrificing 
ratings. President Echeverría wanted educational and social content as well as the presentment 
and state activities” (M. Flores, personal interview, Mexico, D. F. December 2002).  
Sabido’s mixed television model proposal captured the president’s attention and 
approval. Other television licensees were not so fortunate, because President Luis Echeverría 
took over their television licenses to create Imevisión, a government-owned and operated 
television network. Sabido assisted Emilio Azcárraga Milmo (alias The Tiger) in preventing 
expropriation, and produced a series of educational telenovelas to prove that the “idiot box” 
could educate audiences. Sabido’s first entertainment educational telenovela broadcast in 
Televisa was Acompañame, a drama serial to promote family planning. The drama formula was 
successful. Mexico decreased its population growth rate from 3.1% to 2.7% in a year. As scholar 
David O. Poindexter (2004) remembers, “Here, for the first time, is something that makes total 
sense to me and it has the earmarks of being a valid way to proceed within the realities of a high 
population growth developing country” (p. 27). Sabido produced other entertainment education 
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telenovelas for Televisa, such as to promote adult literacy, Ven Conmigo (Come with Me); to 
promote adolescent sexual education Vamos Juntos (We go together) as well as Caminemos 
(Let’s walk); and to promote women’s rights Nosotras las Mujeres (We the Women) as well as 
Por Amor (For Love). Sabido’s entertainent education television genre had a connection with 
Albert Bandura’s social learning theory, Eric Bentley’s dramatic theory, and Sabido’s tone 
theory. After Emilio Azcárraga Milmo died, he left Sabido a beautiful house in Mexico City in 
gratitude for saving his company.  
The second attempted exploitation of the Mexican television industry took place during 
the days following José López Portillo’s last annual state of the union address when he 
expropriated the bank industry, and the rumors about television being the next in the list began to 
spread. In 1982, the Instituto Nacional del Consumidor (National Consumer Institute)—an 
agency in charge of protecting consumers against abuse— disapproved Televisa’s content, 
arguing that foreign series such as Dinastía (Dynasty) portrayed a lifestyle that was distant from 
the majority of the population. In addition, this agency criticized the way the actors dressed, 
representing a foreign style and diminishing Mexico’s national identity (Fernández & Paxman, 
2000). Furthermore, leftist politicians and leftist intellectuals were asking for Televisa’s 
expropriation. They wanted to create a unique television model that would follow the British 
model. It was very unlikely that President López Portillo would expropriate Televisa, because at 
the time the government did not have the capability to manage such a corporation. Fifteen years 
later, López Portillo declared that he had the motivation to do it, but never did it because he 
realized that it was going to turn into a failure (Fernández & Paxman, 2000). Nevertheless, 
Azcárraga Milmo was worried about the future of his company. In 1982, he then created a new 
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news policy. From that moment on, the news stories would support the PRI and the president at 
all times. The television network went from a censorship phase to a self censorship stage. 
Nevertheless, during the López Portillo presidency, two main independent media outlets 
consolidated their position in society and with the government: Those were the newspaper Uno 
más Uno and the magazine Proceso (Guerrero, 2000). Always, the print press, because of its 
characteristics of possession and control, had more opportunities to state a criticism against the 
government, since print journalists always found ways to denounce the power abuse; television 
and radio were censored more strictly due to their high impact on audiences (De Gasperín 
Sampieri, 2002). One key characteristic of dictatorial and authoritarian systems is the control of 
the press; the more control of information flows, more possibilities exist to remain in power 
(Carbonell, 2001). 
The close connection between Emilio Azcárraga Milmo and the PRI government gave 
Televisa newscasts nicknames, such as prensa vendida (bought press) and El Nacional (the 
National) meaning that the newscast contained mostly official information previously approved 
by the government, like a spokesperson. During election time, it was very common to observe 
the direct support that Televisa gave to PRI candidates. Their CEO Emilio Azcárraga Milmo, in 
an interview in August 1988, stated, “We are PRI supporters, we always have been; we don’t 
believe in any other formula and as members of the political party we will do everything possible 
to help our candidate win” (Fernández & Paxman, 2000, p. 320). 1988 was an election year, and 
Televisia mainly provided space to PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari. However, this time, 
Azcarrága’s declarations caused anger and indignation among the other presidential candidates, 
especially PAN’s Manuel “Maquio” Clouthier. He organized a boycott against 24 Horas, 
accusing the program of not informing the public about opposition candidates. Azcarrága argued 
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that Televisa could give airtime to anybody who can afford it. At this time, Televisa commercial 
advertisements spot price was $25,000 per minute during prime time on Channel 2. None of the 
opposition parties had that kind of budget for advertisements. This type of journalism practice 
diminished the democratic process in Mexico simply by not keeping its citizens informed about 
all political candidates, “Rather than promoting regime change, the media are simply dragged 
along by larger political developments over which they have little influence” (Lawson, 2002, p. 
4). 
However, Emilio Azcárraga Milmo’s unconditional support of the PRI government was 
overlooked by the third and last government attempt for television expropriation that came 
during the Miguel de la Madrid presidency (1982-1988). If Televisa’s news coverage became too 
liberated and open, the government stepped in to inform the network that its content was “not 
appropriate.” Manuel Barlett—then Secretary of the Interior—came up with the threat of a 
possible expropriation attempt to keep Televisa in line with its progovernment policy. During the 
1988 election, Televisa’s election news coverage was biased in favor of PRI presidential 
candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The 24 Horas’ election coverage issue arose when PAN 
presidential candidate, Manuel Clouthier, pointed out Televisa’s bias coverage into an electoral 
issue. He started a boycott against Televisa’s main newscast 24 Horas, organized protests 
outside of Televisa’s headquarters, and passed out bumper stickers with messages against 
Televisa and Jacobo Zabludovsky. Clouthier appeared in campaign meetings and events with his 
mouth covered as a sign of protest against Televisa. The PRI candidate achieved electoral victory 
under a postelectoral fraud controversy regarding vote count computers due to an electric power 
outage. 
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Under such a controversial context, political communication began to appear in Mexico 
20 years ago when for the first time Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) faced a strong 
opposition candidate. According to communication scholar Andrés Valdez (2001), before the 
1988 election when the electoral processes were just a protocol ritual to access presidential 
political power, authoritarian politics were the predominant practice over plurality, liberty, and 
democracy. The 1988 election marked the initiation of real electoral opposition. Aimée Vega 
(2003) suggested that political communication in Mexico began during the 1988 election, 
because simply, it was the first time that presidential candidates ever needed it. For the first time, 
PRI faced a strong opposition in Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and the Frente Democrático Nacional 
(PRD predecessor) political party. The competitive political context required the use of political 
communication strategies in order for political parties and presidential candidates to be in contact 
with voters.  
In addition, communication scholar Jorge Calles Santillana (2003) considered that the 
1988 election was the starting point in Mexico of the introduction of political marketing by 
former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari under the very possible political context that 
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas actually won the 1988 election, a situation that would never be possible to 
know for real. Salinas de Gortari implemented during his presidential period a constant political 
advertising campaign in the media, highlighting government achievements and his personal 
attributes. According to Calles Santillana, Salinas de Gortari’s media campaign was successful:  
By the midterm of his presidency, the discussion over Salinas’ legitimacy was 
limited to opposition political parties (mainly left wing) and intellectual circles. 
The great majority of the population had not forgotten the possibility that Salinas 
won the election via fraud, but they subestimated the fact because the political 
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propaganda made them [voters] believe that the results of the government were 
successful. (p. 178). 
Slowly, voters were persuaded to believe that the media at the time were capable of 
portraying reality fully. However, the reality presented by media outlets did not necessarily 
directly correspond to the social reality that many citizens faced daily. Public opinion polls were 
introduced in political life as a measuring tool of voters’ preferences. It was also the 1988 
election, that was the first time in Mexico’s history that PRI did not win the majority of the 
legislative seats in congress. PRI had to learn to negotiate in congress with representatives of the 
opposition parties, primarily PAN, the second political force in Mexico. 
The political communication practice of combining political advertising, public opinion 
polls, and money was quickly adopted by politicians after Mexico entered the globalized world. 
The open economy policy of Mexico generated by the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) back in 1993 affected not only the business sectors with a restructured dynamic 
process of Mexico’s economic elite class, but the cultural, lifestyle, technology, communication, 
and politics also were transformed. The technological advancements of communication and 
interconnectivity offered Mexicans the opportunity to easily access worldwide news contents and 
easily created news content as well. Neoliberal economic practice promotes the diminution of the 
state and the expansion of the market. 
Later on in the Carlos Salinas de Gortari presidency (1988-1993), the national television 
network Imevisión went up for sale as part of Mexico’s neoliberal economic plan. In 1993, 
Imevisón was sold to Ricardo Salinas Pliego for 641 million of pesos, who reorganized the 
company and renamed it Televisión Azteca. This was the first time in history that Televisa faced 
competition. Nevertheless, in terms of political ideology and political affiliation, both networks 
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shared the same view. Salinas Pliego also considered himself to be PRI and government allied. 
Furthermore, both Azcárraga and Salinas Pliego shared the same position regarding the role of 
television in Mexican society: television’s programming should amuse and entertain. According 
to his viewpoint, for a democratic system to function, more education along with economic 
progress should be present; and television has nothing to do with it (Proceso, 1993, p. 6). For 
Azcárraga Milmo, the function of television is to entertain and amuse members of the working 
class. Television Azteca emerged not as a new voice, just as the perpetuation of the same 
practice previously established by Televisa, a commercial business that supported PRI. Some 
communication scholars called TV Azteca “Televisa Lite” for its lack of critical, unbiased news 
coverage.  
In addition, NAFTA changed the way politics was conducted in Mexico. From the very 
beginning in January 1994, the first year that NAFTA became active in the national economy, 
the Zapatistas (EZLN) began an opposition movement against NAFTA. They conducted much 
of their proselytism on the internet. The rebel group, located in the Chiapas state in La Candona 
jungle, had somehow a cutting-age technology at their fingertips. The battlefield of the social 
movement and the Mexican government was the Internet and the international media—not a 
physical location as tradition dictates. From this moment on, the political communication 
dynamics in Mexico radically changed. According to Tanius Karam (2000), “their media strategy 
of interviews and press releases smashed the traditional rules of a war discourse” (p. 1). 
 The media became the battleground for politics. The military conflict lasted about 12 
days. It was the paramilitary group who had taken the less amount of time before negotiation 
efforts began. Nevertheless, the relationship between the political power (PRI) and the media did 
not change at all. As a matter of fact, one of the leaders of the Zapatista Group, the 
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Subcomandante Marcos, declined national media requests for interviews, arguing that the 
Mexican media were censored by the government. The only interview with the Mexican press 
that Subcomandante agreed on was with journalist Ricardo Rocha.  
After the 1994 election, the major complaint between political parties and their 
candidates was the media exposure, especially from PAN presidential candidate, Diego 
Fernández de Cevallos, who made it clear that he would not recognize the election results if 
media coverage did not change from favoring PRI to a more balanced approach. Televisa’s news 
reporting was perceived as an obstacle to democracy. As a consequence, the COFIPE was 
modified to address the number one complaint of political parties regarding their access to the 
media, television in particular. As a result of the previous events, political parties enjoyed a 
direct access to the media for the next (2000) election; the access consisted of public funding and 
an openness policy to the media.  
On April 16, 1997, media magnate Emilio Azcárraga Milmo died of cancer at 67 years. 
Azcárraga Milmo’s 29-year-old son Emilio Azcárraga Jean became president of Televisa 
Corporation on March 3, 1997, a few days before his father’s death. Under a new presidency, 
Televisa changed its political support from PRI to support an open statement of “Televisa 
supports Mexico,” a nonpolitical perspective that was focused on ratings. As a consequence, 
Televisa changed its electoral news practices for the first time in Televisa’s history during the 
1998 Mexico City mayoral election. PRI’s opposition candidates were covered by the network 
newscasts. This action could have been the result of a combination of three factors, the indication 
of a more unbiased journalistic coverage and the sympathy that Televisa vice president of news 
Miguel Alonso felt for one of the opposition candidates. Second, it was important to change 
Televisa’s news perception among viewers who associated the network directly with PRI. Third, 
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the 1988 election changed Mexican politics dynamics, and as a consequence indirectly 
encouraged media opening. However, “Political liberalization does not guarantee independence 
or diversity in the media” (Lawson, 2002, p. 3). Televisa was forced to change its news content 
to obtain ratings in order to survive in a competitive and global market. At this point, in order to 
maintain high ratings, the news media content changed into frivolous, sensationalistic, and 
yellowish content.  
In 1998, Televisa’s main news anchor Jacobo Zabludovsky stepped down from the TV 
screen in order to change Televisa’s image in the minds of the audience. His newscast, 24 Horas, 
went off the air as well. Zabludovsky was going to remin a participant in the news department 
behind the cameras and became the anchor of a newscast broadcasted in the cable system. 
Zabludovsky was substituted by Guillermo Ortega Ruíz, who was the main anchor of the nightly 
newscast edition in Televisa. Two years later, on March 31, 2000, Ortega Ruíz resigned, arguing 
a lack of journalist open practices. As he explained in a radio interview with José Gutiérrez Vivó, 
“I did not feel comfortable in the company any more, I was subject of a rigid editorial policy 
designed by the top administrators” (Mejía Barquera, 2000, p. 1).  
Televisa appointed Joaquín López Dóriga to substitute for Ortiz Ruíz. On March 29, 
1998, Abraham Zabludovsky, the son of Jacobo Zabludovsky, main anchor and responsible for 
the afternoon newscast on Televisa’s main national channel, resigned when he heard about 
López Dóriga’s promotion. He wanted to be chosen, but the top administrators did not favor him. 
The next day, his dad resigned as well, in solidarity with his son’s decision after 28 years of a 
journalistic career. Even the president of Mexico, Ernesto Zedillo, tried to persuade Jacobo from 
leaving Televisa, but he remained firm on his decision.  
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As a consequence, the news content also changed; the purpose was to gain ratings with 
yellow journalism and celebrity news. During Televisa’s national newscast 24 Horas era, the 
most important news of the day was the president’s activities. However, for El Noticiero de 
López Dóriga (Televisa) and Hechos de la Noche (TV Azteca), the top news stories were crime 
and natural disasters. The president’s daily activities are included in the newscast, but are usually 
not the first story told in the newscast like it used to be in the past. Also, politicians began to be 
covered as celebrities, focusing the report on their particular personal attributes. Many of them 
began appearing in celebrity magazines along with movie stars. News shifted its focus from 
serious political journalism to coverage on personalities. The media began to distance themselves 
from their primary social electoral function—that is to keep voters informed about quality 
electoral facts. 
2006 Election: Candidates and Their Political Platforms 
Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE) registered five candidates for the 2006 presidential election: 
Felipe Calderón, Roberto Madrazo, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), Patricia Mercado, 
and Roberto Campa. Each candidate is briefly described in alphabetical order (biography, 
political alliances, and political platform).  
The conservative right-wing Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) (National Action Party) was 
founded in 1926 by Manuel Gómez Morin. For a very long time PAN was Partido 
Revolucionario Institucional’s (PRI) (Institutional Revolutionary Party) main political 
competitor until PAN finally prevailed over PRI in 2000. Felipe Calderón Hinojosa represented 
the PAN in the 2006 election. Caderón was born August 18, 1962, in the southern state of 
Michoacán. He is the son of Luis Calderón Vega, who was a PAN founding member and 
political candidate at the state level for the PAN party on several occasions. Calderón received a 
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law degree from the Escuela Libre de Derecho, a master’s degree in economics from Instituto 
Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), and a master’s degree in public administration from 
Harvard University. His public service included: PAN party representative registered with IFE 
from 1994 to 1995, gubernatorial candidate in 1995, PAN president from 1996 to1999, federal 
deputy from 1991 to 1994, federal deputy and PAN deputy head from 2000 to 2003, General 
Director of Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicos Públicos (BANOBRAS), and Secretary of 
Energy from 2003 to 2005.  
The political agenda Calderón presented to IFE was a 60-page document titled 
Plataforma Política del Partido Acción Nacional. His agenda consisted of 15 public issues (see 
Table 1). The economy was top priority on Calderón’s agenda. Calderón proposed increasing 
employment, equality of opportunities in a competitive economy, support for tourism, and aid to 
agricultural and fishing industries. He believed that the Mexican treasury policy should be able 
to respond to the country’s economic needs; in addition, Calderón felt that states and 
municipalities should be the catalyst for regional economic development. Education was the 
second item on Calderón’s agenda. He proposed improving the quality of education, creating 
special needs programs, and supporting science/technology research. The third public issue for 
the PAN candidate was human rights; Calderón recommended protecting and defending rights of 
Mexican children, immigration human rights, and support of nonprofit civil organizations.  
Roberto Campa Cifrián was the presidential candidate for Partido Nueva Alianza (New 
Alliance Party). He was born on January 1, 1957, in Mexico City. Campa has a law degree from 
Universidad Anáhuac. He was Mexico City’s deputy, PRI president in Mexico City, federal 
deputy in 2003, and member and spokesperson of the Grupo de la Unidad Democrática 
(TUCOM) in 2005. TUCOM was an internal PRI political group formed to prevent Madrazo 
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from becoming, the PRI presidential candidate. In Congress, Campa voted against AMLO’s 
desafuero process, because to him, the desafuero process was a mechanism to prevent AMLO 
from participating in the 2006 election. 
Roberto Campa’s 33-page document Plataforma Electoral Partido Nueva Alianza 
Elección Federal 2006 had politics as the main issue on his platform (Table 1). Campa suggested 
a new relationship should be formed between candidates and voters. Campa advocated for a 
permanent relationship between elected officials and citizens. In addition, the New Alliance 
candidate considered that a regulated agreement between the United States and Mexico should 
be created in order to administer the flow of immigrants and avoid friction between both 
countries. In his viewpoint, Mexican authorities were responsible for creating an efficient policy 
to reduce the amount of frictions between countries and to defend the dignity of those Mexicans 
living abroad. Campa proposed that the government require banks to create programs with 
widespread office locations for money delivery, and it should reduce the transfer commission. 
AMLO was the candidate for the Alianza por el Bien de Todos (Well Being Alliance), a 
fusion between the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (PRD), Partido del Trabajo (PT), and 
Partido Convergencia. AMLO was born on November 13, 1953, in the state of Tabasco. He 
holds bachelor degrees in political science and public administration from the Universidad 
Table 2: Presidential Candidates Political Platform—IFE Registration Document 
Issues AMLO Calderón Madrazo Mercado Campa 
#       %   #          %   #         %     #           %    #        %    
Economy 20     40   18        27   10       21    11        19    4        25   
Education 7      14    8          12    3           6   9          17    2        13   
Health 2        4    2          3  1           3  4            7    * 0
Culture 3        6    3          5     2           4  4            7    * 0
Religion 1        2  * 0 *           0 * 0 * 0
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Foreign Relations 2        4   4          6    3           6    4            7    1          6    
Military 1        2  1          2  2           4  * 0 * 0
Poverty 2        4   1          2 *           0 1            2  * 0
Political System 5      10    5          7    5         11  3           6  6         38     
Crime 2        4    * 0 1           3  2          4  * 0
Environment 2        4     2          3  5         11 3          6  1           6    
Infrastructure 3          6    1         2  2           4  1           2  * 0
Human Rights * 0 7       10 3           6   4           7  * 0
Gender Equity * 0 1         2 1           3  2           4  1           6    
Media * 0 *         0 * 0 2           4  * 0
Judicial System * 0 5         7    3           6   3           6  * 0
Housing * 0 * 0 3           6   * 0 * 0
Family * 0 4         6     3           6   1           2 * 0
Immigration * 0 4         6     * 0 * 0 1           6     
Total N=50 N=66 N=47 N=54 N=16 
* Public issue does not exist on candidate’s agenda.
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). AMLO was director of the Instituto 
Indigenista de Tabasco (Indigenous Institute of Tabasco) in 1977, general coordinator of Plan 
Nacional de Zonas Deprimidas y Grupos Marginados de la Presidencia de la República 
(COPLAMAR) in 1978, state director of the PRI party in 1983, director of social promotion of 
the Instituto Nacional del Consumidor in 1984, PRD member since 1989, PRD gubernatorial 
candidate for Tabasco state in 1988, PRD party national leader from 1996 to 1999, and Mexico 
City head of state from 2000 to 2005. AMLO has published several books, among them are Los 
Primeros Pasos; Tabasco 1810-1867, Del Esplendor a la Sombra: La Republica Restaurada 
Tabasco 1867-1876, Tabasco: Víctima de un Fraude, Entre la Historia y la Esperanza, and 
FOBAPROA Expediente Abierto. 
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Andrés Manuel López Obrador presented his political agenda in 50 Compromisos para 
Recuperar El Orgullo Nacional. AMLO’s key platform issues were the economy (create more 
jobs, support agriculture, fish industry, update Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) without vending, 
reinforce the business sector, and reinforce tax collection); followed by education (elevate the 
quality of basic education, continue the scholar breakfast program, create 200 new high schools 
and 30 universities, institute a national distribution of a free school supplies package, and support 
scientific research); political system (create a new federal system, devise a system for 
presidential impeachment); culture (establish book fairs, create more libraries, and support 
cultural stations); and infrastructure (create a new airport for Mexico City, purchase a fast 
national commuter train to travel the country, and construct a canal that will unite the Pacific and 
the Atlantic oceans) (Table 1).  
Roberto Madrazo Pintado of the Alianza por México (Alliance for Mexico), a fusion 
between the PRI and the Partido Verde Ecológista de México (PVEM) (Green Party), was born 
on July 30, 1952, in the central state of Tabasco. He holds a law degree from UNAM. In 1979, 
Madrazo Pintado joined the Barra Nacional de Abogados (National Bar of Attorneys). In 1987, 
he published Donde Empieza el Pavimento, an essay about urban societies’ problems and their 
solutions. Madrazo had several positions in the public service, such as federal deputy in 1976, 
senator from 1988 to 1991, federal deputy from 1991 to 1993, governor of Tabasco from 1995 to 
2000, and PRI party national president from 2002 to 2005.  
Roberto Madrazo’s agenda was constructed from the Coalición Alianza por México 
Plataforma Electoral, a document submitted when he registered with IFE as PRI’s presidential 
candidate. The Alianza por México proposal was divided into three major sections—the country 
that we want, the society we desire, and the government we require. His agenda consisted of 15 
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public issues (Table 1). Economy ranked at the top of his list: increased employment, modifing 
the tax collection process, as well as providing incentives to medium and small business in areas 
such as agriculture, fishing, and tourism industries. The two public issues that ranked second 
place in Madrazo’s agenda were the political system and environment. In terms of the political 
system, Madrazo proposed that Mexico needs a state political system and federal system in order 
to assemble a more efficient public administration. In regard to the environment, the PRI 
candidate suggested legislation to protect Mexico’s natural resources in order to save 
ecosystems, species, and water. 
Dora Patricia Mercado Castro was the candidate for the Partido Alternativa 
Socialdemocráta y Campesina. She was born in 1957 in the northern state of Sonora. Mercado 
has a bachelor’s degree in Economics from UNAM. Mercado is a feminist politician. She 
founded and directed several nonprofit organizations that focus on women rights, women 
leadership, and gender equality. In 1980, she was founding member of the Grupo Autónomo de 
Mujeres Universitarias; a group devoted to promote gender equality, counsel member of the 
Instituto Mexicano de Investigación de Familia y Población in 1992, director of Grupo de 
Información y Reproducción Elegida (GIRE) in 1996, executive director of Equidad de Género, 
Ciudadanía, Trabajo y Familia from 1997 to 2001, and national leader of the México Posible 
Party during 2002 (but the political party lost its registration with IFE in 2003). Mercado has 
published several essays, such as “Mujeres y Políticas Públicas” with the Fundación Friedrich 
Ebert, “Lucha Sindical y Antidemocracia Feminista,” “Los Grupos Que Buscan La 
Sensibilización de la Población: Las Dificultades para Elaborar una Propuesta para la 
Legalización o despenalización del Aborto,” and “Prevención del Aborto Riesgoso y sus 
Consecuencias Adversas,” among others.  
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Mercado stated her political agenda in her 113-page document, Plataforma Electoral 
2006. Mercado presented a 14-category agenda (Table 1); economy and education were her key 
priority public issues. In terms of economy, Mercado proposed more employment opportunities, 
the revision of current rural economic support assistance as well as policy that would ensure the 
ideal conditions of sustainable development, revision of the country business sector, and support 
of the globalization economic model. For education, Mercado supported the idea of a knowledge 
cities model; support of technological advancement of scientific research was on top of her 
agenda. In addition, she wanted to minimize the digital divide in education by redesigning the 
current instructional models for elementary and secondary education, decentralizing education, 
and devoting more economic resources to education. Mercado proposed eliminating 
discrimination against women, indigenous people, children, homosexuals, lesbians, and 
transgender persons. Mercado was the only candidate who included the mass media on her 
agenda. She acknowledges that the media have a fundamental role in the consolidation of 
democracy, because an informed citizen is an informed voter. Mercado proposed several changes 
in the media landscape. The key points were regulation of political parties’ advertisements by 
IFE, and the broadcast licensing process should be open and transparent; currently, the process is 
at the discretion of the president. Lastly, she would like to revise the role and responsibilities of 
the Radio Television and Cinematography agency. The agency should not operate as a 
censorship agent. On the contrary, in her view, the federal agency should regulate the media. 
Finally, media legislation should be modified to incorporate the right to refute.  
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Chapter 3 
The 2007 Electoral Reform: The New Role of the Media 
 
The problems that arise from the 2006 presidential elections in Mexico led to conflict between 
political parties, voters, media owners, and political analysts; and illuminated the need for 
immediate review of COFIPE. Mexico’s electoral law needed to adopt an adequate legal 
framework to regulate political communication in an extremely competitive electoral 
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environment. Almost a month after Election Day, in the middle of the 2006 postelection turmoil, 
PAN candidate Felipe Calderón declared that an electoral reform was urgent and necessary in 
Mexico because the existing electoral system showed signs of deterioration and collapse. 
Therefore, several PAN members worked to reduce campaign financial expenditures, campaign 
period, and advertising time in the media; and broaden IFE and TEPJF faculties (Jiménez, 
Gómez, & Merlos, 2007). On November 14, 2006, Senate Chamber Head Manlio Fabio 
Beltrones Rivera-PRI presented a legal state reform initiative to Congress. PAN Senate Head 
Santiago Creel and PRD Senate Head Carlos Navarrete were confident that the initiative was 
going to be accepted by Congress before the end of February. Legislators and political parties 
created the State Reform agenda, which consisted of five topics:  
(1) Federation–to update the federal pact with all the federal entities that demand 
more federation and less centralism; the political policy of concentrating 
power in a central organization.  
(2) State Regime and Government to renovate the political regimen in order to 
generate a new balance of power among the executive branch and Congress.  
(3) Democracy and Electoral System to create a system to regulate equal access to 
the media, excessive campaign funding, and precampaigns.  
(4) Judicial Power Reform to promote equality in the transparency of judicial 
proceedings, and  
(5) Social Guarantees to assure human rights and liberties for all minority groups, 
such as women, the disabled, ethnic groups, old people, and infants (Notimex, 
2007g, p. 1). 
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In late February 2007, Congress only used the state reform procedure to conduct 
negotiations, legal writing, and final presentation in each chamber. In practical terms, the state 
reform officially began in late April with the installation of the Comisión Ejecutiva de 
Negociación y Construcción de Acuerdos del Congreso de la Unión (State Reform Committee). 
Congress designated a group of well-known politicians and intellectuals, such as Porfirio Muñoz 
Ledo, Jorge Alcocer, Diego Valadés, and María Amparo Casar, as members of the committee in 
charge of establishing mechanisms for analysis, negotiation, and construction of agreements to 
specify the state reform process in a time period of 1 year. (Zárate, 2007h). The Head of the 
Committee position would be rotated every 4 months between the Senate Head, State Committee 
Head, and Chamber of Deputies Head. PRD Senate Head Carlos Navarrete (2007) commented to 
the press,  
The committee members should not interfere in any way, such as politics, like in the past. 
We [legislators] have no intention to convert the State Reform Committee into a sort of 
political weapon to make pressure against several social sectors in order to resolve other 
conflicts. (Torres, 2007, p. 1)  
The negotiation and agreement process between the Chamber of Deputies, Senate, 
Chamber, the Negotiation Committee, political parties, and general population would have 
several phases:  
(1) Political parties had until May 24, 2007, to submit their proposals to the Negotiation 
committee.  
(2) Public search forums celebrated in Mexico City were scheduled on June 7th  
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and 8th, four other forums were scheduled for the interior; a total of 1,157 papers 
were presented in the public forums by the general public; about 25% (290) of those 
were about democracy and the electoral system.  
(3) Negotiation and construction of agreements between all political organizations were 
affected by the process, 
 (4) Project writing,  
(5) Negotiation committee approval,  
(6) Signing and presentation of initiatives,  
(7) Chambers voting.  
The proposals presented by the political parties regarding democracy and the electoral 
reform were the following: Three political parties—PRD, Convergencia, and PT—united efforts 
to form a common front, the Frente Amplio Progresista (FAP), to present the Propuesta para la 
Transformación de México (Mexico’s Transformation Proposal). Regarding the democracy and 
electoral system topic, FAP’s proposition suggested (1) total prohibition of radio and television 
commercials used for political and electoral purposes; (2) equitable distribution of the state 
official time (name of the broadcast time that private electronic media stations must provide to 
the Mexican government to air government programming) among political parties and 
candidates; (3) reduction of campaign funds; (4) a constitutional reform to democratize the 
media in order to guarantee the right to be informed; (5) prohibition of private financing to 
political parties and candidates; (6) regulation of early campaigning, social programs, and 
governmental advertising during electoral periods; (7) instill the universal vote and the direct 
vote of Mexicans overseas and their representation in Congress, (8) reduction of campaign 
expenditure limits; (9) the adoption of electronic ballot boxes; and (10) the creation of the 
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Instituto Nacional de Elecciones  de Participación Ciudadana (National Institute of Elections 
and Citizens’ Participation) (Garduño, 2007a). PRD General Secretary Guadalupe Acosta 
Naranjo (2007) confirmed that his party agreed with PRI regarding the refusal of the second 
electoral round as well as legislators and municipal presidents’ reelection. Acosta also 
announced that his party would like to concentrate efforts on the electoral reform at first, before 
moving on to the other topics that conformed to the state reform (Ochoa, 2007).   
  The PRI proposed the following: (1) the creation of an autonomous institution that would 
be in charge of creating a new mode of identification in place of the current photo ID voting 
credential. The PRI proposed an ID document that could be used for other purposes in addition 
to voting. This new institution would be in charge of periodically revising the voting list and 
providing the official voter list to the IFE. Later in the discussions, PRI and PRD proposed that 
Instituto Nacional de Estadistica Geografía e Informática (INEGI) should be the institution in 
charge of the new ID because it had total autonomy. However, PAN wanted the Consejo 
Nacional de Población (Population National Council), which depends on the Attorney General’s 
office to be in charge. (2) PRI proposed to establish a second round in the presidential election in 
the event that the winner did not obtain 45% of voters, or that the difference between the first 
two candidates was less than five points. (3) Governmental propaganda would be prohibited 40 
days before Election Day. (4) Negative political advertising should be prohibited. (5) The length 
of the campaign period would be decreased. (6) Primary campaigns would be regulated as in the 
normal campaign periods. (7) A very specific set of rules regarding private and public financing 
to candidates would be created. (8) Creation of a regulation regarding the posting of political 
propaganda in the streets would be established. Nuevo León’s PRI Head Héctor Morales Rivera 
(2007) mentioned to the press that there were many citizens who complained about propaganda 
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placement around the cities, excessive amount, and cost of political advertising in the cities 
(Moreno González, 2007). (9) PRI proposed to discharge all IFE council members. According to 
PRI Senate Head Manlio Fabio Beltrones, the main objective of PRI’s proposition was to prevent 
a scenario like the one on July 2, 2006, when a good number of citizens questioned IFE’s ability 
to arbitrate the election; that resulted in Mexico’s immersion in a postelectoral conflict that 
divided Mexicans and put political stability and the ability to govern at risk (Becerril, 2007).  
The PAN proposed the following: (1) install the referendum and plebiscite legal 
procedures, (2) establish basic principles to regulate the internal practices of political parties, (3) 
institute political party financial liquidation in the event that it lost the registration, (4) revise the 
requirements for the formation of new political parties, (5) establish a better statistical 
accountability to identify the percentage of votes for each political party, (6) improve the 
formula for public financing allocation to political parties, (7) reduce the public financing budget 
for midterm elections (2009) and presidential elections (2012), (8) regulate bank confidentiality; 
that is, bank policies that prohibited the release of financial transaction information to any kind 
of institution or person with the exception of the Supreme Court, (9) elevate the rank into judicial 
command every time that IFE inquired about business information regarding political party 
mercantile deals, (10) prohibit governmental advertising during campaign periods, (11) create a 
guideline of political communication regulations in the three levels of government: municipal, 
state, and federal, (12) create regulations for the intervention of public servants in electoral 
campaigns, (13) assure equal access of political parties and candidates to all mass media outlets, 
and (14) reduce campaign periods (Reforma Electoral, 2007). 
The major problem in the 2006 election process and the later disagreement was the lack 
of a set of laws to regulate the political advertising and the role of the media during electoral 
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periods. Furthermore, former PAN Senator Javier Corral (2006) believed that it would be 
difficult to overcome the postelectoral political discord without a solid agreement to reform the 
set of laws that regulated the electoral process. Left-wing politician Manuel Camacho Solís 
(2007) stated that the electoral reforms were necessary because those reforms would set the 
electoral regulations to conduct the 2009 election. For Camacho Solís, the approval of the reform 
was the only guarantee for political stability that existed at the time, the only way to ensure that 
the country could move forward politically. In 2007, leftist politician Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, 
member of the Executive Negotiation Commission, considered that the two central points of the 
electoral reform were: (1) prohibition of purchasing advertising in the electronic media and (2) 
the discharge of IFE’s general council president and members. From his viewpoint, if these two 
matters did not pass in Congress, the whole reform process would be a fiasco! (Villamil, 2007e).  
In addition, Muñoz Ledo thought that Congress took on an enormous responsibility by putting 
into operation a state reform: “Calderón would not be able to govern, for the reason that from the 
beginning he does not have legitimacy. Also, Calderón has no control of his political party. At 
present, the best thing for Mexico is the reform” (Gómez, 2007, p. 1). Therefore, the state reform 
was the only alternative to recover citizens’ trust. Mexico City’s PRD Deputy Agustín Guerrero 
(2007) pointed out that during the past electoral process, IFE’s council was not able to perform 
in the standard required. Therefore, all the IFE’s general council members, including their 
president, Ugalde, should be discharged from office before the 2009 election (Vergara, 2007b). 
The Head of PRI in the Senate, Manilio Fablio Beltrones (2007), supported this view. For him, 
the current IFE’s general council could not supervise the next federal election schedule for 2009 
(Zárate, 2007a). 
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The state reform negotiations in Congress among legislative representatives were 
centered on two pieces of legislation—the electoral reform and the fiscal reform. Muñoz Ledo 
(2007) described the political context of the moment to the press, “PAN’s legislators had their 
own strategy in Congress, which was to push for the approval of the majority of the fiscal 
initiatives in exchange for fully agreeing with the electoral reform initiatives.”  In his viewpoint, 
the political game was like this “If the fiscal agreement were modest, in consequence the 
electoral would be too” (Villamil, 2007e, p. 1). IFE’s president was furious when he figured out 
the PAN political strategy; Ugalde went even further intimidating Calderón by declaring to the 
media “If Congress approved the removal of IFE general council, in political terms, this action 
meant that Congress accepted fraud in the 2006 election” (Villamil, 2007e, p.1). Ugalde believed 
that in the event that Congress could approve the electoral reform, IFE’s autonomy would be 
vulnerable because its control would shift from the executive power to political parties. IFE’s 
Council President stated that if the electoral council violated a law or the Constitution, the 
procedure should be to file a court case against it. For Ugalde, the discharge of council members 
without a legal or objective cause set a bad precedent for IFE’s autonomy (Delgado, 2007a).  
Some media outlets labeled the IFE’s shift of power partidocracia (political-party ruling 
democracy)—that is, a democracy centered on political parties. This term was also used to 
discredit political parties in the media. Their argument was that political parties wanted to rule 
over IFE; and in time, political parties would rule over the whole country. However, Political 
Science Professor Jorge Chabat (2007) made it clear that those political parties that were 
represented in Congress were not taking over IFE’s control: They owned IFE. Congress was in 
charge of naming council members in 2003; they were the same members that Congress wanted 
to discharge. In other words, Congress had always been in charge of IFE. It was simply the mass 
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media’s attempt to mislead their audiences by providing inaccurate information. The power of 
political parties came directly from the Constitution. In Congress, representatives of political 
parties took an active role in the approval of a law or the elimination of it. In contrast, 
partidocracia was not considered a Mexican reality. Chabat (2007) explained that partidocracia 
occurred when political parties and Congress did not represent the citizens’ interests. In a 
partidocracia context, political parties serve to divide society to eventually incorporate a 
totalitarian power that would eliminate political parties. This was not the case of the Mexican 
political postelectoral context. 
A few days later, Congress announced an agreement between its members to replace 
IFE’s general council members in a three-time scale. Once the reform became active (in late 
November 2007), the Chamber of Deputies had a 30-day period to decide which citizen would 
become the next general council president for IFE and two other council members whose period 
would end on October 30, 2016. Three of the other six council members would be suspended on 
August 15, 2008, and the rest on October 30, 2010 (Zárate, 2007b). For now, Luis Carlos Ugalde 
is the only name that legislators have released from their layoff list (Villamil, 2007f). 
The same date that the agreement was approved, both networks provided IFE Council 
President Luis Carlos Ugalde an opportunity to defend himself. He argued that IFE’s autonomy 
was at risk, and his congressional dismissal represented political revenge regarding the 2006 
electoral process. There was a group of intellectuals who supported CIRT’s position; it published 
an open letter about its opinion on the electoral reform. According to researcher Alberto Aziz 
Nassif (2007), both of them were instruments of the networks’ strategy to misinform the public 
(2007a). The media protected Ugalde from potential removal from IFE. Ugalde, who supported 
the media, said, “The reform is an advancement for Mexico’s democracy” (Reséndiz, 2007a, p. 
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1). Later on, Ugalde contradicted himself by affirming that the electoral reform had made 
significant progress; he then declared that the electoral reform would damage IFE’s 
independence and autonomy, because IFE was in control of the political parties. Ugalde was 
annoyed by the fact that Congress ordered an internal audit procedure that for him was an 
instrument that subjugated general council members.  
The New York Times on September 13, 2007, published a story defending IFE’s 
president, arguing that in the event of Ugalde’s congressional dismissal, the executive and 
legislative branches would place IFE’s autonomy in jeopardy. According to the Times, to 
discharge general council members before their term was due to expire in 2010 would ridicule 
the autonomy created to protect the IFE and the electoral system. The New York Times accused 
PRI and PRD legislators of being the primary promoters of IFE’s general council discharge. The 
newspaper also observed that during the past election, IFE demonstrated its importance because 
the institution had the ability to manage a very competitive and difficult election (Esquivel, 
2007). In response, PRD’s General Secretary Guadalupe Acosta Naranjo (2007) remarked during 
a press conference that it did not seem as if Ugalde was fighting for IFE, but for his job! 
(Proceso, 2007a). In addition, Head of the PRD faction in the Senate, Carlos Navarrete, accused 
Ugalde in the same press conference, saying, “He [Ugalde] knows that he is lying about IFE’s 
independence and he knows which political group he is defending, and that is not IFE’s 
autonomy!” (Proceso, 2007a, p. 1). It was evident that Ugalde was defending the people who 
placed him with IFE (Zárate, 2007c).  
Meanwhile, Televisa, TV Azteca, and other major national media outlets started a battle 
against the Senate. It was a media campaign against the electoral reform based on the 
acknowledgement that the reform was in opposition to freedom of speech, the right to 
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information, political democracy, and the allegation that the reform empowered political parties, 
not citizens. The media only offered a voice to those politicians who supported their point of 
view. The media ignored all other legislators who were in favor of the electoral reform: None of 
them appeared as news sources or were mentioned in a report. Televisa and TV Azteca news 
anchors threatened political parties, arguing that the parties were being unfair to them because 
the election passed, but that the parties should remember that another election was coming in 
2009 and they were going to need the media to campaign. All the information was one-sided; 
perhaps their arrogance worked to their disadvantage by reinforcing, unifying, and consolidating 
the agreement between political parties and the reform.  
In response to the media’s attack, Senate Chamber Speaker Santiago Creel-PAN and PRI 
Senator Manlio Fabio Beltrones held separate meetings with Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa 
(SIP) President Ricardo E. Trotti to explain in detail how the reform affected freedom of speech. 
After hearing the senators, Trotti endorsed the electoral reform during a press conference:  
My organization has always supported laws that protect freedom of speech, and 
guarantees the citizen’s right to be informed. I consider it to be historic, what is 
happening in Mexico in this matter. This [electoral reform] is an example for other 
countries. (Zárate, 2007c, p. 1) 
SIP society was founded in 1943 in Havana, Cuba. One of its main objectives was to defend 
freedom of speech, defend journalistic dignity and responsibility, and promote technical and 
professional interchange between its members. Trotti’s approval sent the message to the Mexican 
media that their freedom of speech was not harmed or lost. 
Former PRI Senator, Manuel Barlett (2007), believes that the Televisa and TV Azteca 
attitude proved that networks had no limits. They used a public good such as the nation’s 
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airwaves to attack Congress. For Barlett, the media networks were violating several laws with 
their behavior; he keeps asking the Calderón administration to get to work and control the 
situation with phrases such as: Who was going to call order? Where was the Attorney General? 
How much would the networks be fined? (Morales, 2007a). The television and radio licensees 
went further by denouncing that Congress was attacking their business interests. The media 
owners overlook the fact that the government provides them permission to use the national 
airwaves to make a profit. In Barlett’s opinion, the conflict had to do with the electoral money. 
The media’s behavior toward the Senate was only another example of the telecracia supremacy 
against the political power to assure Barlett during a newspaper interview.  
Television in Mexico is no longer the fourth power; it’s the first in which the state 
and other public institutions are prosecuted to impose the media corporations’will 
upon them. It is important that the media adjust itself to the new context marked 
by the reform. It was obvious that during the 2006 election, politicians were the 
media’s hostages. (Morales, 2007a, p. 1) 
Furthermore, journalist Jenaro Villamil (2007g) observed that the discussion went beyond media 
profits. For him, media owners converted their signal into an electronic supermarket where all 
kinds of goods could be sold, such as the political ad customized into “news” and “special 
interviews” (2007g).  
Currently, licensees sell 18 minutes per hour of customized advertising. Televisa’s 
president Emilio Azcárraga Jean (2007) stated that political advertising represented 4% of his 
corporation’s total revenue (Villamil, 2007g). For Villamil, the media used Ugalde as an excuse 
to stop the electoral reform; they did not care about IFE’s autonomy. The fundamental concern 
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of media owners was the possibility of losing the political power they obtained during the 2000 
election when presidential campaigns switched to political marketing campaigns.  
As a result, political advertisements turned into a very expensive commodity for 
politicians. In summary, Mexican democracy was kidnapped by the ratings. Obviously, the loss 
of political power was the major issue for licensees, those who never fairly informed their 
viewers. As journalist Armando Delgado (2007) explained in his editorial column,  
Mexicans have never been informed about the most important public issues by the 
audiovisual media (radio and television) outlets. In exchange for their misleading 
information or ignoring certain issues, licensees obtained rewards such as 
privileged amounts of governmental publicity, pardon of taxes, among others 
things. (2007b, p. 1) 
Former Senator and Asociación Mexicana de Derecho a la Información (AMEDI) (Mexican 
Association of the Right to Information) President Javier Corral (2007) considered that the media 
overturned its very core because the media was in charge of exercising the right to information, 
and it failed to expose the exact content of the electoral reform. Instead, journalists launched a 
series of misleading information campaigns, such as spreading negative opinions about the 
reform, arguing its job was on the line and the Senate was trying to take it away from them. In 
addition, reporters and media owners made the case that senators did nothing and earned high 
salaries, as Corral recalls. “Now, the media is trying to prohibit Senators from criticizing them, 
which is a huge step backward!” (2007a, p. 1) Apparently, there was an unwritten rule in the 
electronic media industries, which consisted of attack the senators or lose your job. PAN Senator 
Alejandro González Alcocer (2007) pointed out that the Senate and Chamber of Deputies in 
general showed a firm will to serve their country beyond any kind of pressure from economic or 
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political groups, and he believed that this was one of the facts that gave pride to legislators 
(Villamil, 2007j). 
Talk Show 
Nevertheless, the Cámara Nacional de la Industria de la Radio y la Televisión (CIRT) (National 
Broadcasters Association) participated in a discussion session with legislators about the electoral 
reform. CIRT broadcast nationwide, live via radio and television for 3 hours, their meeting with 
45 senators to request a referendum on the electoral reform. During the meeting, CIRT had the 
support of several of the most well-known television and radio personalities such as Joaquín 
López Dóriga, Carlos Loret de Mola, Denisse Maerker, Ciro Gómez Leyva, Javier Alatorre, 
Pedro Ferriz de Con, Paty Chapoy, Ricardo Rocha, and Nino Canún, as well as television 
executives such as Televisa Vice-President Javier Tejo Dondé; Grupo Radio Centro owners 
Francisco Aguirre and Francisco Ibarra; TV Azteca executive Ricardo Monreal; and Radio 
Fórmula owner Rogelio Azcárraga, who all argued that the reform was going to bring down their 
ratings. In addition, some business associations, such as the Consejo Coordinador Empresarial 
(CCE) and the Confederación de Cámaras Industriales (Concamin), were also present to support 
CIRT’s position.  
The petition was labeled as the “Referendum for Freedom,” CIRT insisted that the 
electoral reform affected Mexicans’ basic rights to be informed. In their viewpoint, it was an 
authoritarian, regressive, and aggression toward the electronic media. TV Azteca’s news director 
Sergio Sarmiento (2007) demanded a popular consult (a legal procedure for citizens to express 
their opinion on a particular matter) for Mexicans to express their opinion, without the 
participation of political parties. “We could not allow society to be kidnapped by political party 
heads” (Mejia, 2007, p. 1). In addition, Sarmiento declared that the media were a byproduct of 
  107
the reform. Therefore, the reform should cease until the referendum took place. He suggested 
that the referendum should be organized by IFE. Sarmiento told senators that licensees were 
willing to open their programming to those politicians who would like to participate in the 
referendum. He asked politicians: “Do you believe that we, the media, generate the negative 
advertising campaign during the 2006 election? Do you truly believe that everything changes 
because now candidates can only use 3 minutes?” (Villamil, 2007i, p. 1). CIRT President 
Enrique Pereda (2007) insisted that the Senate Chamber tried to approve the reform via fast 
track. As a result, none of their concerns were incorporated into the overall discussion (Villamil, 
2007i). TV Azteca spokesperson Luis Niño de Rivera (2007) read a press release that illustrated 
five major points that summarized CIRT’s protest. Those were (1) IFE independency; (2) 
defense of the actual IFE council members; (3) the creation of an ethics code for political parties, 
media, and candidates, instead of a constitutional lock; (4) the electoral reform should not 
encourage prohibitions that damage freedom of speech; and (5) rejection of political pressures to 
discharge IFE’s council members (Villamil, 2007i).  
Concamin president Ismael Placencia Núñez (2007) declared that legislators took the 
country hostage by conditioning the approval of the fiscal reform to the electoral reform without 
taking citizens into account (Mejia, 2007). Consejo Coordinador Empresarial (CCE) President 
Armando Paredes (2007) believed that the reform was a deterioration of all the advancements, 
such as freedom of speech, and that the reform created a vulnerability of IFE’s autonomy by 
forcing it to be at the mercy of political parties (Mejia, 2007). The electronic media licensees 
requested that the current IFE would be in charge of supervising the referendum. Senators turned 
down their petition and rescheduled the voting session 1 week earlier. CIRT also announced that 
the electoral reform could destroy small radio and television stations around the country. Former 
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PAN Senator Corral (2007) argued that this claim was not exact; in order to survive, small radio 
businesses had to rely on official governmental publicity or the electoral campaigns, but what 
kind of political coverage could this type of governmental dependency develop? (Corral, 2007b). 
But what kind of press coverage would stations provide when they depend on the government to 
survive? In the majority of occasions, stations will read governmental press releases exactly as 
they are without any other further reporting on the matter.  
PAN Senator Ricardo García Cervantes (2007) attempted to respond to CIRT, but the 
nationwide transmission was interrupted. Again, the mass media owners as well as CIRT were 
only interested in broadcasting their opinions and complaints about the electoral reform. But 
when an opposite viewpoint was expressed, the transmission terminated. Senator Corral viewed 
CIRT’s action as an act of censorship (Villamil, 2007j). García Cervantes’ discourse clarified 
that the freedom of speech was not damaged in any way by the reform, and that the discussion 
regarding this matter begin on April 13th. Therefore, there was sufficient time (about 5 months), 
to discuss the electoral reform with the media. The major point in the reform was to void the 
illegitimate inference of the money in an electoral process (Villamil, 2007h). That is, the 
candidate with larger financial resources had additional opportunities to purchase political 
advertising. This economic power was considered being unfair by several legislators. The CIRT 
president argued that his association did not wish to be the paladin to freedom of speech. On the 
contrary, his association tried to avoid the country’s regression caused by Congress, which 
harmed the right to freedom of speech (Proceso, 2007c). CIRT member Pereda (2007) explained 
that his association was not motivated by the monetary factor. In the association’s view, this 
reform signified a Ley Mordaza, a gag order that prevented communication flow. He commented 
that for now, this reform only affected the electronic media; but in the future, it could affect the 
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print and magazine media outlets. PRD Senator Pablo Gómez (2007) declared that the people 
slowing down Mexico were the mass media, not politicians. He made it clear that in Mexico an 
antidemocratic television structure existed because Mexico had a television duopoly context 
where two companies held the majority of the money as well as licenses (2007c). He had the 
same opinion as Colima Governor Silverio Cavazos (2007): The reform would generate an 
equitable competition among political parties because all candidates would have the same 
opportunity to present their political platform in the electronic media (Zamora, 2007). Regarding 
the referendum, Cavazos commented that he had never heard of such a thing when the new 
Federal Radio and Television Law (Ley Televisa) was approved. Because this law benefited the 
electronic media licensees, their actions should reflect consistency and compromise with 
Mexico. The governor suggested that the federal money, which would be saved with the reform, 
should be invested in supporting agriculture, health, and education (Zamora, 2007).  
Professor Gabriel Sosa Plata (2007) observed the media’s referendum was only a political 
strategy to gain time and delay the discussion (Morales, 2007a). Corral (2007) stated that 
Televisa was fighting legislators with constant biased news stories and advertising campaigns 
used as weapons against senators, because the corporation was trying to stop the reform. The 
core disagreement was who owned the airwaves. Televisa and CIRT felt that the airwaves 
belonged to the media while the senators claimed that it was a national patrimony (Morales, 
2007b). The bottom line of the media/Senate conflict was the risk of losing more than 500 
million pesos in political advertising revenue that the politicians—candidates, political parties, 
and public servants—generated each year (Proceso, 2007b). Centro de Investigaciones y 
Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS) researcher Alberto Aziz Nassif (2007) 
stated that the media made the public believe that the media defended IFE’s autonomy, but in 
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reality, they were defending their economic interests. Senator Corral affirmed that the 
government purchased 99.4% of its total budget for paid television from Televisa and TV 
Azteca. That was 53% of the yearly resources, approximately 26 billions pesos in comparison 
with radio, which represented 8%. Therefore, each year 15 media businesses controlled 66% of 
the annual advertising government financial budget. On top of that, during elections, the picture 
remained the same; those 15 media outlets managed 66% of the electoral budget (2007b). 
According to Corral, the electoral reform allowed politics to increase the freedom of expression 
privilege and politicians independence from the mediocracia (media democracy) system in 
which the media becomes the first power of the nation. 
The Senate Chamber 
On September 12, 2007, just before midnight, the Senate Chamber approved the electoral reform 
with 111 votes in favor and 11 against. All political parties approved a total prohibition against 
purchasing political advertising in electronic media. Each political message would be free, 
because IFE would have a total of 51 minutes daily on radio and television broadcast time per 
station during election periods; that is, three minutes per hour from 6:30 AM to 11:30 PM. This 
reform established a new electoral communication context: Political parties could not purchase 
advertising in radio and television; they must use official times to disseminate their political 
messages. The reform also prohibited third parties—individuals, associations, and 
corporations—from pursing advertising pay for advertisement in the electronic media. A legal 
definition of political electoral advertisement was written in the reform, incorporating limitations 
for commercial spot inclusion in telenovelas and comic shows.  
The reform redefined the role of the governmental communication. The new concept 
determined that the three levels of government—municipal, state, and national—advertisement 
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should only be informative with the purpose of orienting citizens about the government 
programs, but could not contain images, sounds, or graphics of politicians. IFE had new avenues 
to fine any political party, political groups, foreign businesses, and citizens who violated the law 
by purchasing political advertising. On top of that, IFE had the legal authority to request 
information about financial transactions. IFE’s authority was beyond the bank and fiscal private 
information act in order to keep track of the money that would pay for ads. In addition, the 
reform permitted independent candidacies to legally exist by recognizing the political figure, a 
long-time complaint of small political parties. The political power that electronic media owners 
gained during the Fox administration made them believe the media was the 2006 election 
protagonist, as communication journal Etcétera described. “These changes transport the political 
discussion to another forum; that is, political dialogue would not be centered on the electronic 
media. As a result, the quality of the political debate would not be limited to their party’s 
financial potential” (2007a, p. 1). Also, the media gained power through agreements with Felipe 
Calderón since he was a presidential candidate. During his first 9 months in office, Calderón 
spent three times more money on political advertising than Fox did. The federal government paid 
out 3.7 billion pesos, about 13,700 thousand pesos more than Fox for promotion of government 
accomplishments and the broadcast of official messages (Gil Olmos, 2007b,).  
In terms of news, the reform established that nonpaid news information was not 
considered propaganda (Zárate, 2007e). In addition, the reform would reduce the cost of electoral 
campaigns by 50% (approximately 3 billion pesos) and established that IFE would have 12% of 
the official time during nonelectoral years to promote voter participation (Zárate, 2007d). The 
new reform saved the state 3 billion pesos normally designated for the purchase of radio and 
television advertisement, explained to the press by former IFE’s President José Woldenberg 
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(Morales, 2007b). The reform classified the electoral process as public state affairs that should 
not be part of private media corporations, and established a series of penalties. Perhaps, for 
media owners, one of the most uncomfortable aspects of the reform was that IFE gained the legal 
power to cancel their license or permit as a penalty for violating the reform. This type of penalty 
was never part of an electoral law. This new law dictates that the radio airwaves used by 
electronic media to transmit their signal was the property of the state, and introduced a shorter 
period for election campaigns. The three main political parties— PRI, PAN, and PRD—agreed 
that this reform did not harm freedom of speech in any way. Its main purpose was to minimize 
the influence of campaign money on future elections. 
The Right of Reply 
Senate Chamber Head Santiago Creel–PAN (2007) commented that the electoral reform 
expanded freedom of speech to ensure the right of reply—that the right that any politician had to 
answer any blame in the same medium and time when those accusations were made (Zárate, 
2007f). Basically, the right to media access would benefit citizens. The right to reply was the 
right that any citizens had to defend themselves against criticism and accusations; in other words, 
to present their side of the story. Creel stated very clearly in a press conference,  
The source of disapproval for licensees is the money that destroyed the relation with 
politicians; the one who votes, rules, not the one who pays. This is only the beginning of 
a more profound series of changes; there are many interest groups that need to be 
reorganized. The purpose of the reform was to think more about the constitution and less 
about television. (Arvizu, 2007, p. 1) 
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The senator considered that the reform would modify the relationship between licensees and 
politicians. The reform prohibited buying custom political ads such as favorable information, 
news coverage, and infomercials like those presented during the 2006 election (Villamil, 2007l). 
In Mexico, it was a major accomplishment just to appear on the major television 
newscasts. During past elections, it was often observed that only the PRI candidate appeared in 
national newscasts. All the other candidates were nearly invisible. Opposition candidate access to 
the media was almost nonexistent. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Vicente Fox, Manuel “Maquio” 
Clouthier, Luis H. Álvarez, among other politicians, constantly complained about their limited 
access to the television media. The 1958 PAN presidential candidate, Luis H. Álvarez (2003), 
shared his memories about media and the political process:  
It was a completely closed regimen and very antidemocratic. Obviously, the mass media 
were completely subdued, I never had access to radio, much less television. As a matter 
of fact, one month after I launched my presidential campaign, I was detained in jail for 
several hours accused of being a member of the opposition that was my crime. (Álvarez, 
2003, 51:53)  
In the 1988 election, Manuel “Maquio” Clouthier, then PAN presidential candidate, 
frequently appeared wearing a mask over his mouth representing his lack of opportunity to 
“speak” on television. He also organized a boycott against Televisa’s main newscast 24 Horas 
for its lack of reporting on his campaign activities. In the past, candidates criticized lack of 
campaign coverage. The controversy directly questions the most fundamental journalistic ethics 
and principles juxtaposed to media profits. Jacobo Zabludovsky (2007), former 24 Horas news 
director and anchor, commented that in the past, media censorship during the PRI regimen was 
caused by the lack of political plurality, but current restriction is a bit sinister, because it comes 
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from within the media and it is used to defend its own interests. Zabludovsky commented in a 
magazine article, “Newscasts are employed to combat critics and competitors” (Berruga Filloy, 
2007, p. 50). That is, television newscasts attack and construct reality to benefit its owner’s ideas 
and economic interests. This new dynamic in television journalism questions the daily reporting 
routines and the construction of the news agenda.  
Santiago Creel moved the conversation forward by incorporating another basic 
journalistic concept: the right to reply or rebut media coverage. For several years, Creel 
supported Televisa’s interests. For example, during the Fox presidency when he acted as 
Mexico’s Attorney General, Creel authorized 450 gambling permits for Televisa to operate via 
an open television signal—a sort of bingo via television. Those permits were known as 
Telejuegos (Garduño & Mendez, 2005). The public/players who were residents of the 29 
authorized states could participate in the gambling activity via phone calls for 25 years. Creel 
made his decision just days before his resignation in order to participate in PAN’s presidential 
primaries. Immediately, PAN Senator Javier Corral (2005) demanded the newly appointed 
Attorney General Carlos Abascal revoke Televisa’s gambling permits. He threatened that if the 
permits were not revoked, Creel’s political image could be affected and his candidacy could be 
damaged because these events could be understood as a political electoral alliance between 
Televisa and Creel (Delgado, 2005).  
Furthermore, PRI legislator Heliodoro Díaz Escárraga (2005) inquired about Creel’s 
financial support to pay for his constant television spots broadcast during prime time by Televisa 
(Delgado, 2005). As a matter of fact, it was the second time that Creel was questioned about his 
PAN primary campaign budget. The first time was in 2000, when he was PAN’s contender for 
the Head of Mexico City position. Journalist Sergio Aguayo (2006) affirmed that Creel received 
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privileged treatment in Televisa for about 30 million pesos as a “favor” for the gambling permits 
that he authorized. According to his numbers, Felipe Calderón paid Televisa 7,462 pesos for 
each spot at the same time Creel paid 2,359 pesos for each political ad aired on television. On 
Televisa, Calderón aired 2,168 spots and Creel broadcast 6,206 ads in the same period (Aguayo 
Quezada, 2006).  
Three candidates ran during the PAN primaries: Santiago Creel, Alberto Cárdenas, and 
Felipe Calderón. Calderón obtained 51.8% of the party vote, Creel 24%, and Cárdenas 18% 
(Torres & Jiménez, 2005, p. 1). Calderón became PAN’s presidential candidate; however, it is 
interesting to note that Creel broadcast 4,038 more political ads than Calderón did on Televisa—
over three times as many. What happened? Why did not Creel win the primaries, if he had a 
higher number of ads? Contrary to what many political marketers believed, a high number of ads 
did not guarantee political victory. There were several reasons that could have affected Creel’s 
success, such as overexposure turned detrimental for him in that voters could have become tired 
of seeing his image all the time. Another reason could have been that he used only advertising 
messages and not propaganda communication. Perhaps, the results of this study could help 
determine whether advertising can set the agenda or not. In a simple conceptual form, political 
propaganda are messages focused on the dissemination of a particular political ideology, and 
political advertisement is used to highlight a particular candidate’s public issue positions as well 
as personal attributes and negative attack to other containers. 
In any event, the “political favor” was more beneficial for Televisa than for Creel. Within 
the first year of operation, Telejuegos generated approximately 680 million pesos for Televisa, at 
23 times the discount that Televisa provided Creel during the primaries (Torres & Jiménez, 
2005). However, the period of good negotiations between Creel and Televisa would not last 
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long: Four days after Calderón’s inauguration ceremony, he announced the confiscation of 19.4 
tons of ephedrine, a substance used for the production of synthetic drugs. The government 
announced that the substance was imported from China by the Unimed Pharm Chern—a 
company owned by Zhenli Ye Gon, a Chinese naturalized Mexican. A few months later on 
March 15, 2007, the Procuraduria General de la República (Attorney General’s Office) 
announced the confiscation of 205 million U.S. dollars cash in the interior of a luxurious house 
located on the Mexico City property of Zhenli Ye Gon. On July 2, 2007, in an interview with the 
Associated Press, Ye Gon said the money confiscated at his home belonged to PAN. He stated 
that the wealth was part of the financial resources used on the 2006 campaign; and his PAN 
contact for delivering those funds was Calderón’s Secretary of Labor, Javier Lozano Alarcón 
(Associated Press, 2007).  
Immediately after, the television media begin to broadcast images of the naturalization 
ceremony organized by the Exterior Relations Secretary, which was headed by Santiago Creel at 
the time. In the video, Ye Gon was seen receiving his Mexican citizenship from Vicente Fox 
who was seated at the podium next to Creel. Televisa went further, suggesting that Creel 
authorized Ye Gon’s legal residency in Mexico. Senator Creel solicited space to López Dóriga in 
his national newscast to reply to the media accounts early that day that accused Creel for 
authorizing Gon’s naturalization citizenship. The news anchor declined Creel’s petition, arguing 
that his newscast content was already complete and there was no time for additional information. 
Nevertheless, Creel decided to wait on hold on the phone for an opportunity to “speak” with El 
Noticiero viewers. While Creel was waiting on the phone, López Dóriga stated on air that he 
tried to locate Creel to obtain his reaction, to hear his part of the story, but it was impossible for 
the news anchor to find him. Televisa’s major news anchor and journalist lied on the air. The 
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next day, the senator had a press conference to let people know the content of a letter that he 
wrote to Televisa’s president Emilio Azcárraga Jean. Creel’s letter expressed his anger for López 
Dóriga’s handling of the story during El Noticiero the previous night. However, Televisa ignored 
Creel’s complaint. The subsequent evening newscast misquoted the senator’s statements and 
made fun of Creel’s protest during the editorial segment.  
As a consequence, Santiago Creel modified his position in relation to the Ley Televisa. 
The Senator (2007) declared to a national magazine that the law was approved under Televisa’s 
blackmail; “More than anything it was an imposition, not a negotiation” (Villamil, 2007, p. 1). 
The law highlighted one vision only and failed to embody a plurality of interests. The senator’s 
declarations confirmed the argument that Ley Televisa’s legislative opponents always brought up 
the major role that Televisa played in the creation and legislative negotiation of the new Federal 
Radio and Television Law. Creel then began working and supporting legislative initiatives that 
concentrated on correcting those mistakes that were highlighted by Mexico’s Supreme Court of 
Justice.  
In contrast, Televisa started an intensive campaign against Senator Creel. After that, 
every news story broadcast by Televisa about Creel was negative. Creel, a principal supporter of 
incorporating the right to reply in the 2006 electoral reform, had a different attitude toward 
television and the mass media during electoral periods after he was denied the right to reply. 
However, the core of the reform was based on the management of political advertisement. 
PRI Senate Head Manlio Fabio Beltrones (2007) acknowledged in the Senate chamber 
that “The media could persuade several politicians to act in their favor, but never the whole 
state” (Zárate, 2007f, p. 1). In the same location, PRD Senate Head, Carlos Navarrete (2007) 
observed that the electoral reform prevented the use of money to harm candidates as in the 2006 
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election (Zárate, 2007f). He continued, “[The licensees] pretend to influence the Senate with 
public and private threats, but they never imagined the Senate’s solidarity, strength of character 
and firmness” (Arvizu, 2007, p. 1). The Head of the Radio and Television Commission in the 
Senate, Carlos Sotelo-PRD (2007), stated that its intention was to limit the mechanisms that 
made electoral campaigns function similar to a promotional strategy of any commercial product, 
instead of disseminating political platforms, projects, proposals, and ideas that integrated the 
government. This reform was significant because it stopped the noxious practice of using tax 
money for personal promotion of many governors, city mayors, legislators, and other politicians 
(Proceso, 2007a). PAN politician José Manuel Guajardo (2007) mentioned that with the 3 billion 
pesos saved with the reform could be used to build schools, hospitals, and support scientific 
research (Campos Garza & Mandujano, 2007). PRD Guillermo Gómez Pérez (2007) believed 
that the reform provided new juridical tools to our electoral authorities to reduce the risk of the 
power of money taking over political parties (Campos Garza & Mandujano, 2007). 
The news on the approval of the electoral reform immediately spread in the international 
media that published numerous articles supporting the position of Mexican media owners. The 
key media outlets in Mexico had economic transactions with international media corporations 
that operate around the world. In an era when electoral communication has a tendency to cover 
candidates as celebrities, the media seems to focus on personal attributes instead of public issues. 
That is, there is a big chance that newscasts would set their media agenda reporting based on the 
content of a candidate’s political advertisement instead of covering public issues. In global 
terms, the electoral reform empowered the state and awakened the money and power. Mexico is 
not the only country that enacted drastic media changes during elections; Spain—Mexico’s 
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mother country—has a similar regulation in place. Candidates could not purchase advertising in 
their electronic media, and their campaign period lasted 2 weeks.  
Some of the opposition to the reform came from the senators of the “small parties,” such 
as Convergencia policymaker Dante Delgado (2007), who requested that the speaker of the 
Senate Chamber devote more time to closely evaluate the reform (Barradas, 2007). For Green 
Party Senator Francisco Agundis (2007), the electoral reform negotiation has not ended. For him, 
it was obvious that the dialogue between policymakers and licensees had not reached a 
consensus favorable to both parties (Barradas, 2007). In fact, those negotiations never reached an 
agreement.  
Chamber of Deputies 
After the Senate approved the electoral reform, the legislative proposal was sent to the Chamber 
of Deputies for its authorization. CIRT President Pereda requested a meeting with the head of the 
political coordination assembly of the Chamber of Deputies to explain its concerns. Televisa’s 
vice-president as well as CIRT’s president delivered CIRT’s petition document to the Chamber 
of Deputies. PAN Deputies Head Héctor Larios as well as PRI Deputies Head Emilio Gamboa 
received the petition. Unfortunately, CIRT’s petition was late because the Chamber of Deputies’ 
agenda for the day already included the electoral reform discussion.  
Speaker of the Deputies Ruth Zavaleta-PRD confirmed that the Deputies would support 
the reform without modification, and the Chamber would approve the reform immediately. She 
explained that this reform was fully discussed in the Chamber on previous occasions. As a result, 
legislators were ready to rule (Merlos & Gómez, 2007a). Moreover, PRD Deputies Head Javier 
González Garza (2007) mentioned that there was an agreement with senators to uphold the 
electoral reform ruling that was approved by the Senate. Unfortunately, one major concern of 
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Senator Garza’s was left out: the gender equity on election positions (Merlos & Gómez, 2007a). 
Apparently, the political game was that the Senate was in charge of the electoral reform, and the 
Chamber of Deputies was in charge of the fiscal reform. The unwritten arrangement was that 
both reforms should be approved without any variation.  
The Chamber of Deputies approved the electoral reform on its first reading without 
changes on September 13, 2007. The second reading was scheduled for the next day, and the 
Chamber of Deputies proceeded to a vote. On September 14, after a 6-hour debate, without any 
changes the Chamber of Deputies approved the electoral reform with 408 votes in favor, 33 
against, and 9 abstentions (Proceso, 2007d). PRD Policymaker Raymundo Cárdenas (2007) 
acknowledged that millions of Mexicans who did not have personal money to pay for political 
ads in the electronic mass media outlets could now be candidates (Garduño & Méndez, 2007). In 
Cárdenas’ view, what was pending in legislation was the media’s openness to political plurality. 
PAN Deputy Diódoro Carrasco Altamirano (2007) mentioned that the major obstacle that 
Mexican democracy faced was the power of the business elite in its most negative expression, 
the radio and television advertisements (Garduño & Méndez, 2007). In Altamirano’s viewpoint, 
this reform fulfilled society’s main inducement: less money, more politics, and transparency. PRI 
Head of Deputies Mario Fabio Beltrones (2007) commented that overall, this reform represented 
a significant change in the electoral model; indeed, there were strong reactions from several 
licensees and politicians who believed their careers could be damaged with the reform. He did 
not think that the reform harmed freedom of speech (Villamil, 2007l).  
PRD, PRI, and PAN supported the reform; however, the small parties such as Green 
Party, Convergencia, and New Alliance were against it. The Green Party had eight specific 
concerns on article 41 that addressed the public financing of political parties. In addition, its 
  121
national president, Jorge Emilio González Martínez, requested that the Chamber suspend the 
session in order to permit a meeting with CIRT leadership, but the majority of policymakers 
voted against his demand. Green Party Deputy Verónica Velasco (2007) complained about how 
the Chamber’s leadership overlooked her opinion on the electoral reform as Head of the Radio, 
Television, and Film Commission. Velasco stated that the speaker of the house’s office failed to 
turn in a draft of the electoral reform to her commission for consideration, study, and revision. 
As a consequence, her ability to make suggestions or to delay the discussion on the electoral 
reform was limited (Gómez & Merlos, 2007b).  
IFE’s former president Woldenberg (2007) endorsed the electoral reform because to him 
it was a victory that allowed better campaigns and less spending. Overall, it helped create better 
elections (Gómez & Merlos, 2007c). Professor Rafael de la Madrid (2007) also supported the 
electoral reform, although the reform introduced broad order to the chaotic relationship between 
the mass media and political parties. To him, senators made a step forward by making the case to 
the media that the state acts autonomously in front of particular interests (Morales & Ochoa, 
2007).  
At this time, it was up to the 31 state congresses and the Asamblea Legislativa del 
Distrito Federal-ALDF (Mexico City’s Legislative Assembly) to ratify the reform in order to 
send it to the executive branch for its publication in the Diario Oficial de la Federación, 
Mexico’s state newspaper. In order to become active, it needed approval by 51% of the 31 states. 
A meeting was held to come to an agreement on the electoral reform approval in each of the state 
congresses in a 2-week period. The meeting participants were PAN leaders, Mexico’s Attorney 
General, several state secretaries, and state representatives. During the gathering, local legislators 
from Yucatán and Nuevo León mentioned that businessmen were pressuring the State Congress 
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of Coahuila, Tamaulipas, Tabasco, and Sonora. At the meeting, Attorney General Francisco 
Ramírez Acuña indicated President Calderón’s support for the electoral reform.  
PAN’s General Secretary José Espina (2007) declared that the meeting was not to 
provide a line of action among PAN legislators. The purpose of the gathering was to answer any 
questions that state and local legislators had regarding the reform. According to the PAN party, 
there was an agreement to approve the reform in the states of Nuevo León, Guanajuato, 
Quéretaro, and San Luis Potosí where PAN had the majority. Nevertheless, the state of 
Aguascalientes Governor Luis Armando Reynosa Femat, a PAN member, was the protagonist of 
a controversy by announcing his opposition to the electoral reform (Saúl, 2007a). On that same 
day, PAN Senate Spokesperson Hermenegildo Castro (2007) announced that PAN uploaded 
several 45-second videos on Youtube.com that explained the electoral reform. He commented 
that this strategy was used because there was no time available on television. Castro found the 
youtube.com alternative was better than television, because viewers could comment about the 
issue on the Web site (Morales, 2007c).  
Electoral Reform Was Ratified in Mexico 
Despite the bitter struggle to bring electoral reform to Mexico, it was approved by 51% of the 
states on September 28, 2007. Therefore, the reform is now a reality in Mexican electoral law. 
The reform was approved by the State Congress of Nuevo León, Chihuahua, Nayarit, 
Michoacán, Guerrero, Baja California Sur, Baja California Norte, Sinaloa, Tamaulipas, Oaxaca, 
Estado de México, Colima, Jalisco, Morelos, Durango, and Zacatecas (Campos Garza & 
Mandujano, 2007). The electoral reform will be active for the federal elections of 2009 and 2012. 
Senate Speaker Santiago Creel (2007) sent a congratulatory message to state legislators during 
his speech at the Senate chamber, “My public recognition to State Congress who voted in favor 
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of the electoral reform for their vision of democracy” (Corral, 2007c, p. 1). Speaker of the 
Deputies Ruth Zavaleta (2007) commented that once the reform was approved by 16 state 
congresses, the Federal Congress would proceed to notify President Calderón (Notimex, 2007a).  
On November 13, President Calderón announced that the electoral reform publication in 
Mexico’s state newspaper, Diario Oficial de la Federación, of the results of this first phase 
would take place the next day (Associated Press, 2007). However, Calderón failed to publish the 
electoral reform decree during the period established by the Constitution. Therefore, several PRD 
legislators began to complain about it. Moreover, PRD Deputy Juan Guerra stated that the 
president’s attitude could be understood as a form of veto (Franco, 2008). The federal executive 
was responsible for publishing the new decree about the electoral reform in Mexico’s official, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación. Once this decree was printed, the electoral reform would 
become active. On January 14, 2008, the electoral reform decree was published in Mexico’s state 
newspaper. As a result, the new electoral set of rules became active the next day (January 15, 
2008). President Calderón acknowledged that congressional approval of the electoral reforms 
was a difficult step for Mexico, but essential for its political transformation (Jiménez, 2007). 
The next step was congressional deliberation of the secondary electoral reform laws. 
Therefore, Congress should move on to phase two of the electoral reform. The electoral reform 
has a direct impact on other laws as well as legal regulations that will need to be revised and 
modified accordingly—such as the COFIPE law and the Congress Organic Law. Also, one of 
those cases is IFE’s regulation, as temporary IFE president Andrés Albo Márquez (2008) 
explained: “The publication of COFIPE signifies a higher challenge in legal matters” (Notimex, 
2008a); the changes to COFIPE impacts approximately 34 IFE’s regulations that must be 
immediately revised. PRD Deputies Head Javier González Garza (2007) said that there are about 
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17 regulations that would potentially convert into secondary laws. According to Garza, the 
reform is not a triumph or defeat, but a necessity in order to permit a new approach to politics in 
Mexico (Notimex, 2007a). Nevertheless, PAN Deputy Diódoro Carrasco (2007) declared that 
from his point of view, 20 laws should be modified to fit the new electoral reform. He explained 
that the electoral reform influenced laws in several areas, such as criminal, fiscal, 
communication, and others. Therefore, the Chamber is carefully reviewing all the COFIPE 
books. Carrasco mentioned that out of the six legal books that encapsulate the COFIPE, five 
must be adjusted (Notimex, 2007a). During the night of December 11, 2007, the Chamber of 
Deputies approved COFIPE secondary laws written in draft documents that the Senate had sent 
them. This act completed the electoral reform process.  
In addition, the publication of the new decree marks the starting point of the 30 days that 
the Chamber of Deputies has to designate three new IFE council members—a president and two 
councils. The Chamber of Deputies has plans to accept, for a period no longer than 1 week, 
proposals from academic institutions, political associations, social organizations, and any society 
member proposing nominations for IFE’s new council members. All candidates for council seats 
should meet the requirements for neutrality, capacity, experience, and prestige. There are no 
limits on how many proposals the Chamber is willing to accept. Ruth Zavaleta would be in 
charge of keeping the nominations secret to make sure all of them meet the minimum 
requirements. The Chamber is in charge of designating who will be members of the new council.  
This is the first time in history that the Chamber has been open to accepting proposals 
from general society members. In the past, only the Chamber’s internal parliamentarian groups 
had the authority to nominate a council member (Zárate, 2007g). Ugalde, as his last international 
activity, traveled to Washington and New York to speak at Columbia University about Mexico’s 
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future democracy, and celebrated a meeting with the United Nations electoral assistance division 
(Urrutia, 2007a). After 4 years of service, IFE President Luis Carlos Ugalde presented his 
resignation on December 14, 2007. He declared to the press that his discharge “set a bad 
precedent for Mexican institutions” (Proceso, 2007e, p. 1) Ugalde expressed that the electoral 
reform limits IFE’s autonomy and harms the citizen’s right to be informed.  
On February 7, 2008, the Chamber of Deputies’ Heads of the three major parties—PRI, 
PAN, and PRD—proposed Leonardo Antonio Valdés Zurita as the new IFE president, but this 
action needed ratification by two-thirds of the legislators. Later on that day, Speaker of the 
House Ruth Zavaleta announced that with 398 votes in favor and 43 against, Valdés Zurita was 
endorsed by the Chamber of Deputies, and he would be the president of the council until October 
30, 2013 (Guerrero, 2008a). The new IFE’s president, Valdés Zurita, stated that he is not an 
amateur, because he has been studying the electoral field for many years. He holds a doctorate 
degree in sociology from El Colegio de México. Valdés Zurita has been a professor, researcher, 
and Mexico City Council member from 1999 to 2005. While serving as council member, he was 
in charge of the Electoral Organization Commission. He has published several articles in 
scientific journals about past elections. His latest book is Sistemas Electorales y de Partidos 
(Electoral and Political Parties system) published by IFE. In addition, Valdés Zurita is the 
president of the Sociedad Mexicana de Estudios Electorales (Mexican Society of Election 
Studies). His next challenge is to prepare the 2009 election without any postelectoral conflict.  
In the same session, the Chamber of Deputies discharged two council members—
Alejandra Latapí and Rodrigo Morales—as well as ratified council members Virgilio Andrade 
Martínez, Marco Antonio Gómez Alcantar, and Arturo Sánchez Gutiérrez who would remain in 
office until October 30, 2010. The Chamber appointed Benito Nacif and Marco Antonio Baños 
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as new council members in substitution of Latapí and Morales. The Chamber reported that it 
obtained 387 votes in favor and 54 against (Guerrero, 2008a). Nacif holds a doctoral degree in 
political science from Oxford University, and he is a researcher for the Centro de Investigación y 
Docencias Económicas (CIDE). Baños has been IFE’s member since its beginnings and has 
served on several positions. He has a law degree from the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana 
(UAM). Both of them began office the next day (Friday, February 9, 2008).  
The 2007 electoral reform is a direct response to the 2006 postelectoral conflict that 
highlighted the urgent necessity to regulate key aspects of an electoral process such as the media, 
content of political advertising, election campaign duration, tax money devoted to political 
parties during campaigns, and other matters. In the 2006 election, the political communication 
strategy of presidential candidates exceeded every experience that voters have observed before. 
The overwhelming change of political communication operation led to the creation of very 
restrictive policies that prohibit candidates from using their personal image in their political 
advertisement; the media democracy environment that is currently present in Mexican politics 
could be understood from a theoretical perspective. Intellectuals around the world and in Mexico 
had focused their attention on the relationship between globalization, media, and politics. They 
have used labels to describe the new landscape, such as media democracy, telecracia, 
videocracia, and mediocracia. All those terms intend to explain how the media is the new 
political arena for discussion. The next chapter presents the literature review that describes 
political marketing as a global phenomenon, larger quantities of political advertisment in the 
media resulting in a higer voter turnout, videocracia and mediocracia, the agenda-setting theory, 
and a brief history of the television era and its electoral coverage.  
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Chapter 4 
 Spots: The Candidates’ Major Political Communication Strategy 
Every election has unique characteristics that establish the tone of the campaign and election. In 
the case of the 2006 election, several major conditions developed during the progression of the 
political campaigns. First, was the unprecedented power of the media corporations over 
politicians, especially after the approval of the “Televisa’s law,” and the influence of President 
Vicente Fox’s marketing and advertising as a vehicle for politics. Second, was the high level of 
dependency that the presidential candidates had on the media, especially television. Former 
Instituto Federal Electoral IFE (Electoral Federal Institute) General Director, Arturo Núñez 
(2005) commented that mass media are the top priority for any electoral campaign in Mexico 
(Loera, 2005). Several political marketers believe that the best way to ensure a political victory is 
to invest a large budget in political promotion. Political researcher Leo Zuckermann (2006) said, 
“There is no other way! In a country with such expansive territory and 70 million potential 
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voters, the election’s victory is gained in the media” (Avizu, 2006, p. 1). In contrast, 
communication professor Raúl Trejo Delabre (2007) argued that politicians have limited their 
activity because they assume that the mass media are the only outlet where politicians can be 
exposed to voters. In his view, the quest for voters has shifted into the quest for ratings, which 
has replaced citizens with viewers. The domination of marketing over politics is the main 
characteristic of today’s political dynamic in Mexico.  
Since early in the election, presidential candidates had a clear tendency to depend on the 
media, particularly television. For example, during the primaries, as of October 6, 2005, political 
parties had expended 16% of their budget, approximately 803 million pesos, in radio and 
television advertisements (González Ménendez, 2005). In particular, data from Verificación y 
Monitoreo indicated that PRI primary candidates Roberto Madrazo and Everardo Moreno spent 
403 million pesos [50% of their budget]; followed by PAN candidates Felipe Calderón, Santiago 
Creel, and Alberto Cárdenas with 219 million pesos [27% of their budget]; Green Party 
candidate Bernardo de la Garza 162 million pesos [20% of his budget]; Victor Gonzalez Torres 
13 million pesos [2% of his budget]; PRD candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador 5.5 million 
pesos [68% of his budget], and Jorge Castañeda 844 thousand pesos [32% of his budget] 
(González Ménendez, 2005). IFE has not released any specific amount of expenses by political 
parties and political candidates during the primaries. IFE conducted a media watch, but only 
during the campaign period, not the primaries. Although Madrazo was the leader in the primary’s 
spending on advertising, on October 29, 2005, just two weeks before the national PRI primaries, 
Madrazo’s spokesman Sergio Martínez Chavarría, announced that Roberto Madrazo had decided 
to suspend his spots on radio and television due to the possibility of exceeding IFE’s official 
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media budget of 49 million pesos (4 million U.S. dollars) for the primaries. Up to this point, 
Madrazo’s campaign had expended 48.5 million pesos (Dávalos, 2005). 
Presidential candidates assumed that advertising was the most important element of their 
strategic plan to ensure a victory. As a consequence, the majority of their campaign budget was 
invested in television advertising (IFE, 2006). The idea that high volumes of commercial spots 
would generate the maximum quantity of votes was the rule of thumb for the three major 
presidential candidates during this election. However, there was a negative effect—the 
boomerang—that is essential to review. Voters could eventually become overexposed to a 
particular candidate’s constant advertising and react against it by voting for another candidate, or 
worse, not voting at all.  
The electoral process also had an unusual mix of presidential candidates. Out of the seven 
candidates who were campaigning in the country from north to south and from east to west 
promoting their political platform, only five were registered with IFE and two were not. In 
Mexico, the independent candidate does not legally exist. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
research, those candidates who were not officially registered with IFE, but presented a political 
communication campaign strategy in the media like a candidate, were labeled as “parallel 
candidates.” IFE’s candidates were: Calderón, Madrazo, López Obrador, Campa, and Mercado; 
the parallel candidates were President Fox and Subcomandante Marcos. They were not registered 
with IFE as presidential candidates; but in terms of the media’s attention, both had a political 
communication strategy in place to actively participate. Marcos traveled the country attending 
public meetings and speaking to crowds. He was able to hold the spotlight for several months; 
however, not all mainstream media reported on his campaign activities. But he had his own 
community radio reporters following him everywhere as well as reporters from the newspaper La 
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Jornada and in several circumstances, even from national television. All the candidates—IFE’s 
and the parallels—received media attention, and their activities were reported on national 
television.  
Mexican elections are considered to be the most expensive in the world. In 2004, 
Professor Andrés Valdez Zepeda conducted a comparative study, “Elecciones y Mercadotecnia,” 
among several courtiers. Based on each nation’s electoral institution official data for the 2003 
election period, Mexico assigned 461 million dollars; that is, 66% over France’s (158 million), 
93% over Brazil’s (30 million), and 96% over Argentina’s (18 million). On August 19, 2005, 
IFE approved 12.9 million pesos (about U.S. $1 million)2 for the 2005-2006 electoral process. 
From this amount, 4.926 million pesos (38%) were designated for political parties; 6.932 million 
(54%) for IFE’s election operation; and 1,062 million (8%) for voters overseas. IFE’s budget for 
the 1999-2000 electoral process was 11.462 million pesos (U.S. $974 million dollars) (González 
Méndez, 2005). This was an increase of 1.458 million pesos (13%) from the previous election. 
Presently, politicians are a very expensive commodity for Mexican citizens, who in the name of 
democracy end up paying an elevated sum of capital each election. 
From the funds allocated to political parties (4,926 million pesos), the three main political 
forces received a total of 64% of those funds distributed as follows: PRI obtained the highest 
amount, with 1.265 million pesos (26%); followed by PAN with 1.1468 million pesos (23%) and 
PRD 744.2 million pesos (15%) for the 2005-2006 electoral process. According to IFE’s 
president, Luis Carlos Ugalde, anywhere from 65% to 75% of each political party’s funds were 
assigned to media promotion, “Seven of every 10 pesos were devoted to purchase advertising in 
electronic media” (Herrera, 2007b, p. 1). The amount of money devoted to the media represented 
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a 20% increase in comparison with the 2000 election. At that time, the three main political 
parties invested in mass media as follows: PRI (Francisco Labastida) devoted 71% of its budget, 
followed by the Alianza por el Cambio (Vicente Fox) 69%, and Alianza por México 
(Cuaúthemoc Cárdenas) 50% (Loera, 2005).  
Obviously, the central point of the presidential campaign in 2006 was political 
advertising and political marketing, with the purpose of highlighting the candidates’ attributes 
and political platforms. The mass media—especially television—are perceived by candidates as 
well as their political marketers as the meeting place with voters. That is, candidates no longer 
meet voters at campaign events. Now, the media are acting as a bridge of communication 
between candidates and voters. Traditionally, television newscasts have been candidates’ targets 
for exposure. But in the 2006 election, television commercial spots were a presidential 
candidate’s main concern. It seems that politicians’, as well as political marketers’, preference 
for spots over news stories has to do with their repetition characteristic. Politicians also have 
greater control over the content of the advertising spots, whereas they do not control the 
newscast. The ability to replicate a political message as many times per day as they want plays 
an important role in sending their message out to voters. Nevertheless, voters could eventually 
become tired of being exposed to political advertisements over and over again. Overexposure of 
a candidate, via campaign commercials, could also work against the candidate because voters 
could favor another candidate who did not bother them as much during their favorite shows. 
Tom Bowers (1977) explored the relationship between political advertisements and news 
stories. He observed that a critical political communication characteristic for political ads is that 
the political candidate has direct control over the content of his/her advertising message. In 
2 11.77 Mexican pesos = $1 U.S. dollar 
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contrast, candidates have only indirect control of the kind of content reporters are going to use to 
write their stories. A candidate can only hope that his or her campaign activities will be reported 
in the news, but the candidate is uncertain about how that person’s message would come across 
in the news. It is up to the reporter to select a particular sound bite from the candidate to 
incorporate (or not) in his or her story. The journalist controls the opportunities that candidates 
have to “speak” directly to voters by selecting a sound bite. Alternatively, a journalist can choose 
to just “talk” over the candidate’s video, letting viewers know the reporter’s interpretation of a 
candidate’s main message for the day. Clearly, in the 2006 election, television commercial spots 
were the 2006 presidential candidates’ top priority, along with other political placements in high-
rated programs to expose and disseminate the candidate’s own personal agenda among voters. 
During the first month of the campaign—January 2006—the majority of the presidential 
candidates broadcast television ads informing voters about their political platform and 
professional as well as personal attributes. However, that apparent positive and democratic 
environment was drastically changed by three main politicians: Felipe Calderón, Elba Esther 
Gordillo, and Vicente Fox.  
AMLO Is Dangerous for Mexico 
In early March, Felipe Calderón began a negative TV advertising campaign against Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador (also known as AMLO). His negative spots strategy, known as “Guerra 
Sucia” (Dirty War), was suggested by American political marketer Dick Morris as a line of 
attack to lower AMLO’s popularity in the public opinion polls. López Obrador had been leading 
the polls for several months since the primary until the beginning of the campaign period. The 
PAN presidential candidate decided to implement a moral fear campaign to persuade Mexican 
voters. Jean-Pierre Dupuy (1999) in his book El Pánico established that panic as an object does 
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not exist; it only exists in social imaginary beliefs. The feeling of panic is present during 
situations of extreme tension. Nevertheless, such situations can be fabricated, as Calderón did 
with his negative campaign against López Obrador, labeling him as dangerous for Mexico. The 
power of this feeling relies on the fact that in the face of panic, voters weaken their critical 
thinking capacity to comprehend the election. El Colegio de México researcher Lorenzo Meyer 
(2007) pointed out that “a democracy constructed on the base of fear, is nothing more than fear 
for democracy” (p. 1). Meyer believes that the result of the 2006 election is that Mexico did not 
advance into a democratic political transformation because the political right sector worked to 
prevent the left’s victory.  
This type of negative political campaigning is not new in Mexico. The innovation is that 
this negative political strategy was used in the general election and not during the PRI internal 
election process to elect its presidential candidate. Usually, around the time when the president 
had to choose the PRI presidential candidate, this type of hate campaigning took place because 
elite groups were fighting among themselves to defend their “candidates.” Nevertheless, if an 
enemy of the “revolutionary family” (PRI-government) arose during a presidential period, the 
government hate strategy was automatically activated.  
We cannot overlook the fact that negative advertising generates high ratings and profit. 
The media played a crucial role as journalist Jenaro Villamil (2007) recalls:  
Televisa had an essential role along with radio concessionaries and newspaper owners. 
The government threatens them by removing their licenses if they did not respond to the 
government’s script; in the case of the press media, the government controlled and 
distributed the paper and the state advertising. When those control mechanisms failed, the 
government found an alternative repression method to silence the critic media. (p. 66)  
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After the second Clinton presidency, Dick Morris started to look for new opportunities in Latin 
America. He worked as a political consultant in Mexico for Vicente Fox, and in Argentina for 
former president Fernando De la Rúa. The interesting fact is that De la Rúa was not able to 
maintain a position of power and was removed 2 years after he won the election; and Calderón 
had trouble consolidating his political power. Up to a point in terms of the political media image, 
Mexico currently has three unofficial presidents and one official president; Calderon 
(http://www.presidencia.gob.mx/), AMLO (http://www.amlo.org.mx), Fox (http://www.centrofox.org.mx), and 
Subcomandante Marcos (http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/ and http://zeztainternazional.ezln.org.mx). All of 
them have an impressive political communication plan on their webpage; each one of the sites 
presents him as president. That person’s agenda, events, press releases, photos, among other 
things, are posted there. As a matter of fact, Vicente Fox likes to be called “president” and not 
“former president.”  
In any case, Morris’ strategy consisted of four major components: focus groups, public 
opinion polls, political ads, and the transformation of the electoral campaign into a battleground; 
according to Villamil (2006), Morris’ purpose is to reduce politics to celebrities with high 
quantities of money to buy political advertisements in order to influence voters. For Morris, 
Villamil continues, it is irrelevant for candidates to appear on the news; “in a modern democracy 
the only thing that works are spots with an emotional connection” (p. 75). Therefore, candidates 
should put aside their doctrines and ideologies to convert themselves into pragmatic contenders. 
In addition, a Spanish political consultant who usually works with Partido Popular, Antonio 
Solá, advised Calderón. The participation of Morris and Solá in the PAN presidential campaign 
violated the Electoral Law, which prohibits the participation of foreign citizens in the electoral 
process or a candidate’s campaign. Nevertheless, IFE applied only a modest fine to PAN, and 
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Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación TEPJF (Electoral Tribunal of the Federal 
Judiciary) stated that the court did not have a scientific study or other measurement tool that 
could measure the impact of the negative campaign on voters; therefore, PAN was only subject 
to a warning. In addition, Calderon’s campaign violated the Electoral Law for accepting 
economic donations from businesses corporations because “our legislation does not permit the 
economic support of industry, much less from international conglomerates” (Garduño, 2006, p. 
1). The penalty varies from the loss of the political party’s registration to an election’s 
annulment. However, TEPJF did not act against PAN or Calderón regarding this violation. 
The goal of the negative campaigning was to induce fear in voters and the general 
population. The political message did not inform citizens; on the contrary, it was completely 
emotional, alerting citizens to act against an upcoming threat. Historian Lorenzo Meyer (2006) 
believes that PAN’s electoral success was based on its decision not to disseminate its own 
political platform because the platform was only popular in right wing circles. Therefore, all 
PAN’s energy was focused on its PRD opponent. The phrase “AMLO is dangerous for Mexico” 
that PAN attributed to the PRD presidential candidate was based on false argumentations, but 
was the foundation of López Obrador’s negative image. The interesting fact is that campaigns 
based on fear are seeking a leader who will bring order and peace into a chaotic situation. It is 
not a coincidence that one of Calderón’s slogans was Mano Dura (strong hand), referring to his 
capacity to bring order in the country in front of the warning that AMLO would convert Mexico 
into a new Venezuela.  
For journalist and writer Carlos Monsiváis (2006), PAN’s campaign based on hate more 
than fear was something to be concerned about, because it predicts the intention to govern under 
those terms. The negative ad campaign denotes the political right’s (PAN) immense lack of 
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ideology, which instead bases its political campaign on the manipulation of the voter’s 
sentiments. López Obrador (2006) explained that those spots suggested, “I am Mexico’s danger.” 
This concept was also suggested by Salinas during a meeting with Televisa in 2003. 
Furthermore, AMLO declared that former president Salinas de Gortari, Televisa’s owner Emilio 
Azcárraga Jean, and banker Roberto Hernández agreed to create a “Dirty War” with the purpose 
of stopping AMLO from gaining the next presidency in Mexico. Openly, AMLO accused Salinas 
of submitting money to Televisa to produce spots that portrayed him as an authoritarian and 
intolerant politician in addition to comparing him with Venezuela’s president Hugo Chávez 
(Lizárraga, 2006). AMLO continued, “They have distorted public opinion polls, the PAN 
candidate has been told to say that he poses the same popularity as me” (Lizárraga, 2006, p. 1).  
In 2006, Mitofsky Director Roy Campos commented in a radio interview with Joaquín 
López Dóriga that AMLO’s drop in voters’ preferences was a direct consequence of López 
Obrador’s critique against Fox (Lizárraga, 2006, p. 1). Mitofsky was contracted by Televisa to 
conduct surveys on presidential candidates. However, Consutores en Información y Analisis de 
Medios CIAM representative finds it interesting that when everybody was looking at the 
controversial PAN spot about the AMLO’s link with Chávez, Televisa’s survey company 
announced that AMLO’s error was criticizing the president (Lizárraga, 2006, p. 1). The only 
problem with the connection that PAN was constructing in its political advertisement about 
AMLO and Chavez was that López Obrador rarely discussed foreign dealings. As MIT political 
science professor Chappell Lawson (2006) noted,  
The quote “right-wing” candidate is a Mexican nationalist who favors expanding ties 
with the rest of Latin America and continuing to negotiate free trade agreements with 
countries other than the United States, and who is likely to normalize relationships with 
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Cuba. The supposedly left-wing candidate doesn't use anti-American discourse, unlike 
virtually every other Mexican leftist, and has almost no interest in foreign affairs. 
(Schorow, 2006, p. 1) 
AMLO’s public issues position primarily included matters on Mexico’s national agenda.  
However, Calderon commented, “We are telling people what the López Obrador 
alternative represents, and what it represents is a danger for Mexico, because he is intolerant” 
(Vergara, 2006a, p. 1). For example, Calderón explained, the economic aspects of AMLO’s 
proposal do represent a risk for the country, because it is a project that would direct Mexico into 
bankruptcy by excessively increasing governmental assistance and creating an economic crisis. 
Just like Chavez, AMLO has an emotional hatred against bankers and businessmen, according to 
Calderón.  
In a press release, the Banco Nacional de México Banamex (National Bank of Mexico) 
stated that the institution never provided financial resources to Calderón’s campaign, or to any 
other political candidate or political party. Banamex is aware that the Electoral Law prohibits 
this kind of activity as well as the bank’s internal policy (Proceso, 2006a). PAN spokesperson 
César Nava Vázquez (2006) commented that the whole situation is a joke. For him, it is clear 
that AMLO was desperate because his popularity in opinion polls was decreasing, so it’s natural 
that López Obrador uses this type of strategy to generate attention (Proceso, 2006a). Nava 
considers that his party would never exploit the dirty war, a complete lie, because everything that 
has been presented in its spots are true facts (Proceso, 2006a).  
During his campaign meetings, AMLO frequently asked his followers not to believe 
PAN’s televised spots because it was part of a campaign to destroy his reputation. López 
Obrador declared that his strategy to combat the dirty war via misinformed spots was with word-
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of-mouth communication, not with money or television spots (Lizárraga, 2006, p. 1). All the 
controversy about the presidential election captured the attention of Mexican award-winning 
filmmaker Luis Mandoki, who decided to produce a documentary entitled ¿Quién es el Señor 
López? (Who Is Mr. Lopez?), which presented a profile on Andrés Manuel López Obrador. 
Beginning in 2005, Mandoki commenced documenting Mexican political behavior during 
AMLO’s desafuero (legislative process by which a public servant lost constitutional immunity), 
when he observed the high amount of resistance against the politician who was, for a long time, 
the voter favorite as presidential candidate for the 2006 election. Mandoki’s original plan was to 
present his work after Election Day. However, he decided to show his documentary earlier in 
order to fight back PAN’s negative campaign against AMLO (Televisa, (2006b). Mandoki 
introduced his documentary via national television through La Otra Versión (AMLO’s TV 
program discussed below). In addition, the film director released a copy of his documentary in 
DVD, registering high sales according to the Cámara Nacional de la Industria Cinematográfica 
del Videograma-CANACINE. Their first idea was to produce 100,000 copies; but the distributors 
told Mandoki that if a documentary sold 20,000 copies, it was considered a success. The 
negotiation closed on 40,000 copies, but that initial order sold out 24 hours after the DVD sale 
began. This number does not include the pirated copies sold on the street. By June 9, 2006, the 
registered vending was 950,000 DVD copies (Notimex, 2006a). The film director donated his 
DVD earnings to charity. After Election Day, the film director declared that in Mexico, there is 
no democracy, and without democracy, the country cannot advance (Imagen Latente, 2007). 
Overall, PAN’s spots, which present López Obrador as a danger for Mexico, do break the 
Electoral Law according to IFE, because those spots exceed the freedom of expression limitation 
by making personal accusations that slander López Obrador (Flores, 2006). In the case of the 
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AMLO-Chávez spot, IFE argues that PAN was using the image of the Venezuelan president for 
free and without any justification for violating Constitutional Bill 33, which states that no foreign 
citizen can participate in Mexico’s electoral process. Nevertheless, IFE noted PRD concerns 
about the possibility that PAN’s political advertisement spots created a negative effect on voters, 
but the fact could not be confirmed because of a lack of evidence for such media effects (Flores, 
2006). Unfortunately, the order to remove those spots came out late in the electoral process, 
weakening IFE’s image in terms of its capability to observe the election from a neutral 
perspective and the ability of immediately reacting against any type of violation to the Electoral 
Law. 
The controversy arises because Mexico does not have legal regulations or even a 
definition of negative campaigning. The federal constitution identifies several freedom of speech 
limitations, such as moral harassment, third party rights, and the perturbation of public order. 
The Electoral Law recognizes the same limits as the constitution. However, those limits do not 
acknowledge negative criticism. It is imperative that the IFE council, the highest election 
authority, define the characteristics of a negative campaign. Ideally, it would be better to present 
an initiative about negative campaigning before Congress to be incorporated into the current 
Electoral Law. Nevertheless, on September 5, 2006, TEPJF declared Felipe Calderón president-
elect of Mexico, winning with a small difference of 0.56% of the national vote over Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador. The jury ruled that it was unable to determine the effect of the negative 
campaign on voters caused by Calderón’s “Dirty War” against AMLO; therefore, it could not 
void the election (TEPJF, 2006).  
Gordillo’s Revenge Plan 
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While Calderón’s negative ad campaign was taking place, Elba Esther “the teacher” Gordillo, 
head of the National Education Worker’s Union-SNTE, initiated her own negative advertising 
television campaign against PRI candidate, Roberto Madrazo Pintado. In a 30-second TV spot, 
Gordillo (in a medium shot looking at the camera) asked the audience, “Do you believe 
Madrazo?,” and then a quote of Madrazo was inserted on the screen. After a small pause, she 
answered, “I don’t either!” In late 2005, Gordillo publicly threatened Madrazo, pointing out that 
she would do everything within her power to prevent him from winning the election. Gordillo 
was PRI’s General Secretary at the National Executive Council—the second most important 
ranking position within the party—at the same time Madrazo was party president. On September 
20, 2005, Gordillo resigned from her position after an unresolved 2-year conflict with Madrazo. 
Her conflict started in 2003, at a time when Gordillo acted as head of the PRI faction in the 
Chamber of Deputies. The teacher strongly supported several economic reform initiatives, such 
as tax increases on several foods and medicines. The authorship of those economic reform 
proposals was initially attributed to President Fox and later to Treasury Secretary Francisco Gil 
Díaz along with former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The controversy began when PRI 
legislators denied support to Gordillos’ reforms. The deputies argued that there was a lack of 
communication between them and their Chamber’s leader, as well as a lack of legislative 
agreement among them regarding Gordillo’s economic initiatives. When this conflict was taken 
to their party’s president, Madrazo supported the PRI legislators, not Gordillo. The teacher 
became furious with Madrazo for his lack of cooperation (Mendez, 2006a, p. 1).  
Political analysts and political journalists have frequently pointed out that Gordillo 
intensely worked on her political revenge against Madrazo. On July 8, just 6 days after Election 
Day, during one of the PRD public assemblies held at Zócalo, AMLO’s campaign coordinator 
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Jesús Ortega played the recording of the phone conversation between Gordillo and Tamaulipas 
State Governor Eugenio Hernández Flores-PRI. Gordillo was negotiating with Tamaulipas to 
vote in favor of Calderón. On Election Day, Gordillo called Hernández Flores to inform him that 
preliminary results of her national survey data from 6,000 respondents (14,000 questionnaires 
were distributed) indicated that 34.1% of voters preferred PAN, 22.96% supported PRI, and 
36.98% were for PRD. Gordillo knew that traditionally Tamaulipas and Coahuila favored PRI. 
Gordillo explained to Hernández Flores that her results indicated that PRI would have no chance 
of winning the election. Gordillo suggested that the governor change his state preference to favor 
PAN, because she knew that Calderón would win the election. Gordillo went further by 
suggesting Hernández Flores call Calderón to express his support (La Jornada, 2006a). 
Tamaulipas’ governor fulfilled Gordillo’s request, and his state results were, 41.29% PAN, 
25.93% PRI, 26.47% PRD, 2.04% Convergencia, 1.01% New Alliance, 1.29 not registered, and 
1.97% void (IFE, 2006a). Remarkably, results from Coahuila, a neighboring state of Tamaulipas, 
also showed a clear tendency in PAN’s favor: 43% PAN, 26.45% PRI, 24.21% PRD, 2.84% 
Convergencia, 0.90% New Alliance, .88% not registered, and 1.60 void (IFE, 2006b). Governor 
Hernández Flores declared that it was his duty to answer calls from people of all kinds of 
political ideologies, that he had nothing to hide, and that the phone conversation with Gordillo 
has only been partially interpreted (Sánchez Treviño, 2006). At the end of the day, the teacher’s 
effort paid off, and Calderón won the election.  
On July 13, 2006, just 11 days after Election Day, Gordillo was expelled from the PRI 
party via PRI’s National Justice Commission that ruled against “the teacher” for promoting the 
formation of an antagonist political party such as the New Alliance Party and supporting 
candidates from other political parties such as Felipe Calderón (Mendez, 2006). Also, Madrazo 
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in his new book La Traición (The Treason, 2007) accused Gordillo of negotiating the election 
with PAN. In contrast, TEPJF ruled that Gordillo’s participation had no influence in the process 
of the 2006 electoral results. 
Perhaps, PRI’s commission forgot to mention “the teacher’s” intervention in the selection 
of her union’s political party presidential candidate. The “teacher” assisted in the creation of a 
political party to neutralize Madrazo’s chance of winning the 2006 election. Although, on several 
occasions, she denied participation in the formation of the New Alliance party, it was not 
difficult to link her persona to this political party. The New Alliance party was founded on 
January 30, 2005, by the National Education Worker’s Union-SNTE, a union organization that 
Gordillo manages. Roberto Campa Cifrián became known in the press as the “Cinderella 
representative,” after El Universal published a story providing details concerning New Alliance’s 
presidential candidate selection process (Samaniego, 2006). According to the newspaper, right 
before New Year’s Day, Campa received an invitation to become the presidential candidate. He 
requested a few days to think it over. A few days after he received the invitation, Campa and 
Gordillo met for lunch. Throughout their conversation, “the teacher” encouraged him to accept 
New Alliance’s offer; and so he did. On January 8, 2006, the party announced Campa as its 
presidential candidate. The 2006 election was the New Alliance party’s first appearance on the 
presidential ballot. 
Campa was the former co-head of the PRI faction in the Chamber of Deputies under 
Gordillo’s leadership. He was one of the few legislators who supported “the teacher” when she 
was removed from her Chamber of Deputies position. During the primaries, he supported PRI’s 
Arturo Montiel Rojas’s precandidacy and became a member and spokesperson for the TUCOM 
group, a political group united against Roberto Madrazo; this group was also known as Unidad 
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Democrática (Democratic Unity). On October 20, 2005, Montiel announced he would turn down 
his opportunity at candidacy after he had been severely questioned by the media and his political 
party in relation to his personal and his family’s wealth (El Porvenir, 2005). He asserted that all 
those corruption accusations were nothing more than a political plan to weaken his candidacy 
along with his political party (Noticieros Televisa, 2005a). Later, Montiel accused Madrazo of 
being the mastermind behind the corruption attacks against him and his son. Madrazo denied his 
participation, requesting Montiel to prove his accusation (Coca, 2005) in a national television 
interview with Joaquín López Dóriga on Televisa (Noticieros Televisa, 2005b). Shortly after 
Montiel dropped his PRI primaries candidacy, Campa (on November 7, 2005) walked out of the 
PRI after 28 years of political membership. Campa determined that he could not support 
Madrazo’s imminent presidential candidacy and decided to leave the PRI. Campa declared that 
PRI could lose, once again, the presidential seat, in addition to an important number of seats in 
Congress (Infosel, 2005).  
Six months later, Madrazo suffered a sort of Montiel boomerang effect, on April 25, 
2006, when the first presidential debate took place; the New Alliance’s presidential candidate 
distributed a 21-page document to the press denouncing Madrazo’s fiscal evasion from 2003 to 
2005. The following day, Madrazo sued Campa for disseminating his personal fiscal information 
that was supposed to prove Madrazo’s owed back taxes. Madrazo argued that by law, only 
official tax collector authorities have the right to use this type of information (El Universal, 
2006a). A few days later, on May 3, the national newspaper, Reforma, published that it had a 
copy of the tax report stating that between December 27, 2005, and January 27, 2006, Roberto 
Madrazo sorted out his fiscal situation for 2003, 2004, and part of 2005 (Reforma, 2006a). 
Therefore, Madrazo was telling the truth during the debate when he assured voters that he was 
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up-to-date on his taxes. On the other hand, in a radio dialogue, Campa declared that if he had to 
face a sanction or even some jail time for denouncing a possible tax evader, it would be worth it 
(El Universal, 2006b).  
Vicente Fox’s Revenge Strategy 
In order to understand the 2006 election, it is important to consider the events that took place 3 
years earlier when Andrés Manuel López Obrador was Mexico City’s head of government. It 
seemed that since the middle of his presidential period, Fox had a personal dispute with the left-
wing parties. Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, cofounder of the PRD, claimed that “since 2003, all the 
energy emanating from Los Pinos [the presidential residency] had one objective: To prevent at 
all cost the leftist triumph” (Meyer, 2006, p. 1). Some journalists have pointed out that the 
Fox/AMLO’s problem had more to do with Fox’s egocentric personality than anything else. The 
only visible politician who possessed the same level of Vicente Fox’s magnetism was AMLO. 
Apparently, Fox’s popularity was extremely high, above any other politician until 2003, when 
public opinion polls indicated that López Obrador ranked at the top in Mexicans’ preference for 
the most appealing presidential candidate. The president’s confrontation with Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador— Mexico City’s head of government at the time—started right after two 
consecutive incidents: the videos-scandal and the desafuero process.  
When Fox realized that AMLO had the potential to eventually become PRD’s 
presidential candidate, he tried to leave him out of the political game by setting up a negative 
campaign known as “Carlos Ahumada’s video scandals” that exposed AMLO’s key staff 
members in corrupt acts. Journalist Carmen Aristegui presented a video of Argentinean 
businessman Carlos Ahumada, where Ahumada admitted to the premeditated recording of 
several AMLO’s aides, such as Mexico City’s former private secretary René Bejarano and 
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former student movement leader Carlos Imaz, receiving large quantities of money from him (El 
Universal, 2006c). In addition, former Mexico City Treasury Secretary Gustavo Ponce was 
caught gambling a considerable amount of money in Las Vegas. Ahumada taped those videos to 
protect himself from a 31 million-dollar fraud accusation. He used those videos to negotiate with 
the federal government and other key politicians, such as former PAN Senator Diego Fernández 
de Cevallos, former president Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and former Attorney General Rafael 
Macedo de la Concha, in order to gain protection from a fraud charge. Ahumada also 
acknowledged that his videos were used to stop AMLO from becoming a presidential candidate. 
On May 9, 2007, Carlos Ahumada was released from prison two months after Judge Manuel 
Horacio Cavazos López was replaced by Judge Alberto Ruvalcaba Ramírez, who ruled in 
Ahumanda’s favor. “Ahumada’s liberation is a new political punch against the Aztec sun [PRD] 
organized by PAN’s Diego Fernández de Cevallos and former president Carlos Salinas” (Verara, 
2007, p. 1) declared PRD’s General Secretary, Guadalupe Acosta Naranjo (2007). “Justice has 
many holes for criminals to obtain their freedom” (Verara, p. 1). Nevertheless, Mexico City’s 
head of government was able to prove that he was not connected or involved with those illegal 
activities in any way. The video-scandals did not damage AMLO’s image and popularity; 
therefore, Fox and his group put into practice another strategy, the desafuero.  
López Obrador ordered the construction of a roadway on El Encino property to access a 
hospital. When the construction was at its beginning stage, the property owners sued the Mexico 
City government. A judge ruled in their favor and ordered the city government to stop the 
construction immediately. AMLO disobeyed the ruling and continued the construction. López 
Obrador’s behavior caused him to face his desafuero process. On April 7, 2005, in an address to 
the Chamber of Deputies, AMLO accused Vicente Fox of promoting his desafuero, and in the 
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same session legislators voted (360 favor and 127 against) to remove AMLO’s fuero. His 
desafuero process caused several forms of protest, such as rallies in Mexico City. On April 24, 
an unprecedented event occurred. A crowd of more than 1 million people congregated at the 
Zócalo plaza to protest against AMLO’s desfuero. As a response to the protest, 5 days later on 
April 29, the president transmitted a message to the nation announcing the removal of Attorney 
General Rafael Macedo de la Concha (AMLO’s desafuero major promoter), the revision of the 
López Obrador case, and an initiative that ensured the political rights of citizens under legal 
process (La Jornada, 2005). 
The newly appointed Attorney General Carlos Abascal Carranza announced on May 4, 
2005, that the government would drop charges based on a legal technicality. He stated that 
AMLO was guilty, but his position as Mexico City’s head of government was of recent creation 
and had not been incorporated in all legal procedures, that at the time included governors and 
municipal presidents. Therefore, there was no law that could be used to continue AMLO’s case. 
Several months later, Mariano Azuela Guitrón (2007), Chief Supreme Justice, claimed that 
neither the president nor Congress could close AMLO’s desafureo process for political reasons, 
citing this action as highly irregular. The entire desafuero operation became a titanic political 
mistake for Fox (Albarrán, 2007). The whole process was not only an excessive and absurd use 
of power, but created a great amount of uncertainty among Mexicans. Azuela Guitrón continued 
explaining Fox’s behavior, “The political elite in power sent the message that they will stay in 
power at any cost and would use any type of method to keep it” (Albarrán, 2007, p. 24). The 
desafuero created a strong polarization between the federal government and the Mexico City 
government. Journalist Delgado (2006) wrote, “The presidency of the republic knew that the 
decision of the majority of Mexican citizen would not correspond to Felipe Calderón” (p. 1). 
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President Vicente Fox unofficially entered the presidential race via spots and news 
coverage, and political science researcher Juan Francisco Escobedo (2006) observed, “Nobody 
told Fox that there was an enormous difference between being a candidate and being the 
president of the republic. And, if someone did, no one helped him understand the differences 
among both roles” (Escobedo, 2006, p. 69). As a consequence of Fox’s behavior, the election 
was labeled as the “State Media Election” because the presidency used its entire communication 
infrastructure to favor one political party—PAN—as well as its presidential candidate—Felipe 
Calderón. This directly violated IFE’s Acuerdo para la Neutralidad Democrática (Neutral 
Democratic Agreement3), that prohibited the president, governors, and majors from directly 
participating in any political campaign, including delivering speeches in the media or elsewhere 
expressing support for a political party, and the creation of a political advertising campaign to 
promote government achievements or public servant personal image. Also, José de Jesús Gudiño 
Pelayo (2006), Supreme Court Judge, ordered on February 28 the immediate removal of all 
presidential advertising materials as well as material that included Fox’s image (Zárate, 2006a). 
Nevertheless, Fox paid no attention to IFE’s agreement and the Supreme Court from January to 
mid-April of 2006. The federal government aired 456,137 spots to promote the Fox 
government’s accomplishments, spending 1.7 million pesos (Reforma, 2006b). In addition, Fox 
traveled more frequently to the interior of Mexico. From January to April 2006, the president 
scheduled 72 visits, approximately a 62% increase in relation to the previous year. In 2005, 
during that same time period, Fox traveled 42 times to promote his government (Reforma, 
2006b).  
                                                 
3 The agreement was signed on February 19, 2006. For more information, visit http://www.ife.org.mx/ 
documentos/cncs/ anexos_boletin_73 
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Fox criticized populism, the PRD presidential candidate, and supported Felipe Calderón 
almost every day at any public event he had scheduled, regardless of the purpose of the public 
event. Fox incorporated into his speeches phrases that were part of his advertising campaign that 
the Supreme Court prohibited him from using (Infosel, 2006a). The president’s open support for 
Calderón irritated political parties and presidential candidates. AMLO nicknamed Fox 
chachalaca, a type of bird that never stops singing. PRD candidate López Obrador’s most 
controversial phrase was the one he used to tell Fox to stay out of the presidential race “Callate 
Chachalaca” (shut up, chachalaca!), but the president continued acting as a candidate. At 
various points of the campaign period, Fox and López Obrador dominated the television electoral 
coverage. It seemed as though Vicente Fox was running again for the presidential seat against 
AMLO. Roberto Campa called Fox “Calderón’s jilguero,” meaning a chameleon, because it is 
unfair to use public money to finance a “Dirty War.” Roberto Madrazo asked Fox “to promote 
the dialog and stop confrontation” (El Universal, 2006a). Ten months after Election Day, 
Madrazo ensured that the 2006 election would not be repealed because of Vicente Fox’s 
intervention (Infosel, 2006b). Madrazo did not reject the electoral result, because he knew that 
the 11 million people who voted for him would protest on the street next to AMLO’s supporters, 
and together they could force IFE and the Federal Electoral Tribunal to open all the ballots and 
recount the election. However, he explained, “I did not want to play that game” (Gil Olmos, 
2007a, p. 1) because it could lead the country to complete chaos, a situation with a lack of 
governance. 
In addition, several governors denounced Fox’s unethical behavior during their 2006 
National Governors Conference (Zárate, 2006b). Political parties also protested Fox’s actions. 
PRI Deputy Jorge Estefan Chidiac accused Fox of being the intellectual author of the dirty 
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campaign against AMLO (Cervantes, 2007a). Even so, it took 5 months for IFE to notice and 
take action. On May 26, IFE’s president asked Fox to stay away from the electoral process 
because his presidential status required him to be neutral (Zárate, 2006c). The president decided 
to follow IFE’s recommendation. He stopped his national broadcast program Fox Contigo, and 
he cancelled all official visits with any of the presidential candidates. Even so, Fox’s revenge 
against AMLO was a rumor until 18 months after López Obrador’s desfuero process. On 
February 1, 2007, Fox declared in Washington, D.C., that his revenge against López Obrador 
was fulfilled because his candidate won the election. Fox declared himself to be the only person 
elected twice as president of Mexico in 2000 and 2006 (Carreño Carlón, 2007). PRI party 
president Mariano Palacios Alcocer along with PRI Senate Head Manlio Fabio Beltrones 
concurred that Fox’s affirmations were out of place, irrelevant, and damaged IFE’s credibility 
and Calderón’s image (Teherán, Saúl, & Reséndiz, 2007). AMLO refused to declare anything 
and remained silent regarding Fox’s affirmations of revenge. 
According to writer Lorenzo Meyer (2006), one of the direct consequences of Fox’s 
behavior was that the left party questioned the election procedures. Fox’s behavior created a 
political polarization in the nation, and this political situation was a major threat for Mexico. 
Nevertheless, similar to Gordillo’s case, TPFJ ruled that Fox’s intrusion was risky for the 
validation of the electoral process. However, because his interference was weakened, his actions 
did not represent major evidence to void the final result (TEPJF, 2006).  
It seemed that it was more important for the major political actors to execute their own 
personal vengeance than to discuss important political matters. The negative political 
environment that took place early in the election set the tone for the entire campaign. In addition, 
narrowing the political advertising to a candidate’s attributes limited the opportunity to learn 
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about the candidate’s position on public issues. In this election, the discussion of political 
platforms, issue positions, and political ideology in television advertisements were almost 
nonexistent. Democracy is based on an informed voter, a voter who must be aware of the main 
national problems and a candidate’s solutions for those problems. Unfortunately, in this case, 
political advertisements focused on a sort of “political show” more than anything else.  
IFE’s Media Watch 
IFE contracted two companies, IBOPE AGM Mexico and Sigma Dos, to monitor and count 
promotional spots for the candidates and to monitor newscasts for news stories about candidates. 
The Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics IBOPE was founded in 1942 in São 
Paulo, Brazil, by Auricélio Penteado with offices in 12 Latin American countries. IBOPE-
Mexico (http://www.ibope.com.mx) was established in 1991, offering media research and audience 
measurement services. Sigma Dos-Mexico (http://www.sigmados.com.mx) is a Spanish company 
founded in 1982 that specializes in marketing and public opinion research with offices in more 
than 10 countries in Latin America. With IBOPE, IFE had two contracts to monitor and count 
promotional spots for a total of 54.5 million pesos. With Sigma Dos, IFE had one contract for 5.4 
million pesos (Herrera, 2007a). IFE’s Fiscal Representative Fernando Agíss (2007) asserted that 
its monitoring system is the best of the best.  
[IFE] has the most complete monitoring system in the history of the Federal Electoral 
Institute. It’s a monitoring system that summarizes a large number of cities, stations, and 
frequencies; for the first time, radio and billboards are included. We have practically 
covered all the press in the national territory because we have done it with our own 
resources throughout our district and local offices across the country. (Herrera, 2007a, p. 
1)  
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IFE released results from IBOFE and Sigma Dos in two different reports: one for promotional 
spots Reporte final de los monitoreos de promocionales: Periodo del 19 de enero al 28 de junio 
de 2006 and other for news coverage Análisis general de los resultados del monitoreo de noticias 
del 19 de enero al 30 de junio del 2006. IFE’s official report on monitoring promotional spots 
indicated that a total of 704,502 spots were aired on 240 radio and 150 television stations. 
Television alone broadcast 142,358 spots of which 28% [40,305] concerned the presidential 
candidates, distributed as follows: Coalición por el Bien de Todos 16,316; PAN 11,904; Alianza 
por México 10,425; Nueva Alianza 1,454; and Alternativa 206 spots (IFE, 2006c). Month-by-
month data indicated an increase in AMLO’s TV promotion near the end of the campaign period 
during the months of May and June. It is interesting to observe that PAN was at the top of the 
IBOPE political advertisement list during the months of March and April, precisely the time 
when the defamatory spots against AMLO began. PRI always placed third each month (IFE, 
2006c). The presidential candidate who spent the highest amount of money on mass media was 
Roberto Madrazo-PRI with 445 million pesos; followed by Andrés Manuel López Obrador-PRD 
384 million pesos; and Felipe Calderón-PAN invested the least amount, 250 million pesos. In 
terms of television, Madrazo-PRI was still at the top with 295 million pesos; followed by 
AMLO-PRD with 268 million; and Calderón-PAN with 127 million pesos (IFE, 2006c).  
Contrary to IFE’s numbers, two days before the end of the campaign period, El 
Universal4 reported a projected cost of what each presidential candidate invested in political 
advertisements, and the PAN presidential candidate was the spending leader. El Universal 
indicated that Calderón spent 574,455,824 pesos; Madrazo spent 384,634,875 pesos; López 
                                                 
4 El Universal contracted the company Verificación y Monitoreo to monitor Mexican mass media and reported its 
findings in the paper. 
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Obrador spent 242,478,634 pesos; Patricia Mercado spent 42,375,399 pesos; and Roberto Campa 
spent 28,578,875 pesos (Morales, 2006). IFE’s president Ugalde acknowledges that IBOFE’s 
monitoring system does not represent the total amount of promotional spots (Aristegui, 2007). 
IBOFE’s sample covered 90% of the spots that were broadcast in 20 major cities.5  
Confusion surrounding the monitoring results motivated political parties to take a hard 
look at IFE’s report. On April 23, all eight political parties registered in the Mexican electoral 
system found a minimum of 10 significant errors in IFE’s promotional spots monitoring report. 
For them, the report was unreliable. Examples of the “miscalculations” include: (1) spots paid for 
by IFE directly to promote the election, (2) spots of municipal elections were incorporated, (3) 
double counting of spots, and (4) nonsense registration of broadcast time like 25:00 hours, when 
a full day only has 24:00 hours, among other discrepancies (Herrera, 2007b). However, IFE 
council members argue that there is not a margin of error in the database.  
Penalties 
The problem between the political parties and IFE was not only about agreement on the number 
of spots aired, but also economic penalties. The base criteria to allocate penalties to political 
parties were established by IFE’s results from the promotional spots monitoring report. IFE’s 
Fiscal Representative Fernando Agíss (2006) justified the logic for this procedure by saying: 
The major investment of political parties during the campaign is in the mass media. 
Radio, television, press, and billboards generate a very considerable investment in 
relation to the total. I could guess that around 65%, 70% up to 75% of the campaign’s 
total budget. Therefore, if we have control of those disbursements, you would have taxed 
5 Those cities were: Acapulco, Ciudad Júarez, Culiacán, Distrito Federal, Guadalajara, Hermosillo, León, Mérida, 
Mexicali, Monterrey, Morelia, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis, Tijuana, Toluca, Torreón, Veracruz y Villahermosa. 
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the major part of the parties’ budget, and this is an expense that can be compared with 
something that took place in reality. (Herrera, 2006a, p. 1).  
Based on their own report, on May 23, 2007, IFE announced that the political party 
penalties for the 2005-2006 electoral process totaled 99 million pesos [8 million dollars]. PRI 
received the highest penalty of 37 million pesos; followed by PAN with 17 million pesos; PRD 
with 15 million pesos; PVEM with 14 million pesos; Convergencia with 5.6 million pesos; New 
Alliance with 4 million pesos; and Alternativa received the lowest penalty of 262 thousand 
pesos. At the end of the session, IFE explained that those penalties are not final. IFE’s president, 
Luis Carlos Ugalde, claimed to possess evidence to prove that a total of 757,000 commercial 
spots were paid for by political parties during the 2006 election, from which 281,000 were not 
reported to IFE. The electoral agency subsequently conducted research to find out who paid for 
those 281,000 spots (Villamil, 2007a).  
Indeed, on August 31, IFE announced, after its investigations, the total amount of the new 
fines was 107 million pesos: PRD and PAN 32 million pesos; PRI and New Alternative 15 
million pesos; finally, Convergencia 13 million pesos. In addition, IFE said it had opened 26 
legal investigations to find out the origin and destination of other monetary sources that political 
parties have not reported. From the 26 legal inquiries, 8 focus on PRI, 6 on PRD, 4 on New 
Alliance, 3 to PAN and Alternative, as well as 2 on Convergencia (Villamil, 2007c). The next 
day, PRD Communication and Propaganda Secretary Gerardo Fernández Noroña (2007) 
presented TEPJF documentation to refute IFE’s fines. He considered this act to be a political 
revenge against his party for promoting Ugalde’s dismissal from office in Congress (Vergara, 
2007b). Four political parties that determined that IFE’s penalties were not reasonable presented 
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their claim to TEPJF. They argued that those fines were based on incompetent results from 
promotional spots monitoring.  
However, PAN Representative Dora Alicia Martínez (2007) was confident that her party 
would not receive additional fines. She stated that the cost of each spot aired in television and 
radio that promoted Felipe Calderon were the cheapest in comparison with those paid by PRD 
and PRI (Villamil, 2007a). Nevertheless, the political negotiation that each party does with a 
particular mass media outlet is what could set the price range for political advertising. As 
Professor Raúl Trejo Delabre (2006) explained,  
In Mexico frequently the major radio and television networks offer political parties 
additional spaces than those they contracted for electoral propaganda, such as candidate 
interviews in their newscasts, favorable comments about candidates by newscasts’ main 
anchors, and favorable treatment in discussion and opinion programming; among other 
things are components of their negotiation deal. (p. 1)  
In regard to IFE’s investigation of the 281,026 radio and television spots that were not 
reported to IFE, the institution declared that its investigation period will expand to 1 year 
because of the complex process that is involved. In the first phase, IFE made around 600 to 700 
information solicitations to several radio and television stations. The second phase involved the 
right of political parties to request an audience with IFE. The third phase involved IFE’s 
production of the final report. Finally, the fourth phase involved IFE’s announcement of fines to 
political parties. As of September 15, 2007, IFE reported that the first phase of its investigation 
had not been accomplished (Martínez, 2007).  
Spotgate 
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Meanwhile, a new electoral controversy referred to as “spotgate” arose because of a 
contradiction of information regarding the number of presidential campaign spots that Calderon 
aired. The estimate is that the PAN’s presidential candidate could exceed IFE’s advertising 
expenditure limit of 651 million pesos by 244 million pesos. That is, PAN’s final disbursement 
might be 895 million pesos. On May 28, 2007, PRD representative Horacio Duarte presented an 
Apelación (legal resource to request a superior court to review the sentence) against IFE’s 15 
million pesos penalty. PRD argued that IFE’s spots monitor database is erroneous. He confirmed 
that in the case of his presidential candidate, AMLO, there was a discrepancy with the IBOFE 
(company that conducted IFE’s media watch study) of 384,000 spots contracted by his political 
party in radio and television, but the IBOFE’s database does not contain that information. 
Furthermore, PRD presented documents illustrating that the IBOFE database does not contain 
the spots that were paid by third parties in favor of Calderon. This omission represents a capital 
expenditure of 244,340,000 pesos. According to PRD, third parties paid the following amounts 
to promote Calderon’s candidacy: Consejo Cordinador Empresarial - 136,476,000 pesos; 
Asociación Ármate de Valor y Vota - 30,663,000 pesos; Jugomex S.A de C.V. - 13,143,000 pesos; 
and Sabritas - 16,496,000 pesos (Villamil, 2007a). PRD argues that the cost of those spots 
should be added to Calderon’s advertisement budget and that IBOFE should have registered 
them in the first place.  
PRD’s arguments mostly are based on two legal documents. The first is IFE’s Fiscal 
Commission Agreement created on June 23, 2006, establishing that any kind of promotional 
material that spreads images, voices, slogans, names, last names, or nick names (verbal or in 
writing) concerning any candidate will be considered in the advertising budget limit for 
candidates that those spots are endorsing. Second, PRD recognized that on September 5, 2006, 
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TPJF acknowledged in its verdict that those spots paid for by outsiders labeled as Guerra Sucia 
(Dirty War) commercial spots created to defame AMLO’s public image and promote Calderon’s 
candidacy.  
IBOFE-Mexico’s president, Rubén Jara (2007), explained in a press conference that the 
Guerra Sucia spots are not included in its company’s database. He clarified that it was IFE’s 
own responsibility and that it had nothing to do with the methodology used to collect the data 
(Villamil, 2007b). IFE’s president Ugalde affirmed that the Guerra Sucia spots could not be 
counted as part of IFE’s advertisement budget limit because a political party or political 
association did not pay for those spots. However, PRD insists that those spots should be counted 
as part of the PAN budget.  
Perhaps future research to document and demonstrate effectiveness of such an expensive 
electoral campaign could solve this controversy regarding the use of political advertising. 
Furthermore, during the postelectoral conflict, PRD presented to TEPJF an initiative to cancel 
the elections because the Guerra Sucia spots disturbed its presidential candidate, Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador’s, public image. The supreme electoral court turned down its petition, stating that 
it was not aware of a technique to measure media effects on voters. This study will further the 
understanding of the relationship dynamics between the national television media and political 
candidates by presenting the effectiveness of an election based on political advertising spots. 
On a broader note, this research project will contribute to the analysis and discussion of 
how globalization is changing political dynamics by replacing the news story with the 
promotional spot. Political marketers use advertising as their major vehicle of promotion to 
voters. However, critics state that political marketers' strategy is dangerously changing a 
politician's images from a person to a commodity, from a politician to an entertainment celebrity. 
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As a result, political candidates focus their attention on highlighting personal attributes more 
than their stance on public issues. This attitude offends some voters who believe politicians 
should pay more attention to basic social problems than their ego. This dynamic of profiling 
politicians as celebrities has created a very close competition. In the 21st century, presidential 
elections (Italy, United States, Mexico, Argentina) yield very close results, and Mexico is not the 
exception. Could this phenomenon be the new global political tendency? 
Television political advertising establishes the tone of the campaign and has a strong 
possibility to set the media’s agenda. Political promotion in television holds a high social value 
in Mexican society. Television commercial spots are the presidential candidates’ top priority. 
Felipe Calderón expended the highest amount of pesos in political promotion followed by 
Roberto Madrazo, AMLO, and Patricia Mercado. Roberto Campa spent the smallest amount of 
money on television political ads. The idea that high volumes of commercial spots would 
generate the maximum quantity of votes was political marketers’ main strategy. IFE also 
considered that the influence of political advertisement was significant on voters. Therefore, IFE 
monitors television political ads and allocates economic penalties to political parties based on 
their counts of promotional spots. Such a criterion implied that IFE at some point did consider 
that the media’s agenda could be set by television political ads. Nevertheless, IFE did not 
monitor television political entertainment products that tended to present presidential candidates 
as goods for sale. 
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Chapter 5 
Political Campaigns as Entertainment:  
The Commodification of the Presidential Candidates 
 
Mexican television audiences saw a new form of political advertisement during the 2006 
presidential election campaign. Television audiences were accustomed to seeing their favorite 
telenovela (Latin American soap opera) character drinking soft beverages, eating chips, or 
wearing designer apparel. The new advertising strategy was to sell a new commodity—a 
presidential candidate. The telenovela Lety, La Fea más Bella (Lety, The Prettiest Ugly Girl) 
produced by Televisa, registered one of its highest ratings (24.5 points) of the year 2007, 
increasing the cost of the advertising spot broadcast during the telenovela. A public advertising 
rate list estimated that a 20-second spot rate was 359,300 pesos (Gil Olmos, 2007c). How much 
would it cost to place a product—the presidential candidate—in the telenovela drama? Usually, a 
lot more. When the advertised product is a presidential candidate, however, it is difficult to 
estimate the economic, social, and political cost of the commodification of a political candidate. 
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In 1999, the Colombian network RCN produced the telenovela Yo soy Betty, la Fea (I 
Am Ugly Betty), written by Fernando Gaitán. The story featured as its main character an 
extremely unattractive, intelligent, but poor girl who became more attractive throughout the 
course of its melodramatic series. She was also on a quest for the love of her life—her boss. In 
2002, Yo soy Betty, La Fea won Mejor Telenovela (best telenovela) at the TP de Oro awards (Gil 
Olmos, 2007c). In 2006, two other countries remade the telenovela. In the United States, 
Touchstone Television produced “Ugly Betty.” The show won two Golden Globe awards the 
year it premiered. In Mexico, Televisa produced the telenovela under the name Lety, La Fea Más 
Bella. Palmira Olguín adapted the story for a Mexican audience. The majority of the cast 
members were Mexican actors. The Mexican version of the telenovela added an innovative touch 
to the melodrama—political advertisement. The telenovela could also be classified as 
infomercial, paid advertisement to support and promote politicians. In previous political 
campaigns, it was normal for a politician to pay newspapers and newscasts for news stories to 
maintain their positive image. Now, that practice moved to entertainment television. Near the 
end of the 2006 presidential campaign period, PAN candidate Felipe Calderón paid Televisa to 
incorporate his name in several scripts on the telenovela Lety, La Fea Más Bella. It was the first 
time that this kind of personal political marketing practice occurred in Mexico.  
The Salinas de Gortari presidency supported Televisa’s 1995 production of a historical 
telenovela El Vuelo del Águila. The telenovela featured the life of Porfirio Díaz (1830-1915), the 
absolute ruler of Mexico for 35 years. During the Porfiriato dictatorship, Mexico followed the 
liberal economic model, which was very similar to the neoliberal economic model that President 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari tried to incorporate in Mexico. At the time, the president was 
negotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United 
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States; he faced opposition and resistance to his free trade idea. Therefore, Salinas de Gortari 
decided to support production of El Vuelo del Águila, which portrayal Díaz’s life and the 
“positive effects” that the liberal economic policy had on Mexico’s economy during the 
dictatorship. For that reason, El Vuelo del Águila indirectly supported Salinas de Gortari’s 
economic proposal: the neoliberal economic model. However, his image was never part of a 
shoot nor was he part of the scripted dialog. However, Calderón, who was just a presidential 
candidate, not the president like Salinas de Gortari, used the telenovela Lety, La Fea Más Bella 
to directly advertise himself. The placement of a political candidate in the scene was like placing 
a merchandise product in the scene. Furthermore, José Natividad González Parás—PRI 
Governor of the northern state of Nuevo León—and his wife—Cristina Maíz de Parás—appeared 
in several episodes of the melodrama, because the governor covered the cost of a 1-month 
production in order to publicize himself and his state in the melodrama. Their collaboration 
included the telenovela’s final episode that was broadcast live from Monterrey, Nuevo León’s 
capital, on February 25, 2007. The ratings for that night reached a record number of 44 points. 
The appearance of a real-life politician in a melodrama was unprecedented and ushered in 
Televisa’s productions and its relationship with political power. Slowly but surely, Mexican 
politicians shifted their public image from people into products. Politicians became the products 
as they marketed themselves to voters through television programs. While this merchandise was 
not available for retail purchase, it could be acquired through the viewer’s vote at the polls. 
Political Entertainment in 2000 Election 
Television news remained the primary source of information for Mexican voters during the 2000 
election (Bruhn, 2004). During the electoral campaign, several political parties introduced a sort 
of political entertainment outlets, comic books, and telenovela. The comic book came in two 
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versions: one of the PAN and another for the PRI. The PAN comic book was Fox del Pueblo that 
described Fox’s personal history. All the characters in the book were drawings except Fox whose 
photograph was inserted in the strip. Several segments of his comic book adventures were 
incorporated in the celebrity magazine TV Notas as two-page ads.  
Politics became political entertainment in 1999, when a political telenovela El Candidato 
(The Candidate) was aired on TV Azteca until June 18, 2000, just a few days before Election 
Day (July 2). The telenovela was produced by Zuma, a company owned by actor Humberto 
Zurita and his wife actress Christian Bach. Zurita (2000) explained,  
Nobody likes politics, it’s something very difficult to understand, but I believe that we 
should not be anti-political. Through this telenovela, every day, I have become more 
interested in politics, in our government, and our political parties. We [citizens] must vote 
and decide whom we want to govern us, in our telenovela [El Candidato] we are not 
trying to support any specific political party. (p. 1)  
 If El Candidato inspired voters who stopped participating in previous election to go out and vote 
on Election Day (2000 election) for actor and producer Humberto Zurita, his telenovela had a 
positive effect on their viewing audience.  
The story was an original idea of José Ignacio Súarez Vázquez; Jorge Patiño made the 
adaptation for television; and the script editors were Gerardo Sánchez Luna as well as Gabriela 
Pérez Lau. The interesting fact was that this telenovela offered insight into current political 
events, such as the 2000 election. El Candidato’s script was based on the classic love triangle 
conflict between Ignacio Santoscoy and the Marquez sisters, Marycarmen (his wife) and Beatriz 
(his love for life); intermixed with actual 2000 presidential campaign events. Usually the 
telenovela presented political events with a 1-week delay; therefore, the main news of the 
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previous week was featured in the telenovela 8 days later. Zurita was the main character on El 
Candidato. Ignacio Santoscoy (Zurita) was a politician who at the peak of his professional career 
when he became the presidential nominee of Mexico’s most powerful political party and 
personal life with a family thanks to an arranged marriage with Maricarmen Manríquez, who was 
the daughter of Juventino Manriquez, an influential politician. The political power that Ignacio 
Santoscoy poses has been given by his father-in-law, who persuaded Santoscoy to chair the 
Popular Alliance Party as its General Secretary, making Santoscoy one of the most important 
political figures of the year 2000. At some point, Santoscoy decided to run for president and 
begin his campaign almost at the same time that real-life presidential candidates did in mid-
January of 2000.  
It is not unusual that telenovelas portray political events in their drama. There are many 
examples as in historical telenovelas, such as Senda de Gloria (Mexican post revolutionary), El 
Carruaje (Benito Júarez), La Anorcha Encendida (Mexico’s independence), and many others 
often produced by Televisa. The difference is that those events were presented on a telenovela 
many years after the actual event took place. For example, Senda de Gloria was produced in the 
mid-1980s when the real events that the telenovela portrayals took place 50 years before its 
production. Until El Candidato, Mexican audiences had never seen a telenovela that featured 
current political events. Zurita (2000) commented that El Candidato never received any kind of 
censorship from the Attorney General’s office or from TV Azteca board of directors. On the 
contrary, our own production company was the ones trying to censor us, because it was never our 
intention at Zuma productions to create a political program. El Candidato is just a melodrama. 
Zedillo’s government and TV Azteca owners were supporting the production of the political 
entertainment; El Candidato marked the starting point of portraying current political events via a 
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melodramatic genre. In terms of its effects, the author of this dissertation was not able to find any 
studies documenting such effect on Mexican voters.  Political entertainment in the 2006 election 
expanded to political, parody/comedy and musical telenovela El Privilegio de Mandar, comic 
show ¡Qué Madre, tan Padre!, and political party paid program La Otra Versión. 
¡Qué Madre, Tan Padre! 
Televisa’s weekly sitcom ¡Qué Madre, tan Padre! was also contracted by Calderón to promote 
his candidacy. The television series aired nationwide on Saturdays from 7:30 to 8:00 PM on 
Televisa’s main channel—Canal de las Estrellas. The program storyline was about a Mexico 
City family that faces a crisis when the father loses his job, and his wife decides to go back to 
work in a high-paying professional position. The family is turned upside down by reversed 
parental roles. The mother became responsible for supporting the household, and the father 
became the homemaker, Mr. Mom. The change in family dynamics also created frustration 
between the grandparents and their grandchildren Andrés, Sebastián, Jessica, and the twins Luz 
and Liz. The sitcom consisted of 22 episodes broadcast from early January to late June, just days 
before Election Day. The television series was produced by well-known comedian and director 
Jorge Ortiz de Pinedo. 
The main characters in the series were Maribel Galicia (Maribel Guardia), and Mauricio 
Hernández (Mauricio Castillo). Maribel, a marketing professional who specialized in sales and 
dressed very sexy in the office, positioned her desk to face the main entrance to the office. 
Behind her desk was a window that allowed the viewer to see a billboard outside that featured 
Calderón’s advertising posted on it. Therefore, every time that she sat at her desk, the audience 
could see Calderón’s image. This show did not include any dialog about the presidential election 
or the PAN candidate. The advertising placement took place at the visual level only. 
  164
Nevertheless, this was something unprecedented in Mexico’s national television entertainment 
programming. Televisa’s comic programming aired during primetime and registered the highest 
rating for that time slot; each commercial spot reached about 1 billion 637 million worldwide 
viewers ages 26 to 49 years old. Those ratings were only surpassed by certain special events such 
as the FIFA World Cup championship (Televisa, 2006c).  
El Privilegio de Mandar 
Televisa also created a telenovela committed to representing the 2006 electoral process, El 
Privilegio de Mandar (The Privilege to Rule). It was a political, parody/comedy and musical 
telenovela devoted to the portrayal of the 2006 electoral process focusing on the conflicts 
between the candidates as well as major political scandals. Televisa broadcast the program for 78 
consecutive weeks from January 3, 2005 (18 months before Election Day) to July 9, 2006 (1 
week after Election Day). El Privilegio de Mandar aired weekly nationwide every Monday night 
right after the telenovela Lety, La Fea más Bella and before El Noticiero con Joaquín López 
Doriga. In early 2005, El Privilegio de Mandar registered high ratings, 24.6, ranking as 
Televisa’s prime time top-rated program. By mid-2005, according to IBOPE México, the 
telenovela obtained a 24.2 rating on top of the two main national television newscasts—El 
Noticiero de Joaquín López Doriga (20.8) and Hechos de la Noche de Javier Alatorre (11) 
(Ortega, 2005). El Prilegio de Mandar was another illustration of how entertainment could be 
used to disseminate a political message. Voter preference for television genre was also reflected 
in a national opinion poll (Parametría, 2005) that indicated 7 of 10 Mexicans have viewed the 
telenovela, 66% liked the program, and 9% did not like it. However, 75% of participants 
considered the show as a source of information about politics (Ortega, 2005). In 2005, César 
González and Manuel Rodríguez received the Antena CIRT award, the most important medal of 
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the National Radio and Television Industry Association, for obtaining the highest ratings in a 
comedy show (Presidencia de la República, 2005). However, those ratings contrast with the 
Mexico 2006 Panel Study. The respondents to the question, “Aside from newscasts, do you 
watch a political satire program on television?,” indicated that only 8.2% of survey respondents 
watched El Privilegio de Mandar. The highest number of respondents indicated that they did not 
watch the satire television program (Lawson, et. al. 2007).  
Through El Privilegio de Mandar, politicians became celebrities. Telenovela characters 
were unique in the sense that each one of them was a parody of real-life major politicians. 
Personal characteristics of each presidential candidate, along with some other politicians, were 
carefully analyzed by the creative crew and then a stereotype was shaped. In addition, characters 
keep the same names as the real-life politicians. For example, one telenovela mimicked Andres 
Manuel López Obrador’s speech pattern. He tends to speak slowly, so that whenever the AMLO 
character spoke, he stopped abruptly in the middle of his dialogue. The audience would hear a 
ticking clock sound effect, indicating the passage of time. Then, after another character in the 
scene snapped his/her fingers, then the AMLO character immediately continued with his 
dialogue. In addition, the AMLO character frequently used the ‘j’ instead of the ‘c’ sound to 
reflect a regional language accent. The AMLO character pronounced polícia (police) as ‘polijia,’ 
just like the real politician.   
Even key political figures, such as PRD founder Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, pointed out his 
admiration for the show’s actors. He congratulated actor Arath de la Torre, who played 
“Cuauhtémoc” in the telenovela, for his characterization. The actor commented, “Cárdenas 
invited me to meet him for lunch. During our conversation, I discovered that he likes comedy. 
Generally, we have a cold image about the left, but he is a very likeable person” (Televisa, 
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2005a, p. 1). Telenovela writers created a fictional neighborhood “El Relaxo with x” that 
represents Mexico. In the show, every political party was represented as community organizer or 
city block chief. The Relaxo neighborhood that symbolizes Mexican society was represented by 
three major sectors: the people sector by Mary (actress Angélica Vale, who also portrayed the 
main character of Lety, la fea más bella), a house cleaner, and Canti (actor Carlos Espejel), a 
laborer. The political sector was represented by Chente (nickname for Vicente Fox’s character) 
and his close collaborator Santiago Creel, and the presidential candidates. Public servants 
represented the third sector, such as senators, deputies, state governors, and political party heads, 
among others political leaders. 
Manuel Rodríguez Ajenjo, Cesar González, Sergio Adrián Sánchez, and Claudio Herrera 
wrote the screen play of the show. The telenovela’s script was based on real-life weekly political 
events. The fundamental source of inspiration for the telenovela writers was the national media, 
and politicians’ speeches and their public behavior. Scriptwriters portrayed the actual political 
context from a humorous and entertaining approach; in a newspaper article, scriptwriter Manuel 
Rodríguez Ajenjo (2005) said, “Their goal is [was] to entertain and have good ratings. If they 
[viewers] would like political analysis, there are other programs devoted to that task,” (Molina 
Ramírez, 2005, p. 1). In addition, Rodríguez Ajenjo commented, “I do not believe that people 
would decide their vote by watching the program. What we tried to emphasize is the fact that we 
expose politicians at a level that generally they are not known” (Molina Ramírez, p. 1). For 
scriptwriter César González (2005), the program was designed for viewers to turn their attention 
to politics from a nonpartisan point of view (Molina Ramírez). The show producers expressed 
that the telenovela does not provide any form of political analysis, but because of their work, 
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more viewers were interested in politics because their representations on the program shifted 
from boring political matters into diverse situation comedy (López Cortés, 2005). 
In the past, the presidential administrations did not permit this type of content on the air. 
Both the government censorship and the media’s auto-censorship did not consent to formulate a 
sketch comedy about politicians or the nation’s political life. In Televisa, back “when Emilio 
Azcárraga Milmo was the company’s president, political topics were forbidden,” said Ajenjo 
(2005); “no one could dream about producing a show with political content” (p. 1). Nevertheless, 
now under the leadership of Azcárraga Milmo’s son, Emilio Azcárraga Jean, political topics are 
permitted. Producer Reynaldo López (2005) explained, “Times have changed and currently it is 
possible to produce a parody about our political and social situation” (EFE, 2005b, p. 1).  Actors 
believe that this content can be aired because Mexican media censorship has diminished. “The 
difference is the freedom of speech; today, in a moment of change we [media] have it” (Televisa, 
2006a, p. 1). For other journalists, such as cartoonist José Hernández (2005), the historical 
moment that marked the change was the 2000 election. According to a statement by Hernández 
in a newspaper article, “Before you [journalist/media] needed to be brave to criticize the 
president, today [Fox’s presidency] you [journalist/media] need to be brave to defend him” 
(Molina Ramírez, 2005, p. 1). For him this program arrived with a 30-year delay, “Today does 
not represent a challenge to face up to politicians. Currently [Fox’s presidency], the 
untouchables, those who exercise power, are the businessmen and large media companies, whom 
the program leaves in peace” (Molina Ramírez, 2005, p. 1). Furthermore, cartoonist Hernández 
felt that it makes no sense to make fun of the president or any other politician. “You cannot just 
criticize politics, because the power relies on others that Privilegio does not touch” (Molina 
Ramírez, p. 1). Furthermore, cartoonist Hernández pointed out, “Sometimes politicians provide 
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us with a complete sketch; for instance, during the primaries. Santiago Creel’s father declared 
that Felipe Calderón’s campaign team was better than his son’s; that is a complete scene”
(Molina Ramírez, p. 1). 
Televisa’s telenovela El Privilegio de Mandar does not inform; but it does provoke a 
laugh, according to media analyst Florence Toussaint (2005) in a newspaper article,  
The criticism occurred at a superficial level, it [the telenovela] points out candidates’ 
private matters such as figure of speech or their dress style instead of [presenting] 
important matters. It is terrible that people said that the show informs. What could be 
their expectation if people believe that private chitchat, and not national topics, are 
informing? (Molina Ramírez, 2005, p. 1). 
In contrast, producer Reynaldo López (2005) stated that the goal of the show was to entertain 
and inform at the same time (Televisa, 2005a). According to López Obrador, the purpose of the 
show was to destroy his reputation as a politician, especially after AMLO called Salinas and Fox 
chachalacas in several of his campaign meetings (Lizárraga, 2006). Communication Professor 
Salvador Guerrero (2005), made a case that cynicism had been an exclusive territory of the 
political class, but there was no reason for the media, more precisely Televisa, to transfer that 
sentiment to one of their telenovelas and present it as a cultural political product that could be 
sold like a commodity. El Privilegio de Mandar represented an appealing television format for 
an audience who shares, despite politics, a need to understand the political power dispute. “I 
would not be surprised if this program had effective influence on the 2006 election,” commented 
Guerrero (Guerrero, 2005, p. 1).  
Monterrey Tech graduate students María de Dolores Morín Lara, and Citlalli Sánchez 
Hernández (2006) conducted a content analysis using a qualitative method of El Privilegio de 
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Mandar that focused on the representation of the political context. Their results indicated two 
major findings:  
(1) The change in the Mexican democratic context presented the opportunity for the 
media to criticize politicians and represents a lucrative business for media owners though a 
rentable TV format such as the political/comic telenovela. Further, their concern was that in 
Mexico’s emerging democracy, citizens do not care very much about politics and television 
shows such as this telenovela do not present opportunities for citizens to develop critical thinking 
regarding presidential candidates and their political platform.  
The telenovela represents three sources of income revenue for Televisa: advertisers that 
want to contract spots, ratings, and politicians who want to pay to “look good/good press” on the 
show. Clearly, El Privilegio de Mandar provoked emotions and laughs for its audiences, but by 
no means did the program provide critical analysis of the presidential election. 
(2) In addition, results by Morín Lara and Sánchez Hernández indicated that El Privilegio 
de Mandar portrayed election news that was humorous and controversial with information that 
criticized candidates, not news stories about public issues. Therefore, “The program does not 
induce audiences on what topics to consider, certainly the program does establish a list of topics 
in which the audience thinks about most” (Morín Lara & Sánchez Hernández, 2006, p. 4). That 
is, in agenda-setting terms, the show concentrates only on the second level of agenda-setting by 
representing candidates based on their attributes more than on their positions on public issues. 
The show, in a way, presented presidential candidates along with other influential politicians as 
celebrities more than politicians. The difference lies in the characteristics selected to represent a 
presidential candidate. The celebrity format was based on candidates’ attributes and scandals. On 
the contrary, politicians should be represented according to their standpoint on public issues.  
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El Privilegio de Mandar ended on July 9, 2006 (7 days after Election Day). On the last 
episode, Ugalde declared Felipe Calderón to be the winner of “El Relaxo” neighborhood 
electoral process, and coincidently, Calderón’s speech was almost identical to the one the PAN 
candidate gave late at night on Election Day. The telenovela ended with Canti, the character who 
represented the people’s consciousness delivering a monologue with a clear recriminatory 
message to AMLO. Canti told López Obrador to accept the election results without challenging 
IFE’s credibility, because those attitudes would lead AMLO to lose his reputation and credibility 
with voters. In addition, Canti challenged López Obrador to present proof of election fraud or 
accept the election result, because in Mexico, “the people are the only ones who have the 
privilege to rule” (El Universal, 2006f, p. 1). Canti asked AMLO to continue defending and 
working for Mexico from his position as a PRD member and citizen. Televisa delivered its point 
of view through a telenovela character Canti, and declared Felipe Calderón president-elect 
during a time when the postelectoral turmoil was at its highest point. That is, the television 
corporation expressed to AMLO its perspective regarding the electoral process and the kind of 
news coverage that he received. In this respect, the telenovela suggested how the audience 
should think about Calderón’s victory as president without question. Televisa used the Canti 
character to represent its favoritism for Calderón. Televisa expressed its political agenda through 
its entertainment programs, but not through its newscasts. 
Perhaps, Televisa's favoritism toward Calderón could be understood as the network’s fear 
of potentially losing its business via nationalization decree. Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
(2007) wrote in his book La Mafia nos Robó la Presidencia (The Mafia Steals Our Presidency), 
that 2 days before election day, he had lunch with Televisa's president Emilio Azcárraga Jean 
and Televisa's vice-president Bernardo Gómez. The purpose of the meeting was to question 
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AMLO about his intention to appropriate Televisa; the PRD candidate was surprised by the news 
and responded that he had no such objective. Immediately after hearing his answer, Azcárraga 
Jean showed AMLO an appropriate decree draft document against Televisa he supposedly was 
planning to introduce to Congress on December 2, 2006 (1 day after AMLO's official 
inauguration ceremony). The PRD presidential candidate pointed out that either Calderón's, 
Fox's, or Centro de Investigación y Seguridad Nacional-Cisen's staff could be responsible for 
drafting the decree to create distrust between AMLO and Televisa (Monge, 2007). Moreover, 
AMLO stated: 
They [Televisa executives] knew that I do not agree with monopoly political power 
which operates on top of the legal and legitimate constitutive powers [Legislative and 
Judicial branches]. I am not in favor of the republic of television [videocracia, 
mediocracia, media democracy]. However, I had never thought that the path to 
democratize the mass media and guarantee the right to information could be to 
expropriate Televisa" (Monge, 2007, p. 1). 
The Other Campaign 
Typically, indigenous communities are trapped between two kinds of fears: economic and 
repression. The Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) (Zapatista Army of National 
Liberation) began as a social movement to defend Mexico’s indigenous population back in the 
1900s, but over time, its purpose expanded to defend other kinds of marginal people for their 
economic condition, sexual preferences, and gender. While other major candidates were featured 
on television and radio, parallel candidate Subcomandante Marcos relied on Zapatista 
community radio, Radio Rebelde, to present his political platform. On Christmas Day of 2005, 
Zapatista’s ski-masked leader Subcomandante Marcos (also known as Delegado Cero-Zero 
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Delegate) announced the launch of his own political campaign crusade, known as La Otra 
Campaña (The Other Campaign). His Sexta Declaración de la Selva La Candona (Selva La 
Candona Sixth Declaration) document was EZLN’s political platform as well as a general 
invitation to participate in the cause. Marcos traveled the country on a motorcycle promoting a 
parallel political campaign during the 2006 election. The Delegado Cero insisted that his 
political campaign would be conducted in a very simple way without excessive spending; 
however, it would be open to dialog and ready to hear the voices of the minority population.  
Marcos commented that the purpose of EZLN’s peaceful civic campaign was to construct 
a leftist national front of battle against capitalism and formulate a new political constitution 
(Zermeño, 2006). The Subcomandante stated that his enemy was not a certain political party, but 
the political system. The Zapatistas did not plan to divide the country into pieces; rather, EZLN 
members joined the movement from the very bottom layer of society: the poor (Bellinghausen, 
2006h). On the contrary, this social movement disseminated its own political agenda. Moreover, 
the Delegado Cero said that the people who supported La otra campaña were persons who did 
not sell themselves, who had not given up. In contrast, political party members were individuals 
who sold themselves and gave up. Therefore, this was the best way to define the 2006 
presidential candidates (Bellinghausen, 2006c). Marcos said, “Political parties are no good for 
the people anymore. They only use and divide us; once they are in power, all of them are the 
same; political parties abuse and support the militarization of the indigenous territories. 
Therefore, our fight is against the political parties who are supporting the capitalist system” 
(Bellinghausen, 2006p, p. 1). 
For Professor Neil Harvery (2006), Marco’s campaign plan consisted of three main 
points: (1) dialog as an ethical principle, (2) the search for new ways of participation and 
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interaction, and (3) the collective responsibility to achieve campaign success (Bellinghausen, 
2006p). The Subcomandante, during his public presentations, criticized all presidential 
candidates. However, Professor José Antonio Crespo (2006) argued that perhaps Marcos’ 
criticism of López Obrador could in fact help him in the long run, because voters would 
understand that AMLO’s point of view was not as radical as voters might think. Since there was 
another person, Subcomandante Marcos, whose point of view about Mexican politics and public 
issues was in fact extreme, potentially, this situation could attract undecided voters who feared 
radicalism, but who did not tolerate PRI or PAN any longer (De Buen, 2006). Another possibility 
could be what journalist Néstor de Buen (2006) perceived that Marcos felt he had been away 
from the spotlight and wanted attention (De Buen).  
PRI also agreed with this viewpoint. PRI spokesperson Eduardo Andrade Sánchez (2006) 
declared that his party would not enter any type of controversies with the Subcomandante, 
because all he wanted was press coverage (Velasco & Méndez, 2006a). In a gathering, Marcos 
invited voters to send “PRI to hell” and pointed out Madrazo’s negative attributes. PRI Deputy 
spokesperson Miguel Lucero Palma (2006) commented that the call of the masked man, known 
as Subcomandante Marcos or Delegado Cero, would not affect the PRI party (Velasco & 
Méndez, 2006a). In addition, the Subcomandante denounced the PAN party, and said all the 
governments emerged from this political party for authoritarian and their fascist tendencies. He 
called attention to Guanajuato Governor Juan Carlos Romero Hicks as well as El Yunque (The 
Anvil)—an ultra right wing secret organization—and “Mexico’s vice president” Ramón Muñoz 
for actively promoting the ultra-right ideology in Mexico (Bellinghausen, 2006i). In President 
Fox’s home state, Guanajuato, the Subcomandante again accused PAN and El Yunque of 
classifying marginal people as a hindrance in their plan to take possession of Mexico 
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(Bellinghausen, 2006e). Furthermore, the Delegado Cero declared that the political party in 
power (PAN) and Mexican executives could not fool voters with their electoral circus. “They are 
mistaken if they believe that we are going to be sitting down waiting for them to kill us, destroy 
our land, and sell our country” (Bellinghausen, 2006e, p. 1). In addition, Marcos announced that 
“the teacher,” Gordillo, was forcing teachers and union leaders to become members of the New 
Alliance party, under the threat that if they did not join, their salaries would suffer the 
consequences (Bellinghausen, 2006c). 
Nonetheless, philosopher Enrique Dussel (2006) insisted that AMLO was the candidate 
that PAN and the business elite wanted to defeat. That is, the elite planned to divide the left into 
two: the first campaign, where the leftist youth should be the propaganda element and the other 
campaign where the leftist youth should not participate in the first campaign. Therefore, their 
effort to influence the population not to vote was a fundamental tactic objective for the elite in 
power (Dussel). In other words, it was just like the popular saying, “My enemy’s enemy is my 
ally!” Journalist John Ross (2006), “The Other Campaign was an anti-electorate crusade 
designed to bring together underclass struggle groups into a new left alliance” (p. 1). Perhaps, 
this was the reason PRD never became directly involved with EZLN. PRD president Leonel Cota 
(2006) stated that his party would not interfere in Subcomandante Marcos’ campaign. PRD 
would be respectful of the EZLN agenda. “It is better to facilitate the opportunity of political 
competition” (Herrera, 2006, p. 1).  
The Zero Delegate (2006) made clear that for a matter of dignity, La Otra Campaña 
could not support PRD; “the political party that brought suffering to EZLN members: 
Subcomandante understands that this matter could be difficult for politicians to understand 
because our movement has strong principles” (Bellinghausen, 2006c, p. 1). During a meeting in 
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the Hidalgo state, Marcos stated that his campaign was accused of taking voters away from 
AMLO. However, he explained that his movement was not responsible for that action. PRD state 
officials were to blame: for example, Tulancingo City Mayor ordered his local police to surround 
an EZLN gathering by constructing a perimeter with police dogs and armed police officers to 
make sure the meeting did not speak negatively about AMLO (Bellinghausen, 2006c). Zapatista 
member Sergio Rodríguez Lascano (2006) stated that from the beginning, the discussion about 
the Zapatista initiative has been viewed by PRD party members in accordance with its purposes 
and its mechanism to achieve it; that is, if you are not with me (PRD-López Obrador), you are 
supporting the ultra right (Bellinghausen, 2006a). The Delegado Zero supposed that his keeping 
a distance from PRD might signify less press coverage,  
We are closing the door to massive meetings, huge compliments, as well as front-
page coverage, but I do not care, our movement has dignity. . . . Furthermore, we 
could talk about PRI or PAN and the media do not report on it, but if we speak 
about PRD then the media reports on it. . . . The main difference is that López 
Obrador wants to be president, and I do not; I just want to be your brother. 
(Bellinghausen, 2006a, p. 1)  
EZLN was convinced that none of the political parties and presidential candidates 
represented a respectable government. As a result, the Subcomandante Marcos campaign 
promoted abstentions, or no votes. However, its major spokesperson expressed the same 
ideas but used different terminology. The Zero Delegate explained that La Otra Campaña 
(name of Subcomandante’s campaign) was not promoting abstentions among voters; but 
suggesting voters to look at alternative forms of government (Bellinghausen, 2006d). A 
set of political beliefs that Arturo Ramos (2006), Chapingo University professor and 
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Zapatista scholar explained, democracy is incompatible with capitalism (Bellinghausen, 
2006d). Therefore, governments that promote a capitalistic economic model are not good 
for democracy. Nevertheless, Marcos contradicted himself by proposing to block, in a 
civil and pacifistic mode, the electoral process on July 2 (Election Day) (Bellinghausen, 
2006j). On several occasions, the Subcomandante was questioned regarding the 2006 
electoral process. The Subcomandante opposed the election because to him the problem 
with political parties and their candidates was the lack of new proposals to govern; people 
should not be conforming to those governmental options. Subcomandante Marcos 
explained that the other campaign was not an electoral campaign, but a movement to 
encourage the use of reason and to analyze “other” political options, such as EZLN 
anticapitalism political ideology (Henriquez, & Boffil Gómez, 2006). Marcos said, 
The only thing that is going to change in this election is the name of the person who is 
going to take us into custody, who would order the soldiers to fire at us, who would order 
to raise the price of food, who is going to sign a decree to strip us from our lands. 
(Mariscal y Bellinghausen, 2006, p. 1) 
For Subcomandante, the current political definition of democracy for EZLN members 
meant the freedom to elect EZLN’s tyrant; “Zapatistas stop! No more! The tyrant politics of the 
exercise of power to gain money must convert into a different kind of politics, into a different 
government system” (Henriquez, 2006, p. 1).  
The Delegado Cero crusade around Mexico was frequently reported in alternative media, 
but rarely in the mainstream media. The Zapatistas believed that Mexican mainstream mass 
media only served the government and national as well as international corporations, not the 
indigenous communities. Oventic Caracol’s representative commented that the media never tell 
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the truth, they only disseminate ideas, thoughts, the interests, and lies of the bad government 
along with wealthy people in order to control communities from a political, ideological, and 
economic perspective (Mariscal & Bellinghausen, 2007). In response, Libertas Anticorp delegate 
Yazmín Núñez suggested that a project of Television via Internet could be the solution to the 
problem, because every Caracol (group/region) could upload videos and information for all of 
those interested in exposing themselves to a free television (Mariscal & Bellinghausen, 2007). 
There are several Internet hot spots along the indigenous territory equipped with technology such 
as computers with Internet access, video cameras, and printers that Zapatistas used to stay in 
touch with the rest of the world. For EZLN Lieutenant Colonel Moisés (2007), to be an outsider, 
to resist the current capitalistic government was not only about not receiving any governmental 
economic support. EZLN had to overcome many threats as well as political and ideological 
bullets sent via the mass media (Bellinghausen, 2007a).  
Two months before Election Day, held on July 2nd, 2006, Subcomandante Marcos gave 
an interview on Televisa that startled Mexican politicians when he declared that the presidential 
candidates were “mediocrities” because they viewed the presidency as a business and not as a 
leadership position. For Marcos, elections in Mexico were always the same, “There is going to 
be a bit of hope for a change in the government, then after a while the disillusion sentiment is 
going to come and that is when we need another thing” (Reforma, 2006c, p. 1). For 
Subcomandante, all candidates were the same because they did not propose a different political 
point of view—an alternative political ideology other than capitalism. When asked who he 
thought would win the election, Marcos suggested Andrés Manuel López Obrador because 
Calderón signified the continuation of a political profile of a president who was not a good 
administrator and wanted to rule the country with the use of military force (Reforma). Although 
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some intellectuals believed that Marcos’ endorsement played to the detriment of AMLO’s 
candidacy.  
The Delegado Cero arrival in Mexico City at the end of April placed him in the national 
spotlight once again. Nevertheless, his press coverage was limited and his marches were small 
until late May, when the San Salvador Atenco (a village located it just outside of Mexico City) 
confrontation took place. A group of farmers affiliated with the other campaign fought against its 
own local, state, and federal authorities for 2 consecutive days. The confrontation between 
citizens and police officers was cruel and brutal, which resulted in hundreds of arrests, rapes of 
women and prisoners, and countless human rights violations. Marcos threatened the Fox 
administration by stating that if the government did not free 27 political prisoners arrested during 
the Atenco confrontation, he would alter the peace and tranquility of the remaining electoral 
campaign period which was about 29 days (León Zaragoza, 2006a). National security authorities 
Eduardo Medina Mora and Daniel Cabeza de Vaca considered that Marcos’ message did not 
contain evidence for the crime of sedition; he was simply expressing his viewpoint (León 
Zaragoza, 2006a). Therefore, they could not reactivate the Subcomndante order of apprehension. 
Moreover, the Amnesty Law benefited EZLN active members. The Zero Delegate organized two 
street protest marches to show their support to the families of the victims and political prisoners 
arrested during the Atenco conflict. Until then, Marcos had not authorized any interviews with 
the media. However, after the Atenco event, he changed his mind. 
For the Subcomandante, the Atenco violence event was created by the party in power to 
hit AMLO, and it was far from signifying a victory to the government over the repression, 
imprisonment, and death of the rebellion. What the government had achieved was a national 
destabilization context during electoral times. Ultimately, Mexico could potentially face 
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elections conducted under the scrutiny of the military and police at the polling sites. Marcos had 
two predictions: (1) that if Calderón won the election, there was a possibility of more social 
rebellion. If he came to power, he would use the military to provoke fear and repression. (2) If 
López Obrador won, he would reconstruct the national state to support a new administration, but 
La Otra Campaña thought that AMLO did not present an effective alternative proposal for 
governing. (Bellinghausen, 2006q).  
Five days after Election Day, July 7, 2006, right in the middle of the postelectoral 
aftermath dispute, Marcos endorsed the PRD candidate fraud argument and declared that from 
his point of view, Andrés Manuel López Obrador won the election. “The political system is in 
crisis [democracy was not consolidated], because a fraud operation was promoted by federal 
highest authority [President Fox] along with PAN leadership (Bellinghausen, 2006l). According 
to his data, IFE’s voter registration had some “extra voters,” including 5 million individuals who 
did not vote, 2 million dead people, and about 3 million people who were overseas. Altogether, 
10 million votes were Calderón’s backup. On the afternoon of July 2, 2006, Fox ordered Ugalde 
to “administrate” PREP entries by authorizing access to the database to only those voting pools 
where Calderón won in order to make time to adapt the “backup votes” into IFE’s PREP 
(Bellinghausen, 2006l). Allegations of fraud were everywhere in Mexico and in many voters’ 
minds. Members of the other campaign believed that without liberty and justice, democracy 
could exist; therefore, democracy did not exist in Mexico. Apparently, the EZLN was living 
proof that its definition of democracy did not exist. “Our ideas of justice and liberty do not fit the 
voting polls” (Bellinghausen, 2006f, p. 1)  
After the postelectoral discord, Marcos (2006) declared that Calderón’s inauguration 
ceremony (December 1) marked the starting point of the end of the political system established 
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after the Mexican revolution, and Calderón would begin to come down on his first day as 
president! (Bellinghausen, 2006f). He made it clear that EZLN did not recognize the official 
president (Calderón) and the legitimate president (López Obrador). The Subcomandante thought 
that Mexico was on the eve of a civil war; and EZLN would wipe out the entire political class, 
including leftist politicians when this uprising took place (Bellinghausen, 2006l). 
La Otra Campaña highlighted that Mexico was living in a period of political crisis, 
because the political class did not respect Mexican institutions; the right and ultra right were 
pursuing a denationalization project. Therefore, members of the Zapatista organization decided 
to combat capitalism, because Calderón’s government had two characteristics: [1] to serve its 
owner and [2] to compromise the security policy that was designed by the United States 
(Bellinghausen, 2006b). The relationship between Calderón and the EZLN was cold because the 
new government did not possess the political will to analyze the case of nine indigenous people 
incarcerated for a federal felony and four more imprisoned in Tapachula for protests against the 
increased cost of electricity since the electric company is owned by the government. PRD 
Deputy Fernel Gálvez (2007) invited both parties to a dialog. The problem was that official 
authorities did not listen to community complaints regarding the electricity. Instead, the authority 
subsidized electricity bills with 50 pesos, a mere pittance since electrical bills were up to 2,000 
pesos (Méndez, 2007a).  
Summary 
The 2006 election had five presidential candidates registered with IFE: Calderón-PAN, Madrazo-
PRI, López Obrador-PRD, Campa-New Alliance, and Mercado-Alternative. Mexico’s electoral 
law did not recognize the independent presidential candidate figure. The concept of independent 
candidates does not exist in Mexican politics. However, in terms of the national television 
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journalistic coverage of presidential candidates, it is important to add two other presidential 
candidates who ran their own parallel presidential campaigns: Vicente Fox and Subcomandante 
Marcos. Both of them were never stopped by IFE. Moreover, TEPJF ruled that Fox’s 
intervention in the electoral process put the election certification in danger. Nevertheless, all 
seven candidates received some television news coverage. The Delegado Cero was the only one 
who did not purchase any political spots on any electronic media, except on his own indigenous 
radio station—Radio Rebelde. 
In 2006, Mexican television audiences witnessed first-hand how the election marked the 
initiation of an unprecedented innovative political communication age. The innovation consisted 
of the introduction of a new advertising commodity: the presidential candidate. The innovation 
was the introduction of a new advertising commodity, the presidential candidate as product 
placement in an entertainment medium. In U.S. and Mexican movies and television series, it is a 
common practice to place commercial products as part of their programs in order to create 
profitable, and generate alternative revenue. In this case, the product to be sold was a presidential 
candidate: Calderón. He employed a telenovela—Lety, La Fea más Bella—and a comic 
program—Qué Madre, tan Padre!—to promote himself. In the telenovela, Calderón's name 
along with several positive comments was incorporated into the script. As a consequence, several 
of the telenovela's key characters were seen and heard by viewers making positive references 
about the PAN candidate. On the comic show, Calderón's image was part of the background 
scenery in the show. Characters did not directly make a reference in favor of the PAN candidate. 
However, audiences saw a replica of Calderón's billboard political advertising as part of the 
show's decorations. In both cases, Calderón placed his image as a commercial product placement 
to be sold to audiences. This new political communication approach was risky, because it is 
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shifting the presidential candidate image from a politician into an entertainment commodity, 
from a person to a product. As a result, the majority of the political advertising messages 
concentrated on the candidate's attributes and attacks, limiting the exposure of the candidate's 
political platform. The political candidates as product placement strategy restricted their ability 
to set an agenda of public issues in the entertainment media such as the telenovela. All the 
exposure that Calderón received in the entertainment media, as political product placement, was 
not counted by IFE. IFE's authorities were only prepared to monitor newscasts and political 
commercial spots, not political placement publicity on entertainment. Moreover, there was no 
electoral law to regulate this new type of political exposure. As a result, the PAN presidential 
candidate had more opportunities of representation without suffering any IFE penalties. 
Televisa also had the opportunity to incorporate a new cultural product such as the 
political satire telenovela into their programming. El Privilegio de Mandar illustrated how an 
entire entertainment show can be based on a current national event such as the election. The 
satire telenovela based its script and characterization on election key players. Mostly 
concentrating on the portrayal of candidate's attributes than on the discussion of the candidate’s 
public issues; once again the television drama series limited the chance for voters to be exposed 
to a contender's proposals for developing a better country. 
Another interesting political communication plan observed in the 2006 election was the 
expansion of the candidate's public relations responsibilities with the creation of a television 
series to directly inform voters about the PRD candidate's activities and scheduled events. 
AMLO's staff did wait around to be covered by the news reporters. On the contrary, they took 
control of the political communication situation by creating their very own television program, 
The Other Version. It was just like those paid product informational programs that are very 
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common on television. AMLO produced his own informational show to keep voters informed. In 
this case, López Obrador had total control over the information that was disseminated to viewers. 
In contrast, AMLO had no control over how a journalist was going to write/produce his/her news 
story. 
Finally, Subcomandante Marcos’—parallel presidential candidate—campaign was 
mainly covered by a Zapatista niche media outlet, Radio Rebelde. The novelty in this case was 
that a particular media outlet concentrated its reporting according to its listeners’ preferences, yet 
limiting the exposure of all other candidates who do not fulfill its audience's preferences. That 
was, Radio Rebelde’s news coverage favored the Subcomandate campaign. As a result, reporters 
mostly covered Subcomandante's activities, a particular medium that serves a very segmented 
audience niche focused on the political figure that was very sympathetic to its audience 
preferences instead of presenting information about all candidates running for president in order 
to keep its audience informed about the complete electoral dynamics. This chapter illustrates the 
innovative political form of advertisement used during the election campaign. Mexican television 
audiences were used to seeing the traditional television political television spot included in a 
commercial break. However, in the 2006 political process, the political advertisement 
opportunities were expanded like never before. This context could bring more opportunities to 
generate a strong political effect on voters and limit the national television newscast’s power to 
set the media’s agenda. This new political communication environment developed in the absence 
of a clear and specific electoral law or regulation. This situation provoked what some politicians 
considered to be unfair political communication practices that turned out to be the main reason 
for revision of Mexico's Electoral Law. The following chapter presents the evolution of the 
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Electoral Law up to its last reform on October 2007 that seriously restricts political candidate 
exposure in the media.  
 
Chapter 6 
Electoral Law: From 1824 to 2000 
 
Events in society often precede the necessity for law; sometimes tragic, sad, painful, and violent 
events mark a historical moment that provokes the change and creation of legal norms. The law 
establishes a set of rules and regulations that must be observed by citizens; in the case of 
misreading, the citizen breaks the law and faces consequences that are determined by a code of 
law. However, there is another possibility: the no law situation. What happens when there is no 
law to regulate an unprecedented event? The 2006 Mexican presidential election provides an 
excellent example of events that had no legal precedence. Unlike American election policies, in 
which political advertising is highly regulated, the Mexican government did not have regulations 
governing media advertising during election campaigns. This chapter provides a brief review of 
the history of the Mexican electoral law until 2000.  
The Republic of Mexico created its first election regulations on May 21, 1823, with the 
decree Ley de Elecciones. Those regulations established selection of a constituent Congress that 
would be in charge of writing the 1824 constitution. Each group of 50,000 people should have a 
deputy; the representative would be at least 18 years of age and be a resident of the territory. On 
October 4, 1824, a first Constitution of Mexico was signed. Mexico adopted the republic system 
and established the offices of president and vice president. In addition, the supreme justice court 
president was established as the third person in line to act as president in the event that the 
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president and vice president could not conduct the business of the country. The 1824 constitution 
prohibited an immediate reelection for a president or vice president; 4 years needed to pass after 
the term expired in order to be reelected. The electoral system of 1824 established the indirect 
vote for the election of federal and state deputies. Citizens were not allowed to vote. As Gustavo 
Emmerich (1985) stated, “The role of the electoral citizenship finished; president, vice-president, 
senators, and high magistrates were elected by the State’s Congress” (p. 9). The Chamber of 
Deputies had the constitutional duty to supervise the electoral process; that is, congressional 
members were the only citizens allowed to vote. On July 12, 1830, the document, “Rules for the 
Election of Deputies and Mexico City’s City Council and Territories of the Republic”—a set of 
64 rules—was published. Rule 56 established the second round: In the event that no candidates 
collected the absolute popular vote during the first round, a second round should take place 
between the two candidates who obtained the highest numbers of voters on the first round 
(García Orozco, 1989). The people who were not permitted to vote were the women, convicted 
criminals, and the clergy. Rule 34 stated who was eligible to vote: males who were 21 years old 
or 18 if married and made their living from officially permitted job or industry (González García, 
1999).  
 The indirect procedures continued to remain active until 1835 when a new constitution, 
known as Las Siete Leyes (The Seven Laws), was written. These laws developed new 
requirements for political candidates. Those were: minimal income; in the case of a deputy the 
requirement was 1,500 pesos annually and an age of 30 years or over. For a senator 2,500 pesos 
per year were required and an age of 35 years or over (González García, 1999). In addition, the 
document recognized a minimum annual salary of $100 pesos in order to have access to vote. 
The Fourth Law ordered the Junta de Ministros (Ministry meeting) as the committee in charge of 
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electing the president and the qualification of the election by the Chamber of Deputies. The 
presidential period was 8 years with a reelection possibility. The president was in charge of 
appointing state governors.  
Eight years later, in 1843, a new constitution was created: the Bases Orgánicas de la 
República Mexicana (Organic Base for the Mexican Republic). This document increased the 
minimum annual salary to $200 pesos in order to have access to vote, reduced the presidential 
term of office to 5 years, established an electoral college, divided the population into segments of 
500 people, ordered the elaboration of a census every 6 years, and departmental assemblies were 
in charge of electing the president. Those elections were coordinated by the Chamber of 
Deputies; Congressman Mariano Otero (1847) proposed that Congress modify the 1824 
constitution because all citizens should have the equal right to vote regardless of their personal 
annual income (González García, 1999). Congress approved his proposal—Actas de Reforma—
in 1847; finally, all male citizens with 21 years old or 18 if married apart from their personal 
income were allowed to participate in the elections. 
Fourteen years later, in 1857, Congress wrote a new constitution. The presidential period 
was once again reduced to 4 years with a reelection option. As in 1824, the supreme justice court 
president was the third in line to be president in the event that the president and vice president 
were absent. The election rules changed; 1 week after the constitution became active, February 
12, the new Ley Orgánica Electoral (Electoral Organic Law) became active. The law consisted 
of 63 bills; it established the first mechanism that required voters to register in order to vote, and 
the Orozco proposal became law. In addition, the Chamber of Deputies had the power to convert 
itself into an electoral college during the presidential elections. The Chamber was in charge of 
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counting votes and declared which candidate won the election. Also, the document described a 
series of events that eventually could cancel the election.  
The electoral process became a national problem during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship, 
which lasted for 35 years. Díaz was elected president twice. His first term was from 1876 to 
1880, and his second term was from 1884 to 1911. At the beginning of his dictatorship, Díaz was 
considered a liberal—meaning that he supported the ideal of abolishing the presidential 
reelection clause from the constitution. Back in those days, Mexico was ruled under the 1857 
Constitution. The document limited the presidential period to 4 years with the right to be 
reelected. Later in his presidency, Díaz changed his position, stating that no one else was ready 
to take his place as president. In his eyes there were no others prepared to lead the country as 
well as he was. However, when economic elites began to shrink, the electoral problem reached a 
critical point.  
The revolutionary movement of 1920 was motivated by two points of view. The first was 
the confrontation between the Porfiriato’s Mexican upper class, Los Científicos (the Scientists) 
group, and the “left out” group, who were angry because Los Científicos left them out from what 
they considered to be a high profit juicy business. At this time, some of the elite members were 
persuaded by the philosophy of positivism. The group that promoted this ideology was known as 
Los Científicos. They wanted to offer a strong economic foundation for Mexico through 
following the guidance of science; their argument was that the only true knowledge was that 
which could be proved (Mancisidor, 1973).  
Los Científicos was the most aggressive opponent of church doctrine and the philosophy 
of metaphysics. Education was the main weapon used to keep the nation divided and the 
positivists (Los Científicos) group in power. As long as the general population did not possess 
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the required cultural knowledge, Los Científicos were the country’s most educated men, and thus 
the most suited to determine the country’s political and economic development. Francisco I. 
Madero was a member of a wealthy Porfiriato family and was well educated. He studied in 
France and the United States. This exposure to different ideological, cultural, and political 
contexts inspired Madero. He presented his proposal for change in 1908 in his book La Sucesión 
Presidencial en 1910. Madero stated that if the no-reelection rule became active, no political or 
economic group would have the possibility of running the country; because after each election, 
those groups would have to change members, providing the ideal conditions for promoting 
business opportunities for every elite member. 
The second condition that motivated the revolution was journalist Ricardo Flores 
Magón’s influence regarding workers’ rights. He wanted a change but believed it needed to 
come through total transformation of the political and economic system. Flores Magón was an 
anarchist communist whose radical newspaper Regeneración began the process of national 
consciousness-raising with a focus on the social reality of Mexican workers. According to 
historian Fernando Zertuche Muñoz (1995), Flores Magón was the first person to address the 
needs for social reforms that could help change labor conditions in Mexico.  
Flores Magón and Madero had such an impact on Mexico that the Mexican Constitution 
of 1917 summarized their main arguments. Contemporary Mexico is still governed under this 
constitution, which is considered the strongest legacy of the revolution. The constitution 
prohibited the reelection, eliminated the vice president position, established the election victory 
by means of a majority of votes, and in the event of definitive absence of the president, Congress 
would transform itself into an electoral college in charge of electing a substitute president and 
call for new elections. Ten years later, in 1927, Congress modified Bill 83 to permit the 
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president’s reelection, but President Alvaro Obregón’s assassination motivated Congress to 
rescind the bill in 1928, once again prohibiting reelection. On July 17, 1928, in Mexico City, 
during a celebratory banquet in the restaurant La Bombilla to honor Obregón’s reelection victory, 
he was shot dead by José de León Toral, a Catholic fanatic who opposed Obregón’s views on 
religious matters. 
Until then, Mexico never had an electoral law. In 1946, during the Miguel Alemán 
Valdés presidency (1946-1952), Congress wrote the first Ley Federal Electoral (Federal 
Electoral Law) that established for the first time the Derecho Electoral Mexicano (Mexican 
Electoral Right) and an institution, the Comisión Federal de Vigilancia Electoral (Federal 
Electoral Vigilance Commission), in charge of supervising the electoral process and part of the 
general attorney’s office. The electoral law was created with the purpose of centralizing and 
organizing the elections. Its highest point was the regulation of political parties. That is, in order 
for a political group to gain political party status, it must complete all the requirements indicated 
in the electoral law. Otherwise, that particular group could not obtain recognition and, as a 
consequence, could not participate in the electoral process. In addition, the voter registration 
activity was delegated to a federal agency, Consejo del Padrón Electoral, which reassigned the 
task of voter registration from the states to the federal agency. Several commissions were 
instituted, such as the Comisiones Locales Electorales (Local Electoral Vigilance Commissions), 
Comités de Distrito (District Committees), Junta Computadora (Computation Supervisors), 
Mesas de Casilla (Voting Site Supervisors), and the Supreme Court of Justice, which had the 
authority to arbitrate in any electoral conflicts. In December 1946, the Senate Chamber approved 
a reform on Bill 115 that for the first time permits women voters to exercise their rights as 
citizens; however, their participation was restricted to municipal elections.  
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In 1949, another electoral reform was needed in order to define in more detail specific 
matters regarding organization and management of the election. The reform restricted the 
participation of the Supreme Court of Justice in the electoral process, transferring all its 
responsibilities to the General Attorney office. Later on during the Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-
1958) era, the agency Comisión Federal Electoral (Federal Electoral Commission) was created 
to be in charge of supervising the deputies’ election and oversee the observation of the electoral 
law. In 1951, another electoral reform was implemented. The changes were:  
1. Reduction of the number of executive power representatives in the Federal
Electoral Commission from two to one,
2. Increased political party delegates from two to three,
3. Transformation of the Consejo del Padrón Electoral into Registro Nacional de
Electores (National Voters Register), and
4. Provide equal responsibility to oversee the electoral process to the state, registered
political parties, and Mexican citizens.
In 1954, a new electoral reform was necessary because of the large number of registered political 
parties. Therefore, a limited number of political members were required to create and register a 
political party; the minimum number of national affiliate members was elevated from 30,000 to 
75,000 citizens.  
In 1954, Mexico had its first female Federal Deputy, Aurora Jiménez de Palacios from 
Baja California State. In 1955, Congress authorized women to vote on federal deputy elections, 
and in 1958 on presidential elections. During the epoch of President Adolfo López Mateos 
(1958-1964), a new electoral reform in 1963 created the political party representative deputies in 
Congress with the purpose of providing more participation to opposition parties. During the 1964 
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election, the presence of the opposition parties in the Chamber of Deputies increased from 3% to 
15% (Museo Legislativo, 2006). One direct consequence of the October 2, 1968, violent conflict 
among students and the government at the Tres Culturas plaza resulting in a large number of 
deaths and injuries, led President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964-1970) to support an electoral reform 
that would grant political rights allowing youth to vote on their 18th birthday.  
1976 Election 
It is important to explain that at the beginning of the PRI regimen, the political party won many 
real votes, but over time, it became difficult to differentiate between the voluntary voters vs. the 
involuntary voters. The establishment of social control by means of effective leadership meant 
for PRI not only political control, but democratic control as well. Historian Enrique Krauze 
(2003) believed that PRI functioned like an employment agency at the municipal, state, and 
federal level; and this political party every 6 years provided the technology and the electoral 
voting machine that Mexico required to have elections. In addition, those leaders had to produce 
large numbers of votes. 
As political researcher José Antonio Crespo (2003) pointed out, the PRI developed a 
clientele system. This client system was not necessarily incompatible with a democratic regimen 
since it translated into large numbers of votes in favor of PRI. This procedure ensured an 
electoral machine that was used in every political election. Economist and diplomat Daniel Cosío 
Villegas (1972) defined Mexico’s political system as an absolute monarchy that lasted 6 years. 
The president was the ultimate and absolute king. This kind of power was known as 
presidencialismo. This means that the executive branch governed over the legislative and judicial 
branches. In the constitution, of course, all three branches were equal, but in practice, the 
president represented absolute power. This presidencialismo power structure produced 
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individuals who kept their political power beyond their presidential period. That is, the president 
had the right to choose the next PRI presidential candidate who would most likely become the 
next president. The voting machinery of the PRI controlled the voting polls, but the president 
himself controlled the presidential candidate. 
Unions were known for the labor work to ensure votes in PRI favor; many of them 
guided or even threatened their members in order to get them to vote for PRI. Another interesting 
characteristic were the colors that PRI used in its logo—green, white, and red—mirroring 
Mexico’s flag. Some intellectuals pointed out that the sector of the population that did not speak 
Spanish as its first language, and those who were not literate in Spanish, used the party’s logo 
color to guide their vote because they were familiar with those colors. PRI had an advantage 
because its logo colors are the same as Mexico’s national flag. Therefore, voters could get 
confused by the similarity between the PRI logo and the flag. What was important was to 
accumulate the maximum number of votes, because the constitution established that the numbers 
of voters determine who is the winner of the electoral race. That is, in Mexico, the popular vote 
dictated which presidential candidate was elected.  
The PRI voting machine faced a very difficult situation at the end of Echeverría’s 
presidency (1970-1976). Only one presidential candidate was registered for the 1976 election: 
José López Portillo for the PRI. In a television interview, López Portillo (2003) recalled how 
President Luis Echeverría asked him to be the PRI candidate:  
On a Friday, the President invited me to meet with him at Los Pinos, in his office 
he asked me if I would like to be in charge of all this, his finger was rotating and 
pointing to our national patriotic symbols, I answer yes. Then, he told me to come 
back to Los Pinos on Monday, because the PRI party will officially ask me if I 
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would like to be their candidate. That Monday, I became PRI presidential 
candidate. (López Portillo, 2003, 3:56)  
PRI’s major competing party, PAN, did not register a candidate, because it considered the 
political game unfair. PAN politician Diego Fernández de Cevallos declared in 1976 that the PRI 
regimen wants the opposition only for the political game, but not because the government was 
willing to respect the electoral game and the law. Nobody wanted to participate in the election, 
because it was not considered a noteworthy effort: All Mexican citizens knew that PRI would 
win the election as usual.  
Even though López Portillo was the only presidential candidate, he conducted a 
countrywide campaign tour. During a press conference, northern Mexico radio and television 
journalist Héctor Benavides asked López Portillo a tricky question, “Who do you think rules 
Mexico?” López Portillo answered, “It just depends on how you form your criteria; it could be 
the president. However, I do not know how many married women are in this country, perhaps 
here we will find the secret of who truly rules the republic” (Benavides, 2005, p. 179). 
Writer Carlos Fuentes (2003) recalled that in the late 1970s, the PRI was decadent. The 
attorney general Jesús Reyes Heroles understood the complexity of the political situation and 
proposed laws that permitted further representation of all political parties in Congress. During 
the López Portillo presidency, Reyes Heroles was the leader of the discussion that created the 
new electoral law known as Ley Federal de Organizaciones Politicas y Procesos Electorales—
LOPE. On December 6, 1977, the new electoral law was approved. The major changes in the law 
were:  
1. The political parties became political institutions;
2. New requirements were made to create a political party;
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3. A new system to elect the representatives was instituted.  
These changes were classified as a peaceful political revolution through the political institutions 
and procedures (Noticieros Televisa, 2003). The new electoral rules were the supreme rules of 
the next presidential election.  
Leftist politician Jorge Alcocer (2003) explained that the left-wing parties were unsure 
about the new law during that time. The discussion was centered on the idea that it could be a 
trap. Nevertheless, left-wing politicians were conscious about the necessity that its party had to 
adapt to the electoral process. For leftist politician Gilberto Rincón Gallardo (2003), the leftist 
party was able to register, and LOPE opened the way for a real political opposition. Their 
uncertainty was based on no guarantees to prevent electoral fraud, because the electoral agency 
was the party of the government and not an independent agency. 
1988 Election 
In 1988, Mexico had one of its most controversial elections in recent history. The postelectoral 
conflict resulted in an ungovernable situation that arose from the lack of confidence in the 
electoral agency. As usual, PRI won the election. However, all the opposition parties signed a 
lack of confidence agreement on the election results. It is important to remember that on July 6, 
1988—se cayó el sistema—the electoral computer system failed, and it was out for several hours. 
This was a very important historical moment that highlighted a very serious crack in the PRI 
electoral system.  
The presidential candidates were: Carlos Salinas de Gortari—PRI; Cuauthémoc 
Cárdenas—Frente Cardenista; Manuel “Maquio” Clouthier—PAN; and for the first time in 
history, a female contender Rosario Ibarra—PT. PRI’s main political opposition reacted very 
differently to this crisis. After election day, Cárdenas challenged the election results, claiming in 
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a large mass meeting at Zócalo plaza, in the heart of Mexico City, that PRI stole the election 
since he believed he obtained 32% of the total vote count. Cárdenas had no authority or 
institution with which to file his complaint; therefore, he organized a massive civic protest. A 
large crowd of Mexicans joined him in walking the streets of Mexico City. In Mexico, the 
elections were insufficiently free and fair, and therefore the opposition quite understandably took 
to the streets and the back rooms to overturn the official results (Domínguez & McCann, 1996). 
Nevertheless, not everything was bad news for Mexican democracy. Up to this time, no 
gubernatorial candidate who emerged from the opposition parties had ever won an election. 
Moreover, Congress had always been in control of the PRI party until 1988. During this election, 
representation in Congress changed. The PRI opposition parties won 48% of the seats in the 
Chamber of Deputies, something never before imagined. Cárdenas always referred to Salinas as 
the usurper president throughout Salinas’ term of office.  
Presidential campaigns were based on political ideology, not public issues or candidate’s 
attributes. As political researchers Jorge Domínguez and James McCann (1996) observed, 
“Politicians chose to frame their message ideologically even though the Mexican public did not 
demand consistent, cross-issue ideologies” (p. 9). That is, for voters their position on one issue 
did not control their views on another issue. There were some other psychological mechanisms 
in place, such as the idea that a change of political party in power could signify a change in the 
country’s economic system.  
Many Mexicans believed in popular wisdom concepts that were spread in the population 
by a figure of speech. Obviously, there was one about change that basically said: “Más vale malo 
por conocido, que bueno por conocer” (“It is better to stay with what you know, rather than 
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going on adventure to the unknown.”) Domínguez and McCann have an explanation for Mexican 
voter behavior: 
The attitudes of Mexican voters are best understood in terms of a two-step model. Voters 
decide, first, on their view of the ruling party. For those open to the possibility of being 
governed by another party, but only for them, there is a second step. (1996, p. 11)  
For years, PRI was able to hold votes based on the sentiment of fair to change, and in 
addition, to lack of political interest. Cultural traditional wisdom prevented opposition parties 
from gaining voters. However, something happened during the 1988 electoral process that 
changed voters’ perspectives, turning their fear into great courage:  
In 1988, the principal effect of the entry of Cardenismo was to reshuffle the voters among 
existing parties, not to mobilize the previously immobilized or to shift the underlying 
partisan allegiance of demographic or economic groups or sectors. The new opposition 
failed organizationally to activate the new portion of the electorate, while the long-
existing PAN opposition filed to develop a refurbished organizational capacity. 
(Domínguez & McCann, 1996, p. 11)  
In contrast, the PAN decided to negotiate, not to confront the Salinas presidency like 
Cárdenas did. The circumstances indicated that Salinas would be president no matter what, as 
Manuel Clouthier Carrillo (2003), Maquio’s son, commented in a television interview: “We 
decided to change the purpose of our fight. We had to focus on establishing new rules for the 
electoral game” (8:09). Therefore, as Professor José Antonio Crespo (2003) observed, PAN 
established an agreement with the Salinas government to support his neo-liberal economic policy 
that coincided with PAN’s economic viewpoint and to receive several political advantages such 
as the recognition of PAN’s electoral triumph at the state level. PAN’s political negotiations paid 
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off in 1989 for the first time in Mexican history when a gubernatorial election was won by a 
political party other that PRI; Ernesto Ruffo Appel, former governor of Baja California Norte 
state (1989-1995), became the first PAN governor in the country. 
However, on the same election date, another state held gubernatorial elections as well. In 
Michoacán state, the Frente Cardenista won, but its triumph was not recognized by the national 
electoral agency. As PRD party president (1996-1999), Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2003) 
explained in an interview what was the political game of the time, “It was very easy to 
understand, if a political party negotiated with the government winning could be a possibility” 
(9:45). Many believed that this lack of democracy, this lack of recognition was based on the 
party reaction regarding the 1988 election. The Frente Cardenista decided to confront the 
Salinas presidency through institutions. This political party questioned Salinas’ rise to power. 
PRD believed that it won the 1988 election, but the electoral authorities never recognized their 
triumph. The Frente Cardenista started reconstructing and reorganizing the leftist political arena. 
Cuauthémoc Cárdenas called all left political parties to unite, and created a new political party. 
In May 1989, a new political party was born, known as Frente Democrático Nacional-PRD. It 
emerged from the diverse political forces that united to support Cárdenas’ presidential candidacy 
in 1988. The Salinas government persecuted PRD’s members. As Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (2003) 
recalled, “During the year of 1991 the government was trying to kill the PRD. It was a very 
difficult time; about 400 PRD members were murdered. Those crimes are still unsolved until this 
day” (18:04). 
All this conflict led Salinas de Gortari and De la Madrid to a complex inauguration 
ceremony. On December 1, 1988, members of Congress who supported Cárdenas’ accusation of 
fraud, who were already inside of the Chamber, left the room when President Miguel de la 
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Madrid arrived in order to express their protest by not participating in the presidential inaugural 
ceremony. In addition, PAN congressional representatives turned their backs to the podium and 
held up signs that referred to election fraud. However, none of these events were broadcast on 
television, because the cameras and microphones were shooting the podium without showing the 
audience. Not a word of the protest was mentioned on Televisa or Imevisión (the state channel 
newscast).  
Nevertheless, Carlos Salinas de Gortari during his inauguration speech announced two 
important aspects of his presidency: (1) the Solidaridad program, and (2) his desire to reform the 
electoral law with the assistance of all the political parties. The Solidaridad program functioned 
as a permanent political communication campaign to obtain voters’ approval and reinforce 
Salinas’ soft public image (Reyes Heroles, 2003). Salinas’ campaign included radio, television, 
and music. The most well-known signers of the time united to sing along with the Solidaridad 
song and record its video clip. The official radio and television advertisement was heard 
everywhere several times a day, everyday. The Solidaridad song was the example of how 
entertainment could serve to disseminate and reinforce a political message.  
Televisa was in charge of producing the music and the video clip. The official slogan of 
the Solidaridad campaign was: Unidos para Progresar (United to progress). A side of Salinas’ 
political campaign, the other factor that influenced his political image, was the arrest of Pemex’s 
Union Leader, Joaquín Hernández Galicia (alias La Quina). He was accused of weapons’ 
possessions in his house located in Ciudad Madero, Tamaulipas. Writer Carlos Fuentes (2003) 
explained, La Quina’s arrest sent a message of authority to Mexicans: Salinas de Gortari showed 
that he was president, the ruler, an authority.   
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In terms of his second goal, a reform of the electoral laws, the 1998 postelectoral conflict 
sent a message about political immaturity to the international community. As Krauze (2003) 
clearly explained, in the globalized world with globalized communication, an electoral fraud was 
seen as something pathetic, ridiculous, something to feel ashamed of. Therefore, the next day, on 
December 2, 1988, President Salinas met at Los Pinos with representatives of several opposition 
parties to begin the discussion of a new electoral reform with the aim of reinforcing Mexico’s 
democracy. The new electoral law known as Código Federal de Instituciones y Procesos 
Electorales (COFIPE) was approved by the legislative body in 1990 and had four main 
resolutions: First, the creation of the Instituto Federal Electoral (IFE), an agency to oversee the 
election procedures, process, and vote count; second, the Tribunal Federal Electoral was 
established as the highest court for electoral claims; third, the creation of a new voter registration 
list; and fourth, the creation of the crediencial para votar (voter identification card) that included 
a voter’s photo. This credencial para votar is the most important identification document in 
Mexico (Salinas de Gortari, 2003). 
Nevertheless, the PRD legislative representatives voted against this new electoral law. 
Former Head of Mexico City Government (1988-1993) Manuel Camacho Solís (2003) expressed 
that to him, those reforms were created to stop the Frente Democrático Nacional. It established 
several locks to prevent the center left from winning in the future. For example, this law 
prohibited the coalitions that had a common political candidate. In addition, the IFE 
administration did not change; it did not become autonomous. For Jorge Alcocer (2003), 
representative of three leftist parties—PRD, Partido Mexicano Socialista (PMS), and CFE—
explained in an interview why PRD voted against the electoral law, “The major point why PRD 
voted against was that the IFE still had a dominant influence of the government in their 
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procedures and the PRI” (28:57). Perhaps the appreciation of the PRD representatives was 
correct. Krauze agrees with Alcocer, the IFE needed to be autonomous: 
The Salinas regime was contradictory because it chose for a great economic 
modernization, but it did not give sufficient attention to political modernization. Because 
[this regimen] failed to provide for the continuation and maturity of Mexican democracy, 
during this presidency there were electoral problems everywhere at all levels—states and 
municipalities” (Krauze, 2003, 43:45).  
On November 1, 1992, during the address to the nation, President Salinas de Gortari 
proposed a new electoral reform that would concentrate on three major themes: first, to make 
transparent the origin of the political party finances; second, to cap the financial budgets for 
electoral campaigns; and third, to regulate the mass media during elections.  
The electoral law reforms were implemented a year later in 1993. The new reforms 
established monetary limitations for election campaigns. They prohibited acceptance of money 
from the international companies, international investors, religion, and businesses. In addition, 
the composition of Senate members was modified. Political parties could only have a maximum 
of 315 representatives, the election committees for senators and deputies disappeared, and the 
IFE was in charge of overseeing elections. The IFE was the only agency that could present the 
official winner’s credential letter. The Tribunal Federal Electoral faculties were elevated; now 
this court had the power to penalize political parties with the loss of their party registration. The 
court was reorganized into two hearing courts. The first task was to resolve any electoral claims 
of the five Salas Regionales (regional electoral courts), and the second option was the Tribunal 
Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación (TEPJF) (Electoral Tribunal of the Federal 
Judiciary). Each of those regional electoral courts represents circumscription of congressional 
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elections in which Mexico’s judicial system is organized. Each regional court consists of three 
judges who are temporary in nature; sitting when federal elections take place. The five cities 
where the regional courts are based are: Guadalajara, Monterrey, Mexico City, Toluca, and 
Xalapa. The Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary was a permanent superior chamber 
located in Mexico City. It consists of seven members and is a branch of the judicial system that 
specializes in resolving federal election disputes and certifies the validity of the election. The 
seven magistrates who served during the 2006 election were: Leonel Castillo González 
(president), J de Jesús Orozco Hernríquez, Alfonsina Berta Navarro Hidalgo, José Alejandro 
Luna Ramos, Mauro Miguel Reyes Zapata, J Fernando Ojesto Martínez Porcayo, and Eloy 
Fuentes Cerda.  
The electoral reforms also created the Electoral Observatory. For the first time, national 
and international electoral observers were allowed to participate in an electoral process. There 
are two kinds of electoral observers: the international and national. For the 2006 electoral 
process, IFE counsel Alejandra Latapi indicated that her institution had accredited a total of 357 
international observers representing 41 countries; 47% were United States, 21% European 
Union, 7.3% Canada, and 7.3% Argentina (Herrera, 2006). As of June 12, 2006, the IFE general 
counsel informed that a total of 9,014 national observers were certified by IFE (IFEg, 2006).  
Another major change was that public opinion polls were permitted as an electoral tool. 
IFE created a set of regulations regarding technical matters such as methodology that all public 
opinion companies had to follow. For the 2006 election, a total of 12 public opinion companies 
and two media corporations conducted 66 polls between October 20, 2005, and June 18, 2006. 
The polling companies were: El Universal, Parmetría, GEA-ISA, Reforma, Consulta Mitofsky, 
Demotecnia, BGC, Indermec Arcop Zobgy, Marketing Político, Covarrubias, and PISOS-
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BIMSA y DATA-OPM (Reséndiz, 2006). Public opinion polls are essential for contemporary 
political communication changes and presented opportunities for the application of Agenda-
Setting theory to the Mexican political process. 
 The reforms also established the preliminary statistics based on a ballot sample. The PRD 
party voted against the 1993 electoral reforms because this reform failed to address the most 
important electoral matter, IFE’s autonomy. PRD National Adviser (1993-1996) Pablo Gómez 
Alvarez (2003) in an interview pointed out,  
Those reforms did not resolve the problem. Those were cosmetic reforms only. What was 
the fundamental issue? It was that the government still controlled IFE. As long as this 
situation continued there was no guarantee that the election results were authentic. 
(47:55)  
In the 1994 election year, on January 27, another round of reforms was presented to Congress as 
a result of the demands of the Chiapas guerrilla uprising—Ejército Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional (EZLN) (Zapatista Army of National Liberation). Attorney General Jorge Carpizo 
announced the new electoral legal initiatives:  
1. All parties would have full access to the country’s electoral registrar database. 
2.  The state media would produce fair cover of all political parties and their candidates. 
3. Public resources could not be used during the campaign to support a candidate. 
By February 28, 1994, Carpizo communicated another set of electoral agreements:  
1. Creation of a judicial office to persecute electoral crimes;  
2. Increase of state funding to political parties;  
3. Universities and private firms should conduct an independent external audit of the 
electoral registry;  
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4. An external counsel should be created to supervise the external audit; 
5.  To establish a set of minimal requirements for Mexican citizen observers as well as 
their responsibilities and activities; 
6.  Modify the voting ballot to achieve more accurate monitoring; 
7.  Homogenize the protocol and procedure for the presentation of candidate.  
In terms of the mass media, the rules were: political advertising was prohibited on electronic 
media 10 days before election day and on radio as well. Parties had the authorization to use 60 
minutes of state time on weekdays and 3 hours on the Sunday prior to election day.   
1994 Election 
The 1993 electoral reform was the last one before the next presidential election. The reform 
improved the conditions for this presidential race, but Mexico’s full democratic transition that 
started back in the late 1980s with the creation of the COFIPE was not completed. In addition, 
the economic situation in Mexico was politically stable for the first time in years. During the last 
four elections—1970, 1976, 1982, and 1988—every presidential election was surrounded by an 
economic crisis. Salinas de Gortari throughout his term worked to construct a solid economic 
base to prevent an economic crisis in the election year. It was important for Mexico to guarantee 
a clean and transparent election to ensure credibility, trust, and confidence in the election results. 
Otherwise, the voters would always suspect election fraud. For decades, Mexico experienced 
suspicious election results. Until the reforms, there was a traditional political cultural saying, 
piensa mal y acertarás (think the worst and you would be right). The shadow of fraud was 
always present in voter’s minds. 
On November 28, 1993, Salinas de Gortari presented PRI Head Luis Donaldo Colosio as 
his choice for presidential candidate. PRI’s internal primary procedure was known as dedazo 
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(heavy finger); that is the party does not hold an internal primary election. Instead, the maximum 
authority of the country selects the PRI nominee. In 1994, there were three main presidential 
candidates: Diego Fernández de Cevallos-PAN, Cuauthémoc Cárdenas-PRD, and Luis Donaldo 
Colosio-PRI. On May 23, the PRI presidential candidate was murdered in Baja California State. 
Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León took his place, and the PRI won the election. General Secretary 
of the PRI José Francisco Ruíz Massu was murdered as well, and the investigation pointed to 
PRI’s leadership; Raúl Salinas—brother of President Carlos Salinas—was arrested for this crime. 
The government accused him as the intellectual author of Colosio’s murder. Following the 
murders, President Zedillo distanced himself from PRI. 
The televised presidential debate was introduced during that election. Almost all 
presidential candidates agreed to participate. The debate procedure divided political parties into 
two groups. The first group consisted of the so-called “small parties” that hold a debate. In the 
second group, on May 12, 1994, the “major parties” participated in the debate. PAN’s candidate 
who was articulate, impressive, and well prepared to discuss won the debate; a national 
newspaper Reforma reported that during the election 41% of voters favored Zedillo, followed by 
Fernández de Cevallos with 29% and Cárdenas with 9% (Reforma, 1994). Cárdenas condemned 
mass media for its powerfully pro-PRI support, especially television newscasts such as 
Televisa’s 24 Horas and TV Azteca’s Hechos. Candidate Manuel “Maquio” Clouthier started a 
boycott against Televisa’s main national newscast 24 Horas. He appeared in campaign meetings 
with a cover over his mouth and a sign denouncing Televisa’s censorship and disproportionate 
media access. 
The electoral theme during this presidential campaign was the inequality in media access 
and campaign finances. Zedillo publicly recognized those inequalities and focused to eliminate 
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those conditions. Zedillo criticized the media inequality. He said that it was a clean election, but 
inequitable. He took democracy as the central point of his regimen. On January 17, 1995, 
President Zedillo and the major representatives of each political party signed an agreement of 
political cooperation to discuss a new electoral reform. In August 1996, the electoral reforms 
were approved. This time the IFE became an autonomous government agency; this was 
considered by many to be a major step forward into a democratic life. José Antonio Crespo 
(2003) considered that the government was left out of IFE, and all the politicians interpreted this 
action as a clear step forward from a noncompetitive system to a competitive system. PRD 
president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2003) commented in an interview, “It was important 
because it integrated the figure of an independent electoral advisory, and this was an essential 
contribution to the change in 2000” (47:11). Each one of the members of the electoral advisories 
was elected by the legislature.   
In addition, the 1996 electoral reforms created IFE’s financial division, a branch in 
charge of overseeing the finances of each political party and each municipal, state, and federal 
political campaign. The anonymous campaign contributions were prohibited, and taxable persons 
had a limited contribution amount to political parties and campaigns. For the first time, the mass 
media was included in the reforms. Bill 42 established the responsibilities of the mass media to 
guarantee political parties more access to radio and television free times during electoral periods. 
This law also established IFE’s responsibility to monitor how the mass media covered elections. 
The rules of the political game for the first election of the new millennium were set. 
2000 Election 
Francisco Labastida-PRI, Cuauthémoc Cárdenas-PRD, and Vicente Fox-PAN were the major 
candidates for the 2000 presidential election. This election marked a change of PRI’s internal 
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election procedure to select its presidential candidate; president Zedillo did not implement the 
traditional dedazo. He rejected this tradition supporting the idea of internal PRI primary election 
known as Consulta a las Bases (internal consult) in which all registered PRI members could take 
part in the primary internal process. Primary candidates who emerged from that consulta were 
Francisco Labastida Ochoa, Roberto Madrazo Pintado, José Antonio Fernández González, 
Manuel Barlett Díaz, and Humberto Roque Villanueva. Labastida Ochoa won the PRI primary 
race. The fact that Zedillo broke PRI’s dedazo tradition by refusing to pick PRI’s presidential 
candidate gave him the label of “the man with four fingers.” That is, hypothetically, he is 
missing one finger because he refused to use it for the dedazo exercise.  
In terms of public issues, Cárdenas (2000) made a case that there wasn’t a peso’s worth 
of difference between presidential candidates Labastida and Fox. Both men, he insisted in a 
newspaper article,  
Would continue Zedillo’s program that (1) favored tight monetary and fiscal policy over 
the social spending needed to uplift 50 million impoverished Mexicans, (2) stressed 
global trade over developing domestic resources, and (3) threatened state-ownership of 
Petróleos Mexicanos [Pemex], and the Comisión Federal de Electricidad [CFE], 
respectively the nation’s giant, over staffed oil and electricity companies. (Grayson, 
2000, p. 6)  
The top public issues of the election were: economy 45.2%, crime 31.5%, political 
10.9%, development 6.5%, other 5.9% (Magaloni & Poiré, 2004, p. 301). Early on in the 
election, Fox was able to recognize that Mexico’s top priority was its need for a political change. 
Nevertheless, as in the Mexican context, change could signify many things; therefore, Beatriz 
Magaloni and Alejandro Poiré remarked on what that change meant:  
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Mexico’s pre-2000 part system encompassed two main dimensions. The first was 
a political-institutional one, where at the right-most extreme lay staunch 
conservatives, accepting all features of the political status quo, and thereby of the 
existing style of authoritarian rule by the PRI, and with the left-most extreme 
anchored by rapid and thorough political transformers often lingering with anti-
systemic strategies. Political reformists of different degrees lay in between. The 
second dimension was the conventional left-right divide, with neoclassical 
economic perspectives on the right and Keynesian ones on the left. (p. 294) 
Fox symbolized a change, but during the campaign he rarely specified to what end of the 
spectrum. Instead, he continuously accused PRI of corruption, incompetence, affiliation with 
drug cartels, and insecurity.  
However, there were three main ideas that Fox continually repeated over and over again. 
Those were: the possible legalization of Mexicans living in the United States, the possibility for 
those living overseas to vote, and the 15 minutes as a maximum time line to resolve the Zapatista 
guerrilla problem. Fox also changed all protocols and the politician’s public image for the first 
time in many years; Mexican voters were observing a candidate who dressed like a cowboy 
wearing his characteristic FOX silver belt buckle. Fox used popular sayings and vernacular 
rather than the refined speech that reflected his educational background. Nevertheless, best of all, 
Fox could deliver a message in 30 seconds. In other words, he was the master of the news “sound 
bite,” and that handy skill gave him the opportunity to frequently be used as a source in news 
stories. Even the American press was fascinated by Fox because he could speak English well, 
exude confidence, and promise to change Mexico’s political system. As Professor Raúl Trejo 
Delabre (2000) observed, 
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Fox has exceptional media and public appeal. He always smiles for the television 
camera and has an immediate response to news reporters’ questions. He has 
garnered the affection of the media because of his public speaking abilities. (p. 1)  
Nevertheless, based on Fox’s personal political style, he was called in the media “the 
clutch,” because first he pushed his foot in it and then he shifted to make the change. On July 1, 
2000, the previous day before Election Day (July 2, 2000), President Zedillo was worried as his 
private secretary Liebano Saenz Ortiz (2003) remembered during an interview that democracy 
means uncertainty: “We had another group of people who believed that a president who came 
from the PRI will never recognize PRI’s defeat. The president went to sleep worried because the 
public opinion polls did not indicate an absolute winner” (5:08). Even though Mexico had solid 
procedures to count votes, the idea of fraud was in the mind of PAN candidate Vicente Fox 
(2003) as he clearly stated to the media, “The fact that we now had a very confident institution 
such as IFE, it is very difficult to expect that after 71 years of practice the “mapaches” and 
“vote’s thief” will completely disappear. I was worried!” (5:08). The PRD candidate also 
expressed some irregularities that happen to his party representatives. Cárdenas reported that 
several presidential voting stations received the wrong names of his party representatives. 
Consequently, PRD representatives could not participate in those voting stations. He expressed 
that the whole process was dirty.  
On July 2, 2000, in the morning, the voters favored the PRI. Around 1:30PM, the 
statistics begin to balance out. PAN led the election from around 3:00PM until the close of the 
election. All the participants were respectful to each other and to the institutions. At 11:00PM, 
IFE President José Woldenberg announced PAN’s victory. Immediately after his announcement, 
President Zedillo (2000) spoke through radio and television to the nation, announcing the 
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magnificent work that IFE had done and Fox’s victory: “Today, we were able to verify that our 
democracy is mature with solid and trustable [electoral] institutions and with a citizenship of 
high civic responsibility. The next president of Mexico will be Vicente Fox Quesada” (14:50).  
In addition, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and Francisco Labastida recognized Fox’s victory that 
same night. For the first time in Mexico, its president emerged from another political force that 
was not the PRI. The electoral controversy focused not on the election’s results but on campaign 
finances for PRI and PAN, the Pemex Gate, and the Amigos de Fox cases. After IFE’s 
investigation of both cases, on March 14, 2003, the IFE fined PRI with 1 billion pesos for the 
Pemex Gate case. On October 10, 2003, the IFE fined PAN with 360 million pesos and the 
Partido Verde Ecologista PV (Green Party) with 184 million pesos for the Amigos de Fox case 
(IFE, 2000). The political scandal over those two cases indicated that more legislation was 
required to regulate candidate finances.  
The 2000 election marked the end of 71 years of PRI rule; this election marked the end of 
the PRI regime. Fox’s triumph signified the consolidation of Mexico’s democratic transition that 
started during the 1988 election. It represented almost 20 years of intensive political negotiation 
that modified the election law without a violent upheaval. The PAN triumph signaled the 
opportunity for future democratic changes in Mexico. PRD Politician Porfirio Muñoz Ledo 
(2003) explained to the electronic media that 
Fox’s triumph symbolized Mexico’s culmination of the democratic transition’s highest 
point. So we have [three phases of the Mexican democratic transition] [1] the pre-
transition era 1990 and 1996 were the electoral reforms took place. [2] The transition era 
which is Fox’s victory and Fox’s presidency. [3] What is next? Is it the consolidation of 
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democracy or not? We don’t know what could happen in the future 2006 elections. 
(102:53) 
His point of view coincided with leftist politician José Agustín Ortiz (2003), who also 
believed that the 2006 election was a crucial test for Mexico’s emerging democracy. Because 
citizens were not sure if the Mexican democratic system would remain, it could regress to 
authoritarianism, especially if there were an economic collapse. For Ortiz, a postelectoral 
conflict during the 2006 election would be an indicator of a democratic regression or a 
democratic consolidation. Just like journalist Sergio Aguayo (2003) suggested, all the electoral 
reforms were nothing more than rules for the electoral game, now [the 2006 election] was the 
time to start playing the game. Politicians have constructed agreements on methods to change 
government. Now [the 2006 election] they have to make democracy function to resolve the 
people’s problems in Congress. In order for democracy to exist, all legislative branches should 
learn to work together around a particular agenda. Politicians should learn to negotiate in order 
embrace and flourish democracy. Mexico must keep working on improving the electoral law.  
PRI President (2002-2004) Roberto Madrazo (2003) commented that for him, it was 
important to respect and reinforce our institutions. It was very important not to weaken them. 
Intellectuals Federico Reyes Heroles and Carlos Fuentes (2003) concluded that it was necessary 
to implement the second round of candidates during presidential elections. Under the new 
political arena, President Fox had many challenges ahead. For example, he did not have majority 
representation at any governmental level—Senate, Chamber of Deputies, state, and 
municipalities. This context was part of the democratic era that Mexico was experiencing. 
Therefore, to govern was going to be more challenging because it required political negotiations 
at all levels. The democratic political system that permits diverse political representation also 
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involves a high quantity of political negotiations to reach agreement and keep the democracy 
moving forward. If these political negotiations were not possible, the country remained 
deadlocked.  
There was constant discord between Vicente Fox and the Congress during his presidency. 
PRD Congressman Jesús Ortega (2003) observed that Fox or any other political figure did not 
understand that the Congress served to control the president. When Congress said “No” to the 
president, the people felt that Congress was misbehaving. In the absence of previous 
parliamentary experience, actions of the Congress were considered inappropriate. Mexico needed 
to create an agency that could facilitate communication between Congress and the president. 
Fox’s rise to power also signified the end of the presidencialismo style of governance that PRI 
presidents had enforced for numerous years; this new political arena created conflicts and 
misunderstanding among members of the political class. Therefore, all three federal 
governmental branches—executive, judicial, and legislative—needed to find a new way to 
coexist, work together, and collaborate. Nevertheless, Fox created for the first time the President 
Spokesperson position as a link for communication between him and the nation. The only 
disadvantage was that most of the time both of them—the spokesperson Alfonso Durazo (2000 
to 2004) and Rúben Aguilar (2004 to 2006) and the president disseminated different messages, 
sometimes opposite to each other. 
Vicente Fox acknowledges that his victory against the PRI was thanks to the support of 
the paisanos (Mexican migrants living in the United States) that he called “the truth heroes.” As 
a sign of gratitude to paisanos, Fox promised to send to congress an overseas vote initiative. It 
took him 3 years to fulfill his promise. In 2004, the president submitted an initiative to reform 
the COFIPE to Congress. Fox declared that his overseas initiative was the result of 14 proposals 
 212
presented by several political parties, such as PRI, PAN, PRD, and the Green Party, to recognize 
the rights of those Mexicans living abroad. Fox’s plan was to provide paisanos voter access to 
participate in the 2006 election. The first phase was to create a registration list of voters who 
were abroad. The second phase suggested that their vote should be submitted to IFE via 
electronic/internet, mail, and directly in the polls. Nevertheless, candidates could not organize 
campaign events or purchase political advertisements abroad (Pérez Silva, 2004). Fox requested 
that all paisanos withdraw from IFE’s voter registration list. However, PRI Senator Sadot 
Sánchez (2004) stated that Fox’s request sounded like an impossible mission, because many of 
the paisanos decided to travel to the United States in a short period of time. Consequently, IFE 
could not ask them to provide their permanent residence and get themselves withdrawn from 
their original voting districts (Nájar, 2004a). A group of approximately 310 Mexican citizens 
who lived overseas mostly in the United States, had been lobbying the Mexican Congress to pass 
an “Overseas Vote Bill” for 9 years. In 1996, Congress approved the dual nationality policy. 
That is, in the event a Mexican was born out of the country, they were no longer required to 
choose one nationality when they became 18 years of age. Many Mexicans lost their citizenship 
by choosing another nationality. Furthermore, for the first time in years, Mexicans living abroad 
and descendents of Mexicans could claim their nationality to exercise their rights as citizens, 
including their right to vote.  
At first, paisanos wanted to participate in municipal, state, and presidential elections, but 
in 2004 they agreed to participate in the 2006 presidential elections only. IFE President Luis 
Carlos Ugalde as well as Secretary of the Exterior Luis Ernesto Derbez were against the 
paisanos’ plan. For them, the plan would be too expensive for their institutions to execute. 
According to their information, only 10% of the overseas voters went to the polls (Nájar, 2005). 
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Derbez indicated that the overseas vote was risky business for paisanos because their voter 
registration database could be used by the migra (U.S. border patrol) to hunt down illegal 
immigrants. The other problem was a matter of document functions. Derbez observed that the 
matrícula consular (consulate ID) has been used as an official document for identification 
purposes, and this same function was attributed to the credencial para votar (voting credential); 
therefore, the purposes of both documents would overlap.  
Moreover, it involves an economic matter. If paisanos began applying for their voting 
credentials, they would no longer need the consulate identification card, because both of them 
serve as official identification for the Mexican government. As a result, the secretary of the 
exterior would stop receiving an income of 12 million dollars a year that is generated by the 
consulate identification processing. For Derbez to organize an electoral process without the 
appropriate juridical, logistical, and monetary conditions would signify a high risk for 
consolidation of Mexico’s democracy (Cano, 2005).  
Paisano lobbyist and journalist Raúl Ross (2005) was annoyed with Ugalde and Derbez 
comments for their lack of support and the placing of Fox in an opportunistic position with the 
paisano community (Cano, 2005). Subsecretary of the Exterior Gerónimo Gutiérrez (2005) 
answered Ross, explaining that the Fox administration was supporting their cause, and that this 
was not a political piñata situation. On the contrary, he should stop pretending because Ross 
knew the level of complication that his plan involved (Cano, 2005). It was very difficult to know 
how the paisano community would vote. Congress had fear. What was sad is to see how the 
Mexican Congress still looked down on migrants. They did not like us, said Ross to the Mexican 
press (Balboa, 2005). Mexico’s first migrant legislator in the Michoacán state, José Luis 
Martínez (2005), stated that it would carry severe consequences for Mexico if the paisanos’ right 
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to vote was not approved. The consequences would arise at the economic level as an 
international lack of confidence in Mexican democracy (Balboa, 2005). Migrants were fighting 
for a more democratic political system similar to other democratic countries like the United 
States. 
Perhaps, he was right. PRD Deputy Juan José García Ochoa (2004) declared that PRI 
deputies feared that the Mexicans overseas would not support their presidential candidate. The 
Fox initiative made it clear that all immigrants should cancel their affiliation with the electoral 
districts where they were registered as voters, and PRI recognized that it was difficult to win the 
paisanos trust (Nájar, 2004). Nevertheless, the bottom line of the controversy was the political 
cost the vote abroad plan could bring to political parties and their 2006 candidates. PRI Head 
Madrazo (2004) asked the paisanos’ lobbyist if there was going to be a punishment vote. That is, 
if paisanos voted against PRI for lack of support on their electoral reform. Ross answered that 
the behavior of the voters abroad should mirror voters in Mexican territory. The presidential 
candidate’s political platform that reflects the migrant’s social agenda could win the election, 
because he/she will receive our support, said Ross (Nájar, 2004b). 
On February 22, 2005, the Chamber of Deputies approved the electoral reform with 391 
votes in favor, zero against, and 22 abstentions. Deputies authorized presidential candidates to 
organize campaign events outside of Mexico. Conversely, candidates could not purchase 
political propaganda in the U.S. media. For deputies, the overseas voting procedure should be 
organized by IFE and should provide citizens with voting polls to cast their vote. A voting poll 
would be installed in cities with populations of more than 750 Mexican citizens. IFE needed to 
create a voter registration list of Mexicans living abroad in order to allow them access to vote in 
the 2006 election. Perhaps, the logistical problem with the abroad registration list was that those 
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citizens should be erased from the national voters’ registration list in order to prevent double 
voting. In addition, legislators authorized a budget of 200 million pesos to support the operation 
and promotion of the abroad vote. Such an amount, however, was under budget, considering that 
IFE estimated 6 billion pesos as their minimum to operate an overseas election (Garduño & 
Ménendez, 2005a). However, several deputies were not pleased with the mechanics of how the 
overseas voting procedure would operate. Legislators from the Partido del Trabajo (Work Party) 
declared that they decided to abstain from voting, because for them the practical logistics of the 
voting overseas electoral reform would be disorganized as a result of the lack of time for 
planning. For them, this act could be understood as a Fox and PAN strategic setup to gain more 
voters for the 2006 election (Garduño & Ménendez, 2005a). The Chamber of Deputies had to 
create a different document regarding electoral reform from Fox’s proposition. Then the Senate 
Chamber created another version of the proposal. In order to participate in the 2006 election, the 
Senate needed to approve the proposal before June 30, 2005. 
On June 28, 2005, the Senate Chamber voted 91 in favor, 2 against, and 1 abstention on 
the vote abroad proposal. However, the COFIPE prohibited candidates from organizing 
campaign events outside of Mexican borders. Mexicans who already had their voting credentials 
were the only ones eligible to vote. According to the Secretary of the Exterior, their estimates 
were that only 4 million Mexicans who lived in the United States had their voting credentials 
with them (EFE, 2005a). The overseas voting procedure was that between October 1, 2005, and 
January 15, 2006, Mexicans who wished to participate in the 2006 election needed to complete 
an electoral form, provide a photocopy of their voting identification card, and show proof of 
address in the United States, put all that information in an IFE’s envelope and send it to IFE 
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Mexico via Mexican Consulate private mail. The registration process could also be completed on 
the Internet at the IFE website.  
After IFE created a voting registration list of the abroad vote, the institution mailed the 
2006 election ballot to those Mexican citizens who fulfilled all IFE’s requirements. The plan 
required that ballots voting be received by IFE no later than June 29, 2006; it was just 3 days 
before election day in Mexico. The Senate Chamber rejected the PRD senators’ proposal about 
the possibility to generate a voting credential reposition program and the certification of voting 
ballots. Head of the Senate Exterior Relations Commission Senator Silvia Hernández-PRI (2005) 
stated there was no point for the presidential candidates to travel to the United States since voters 
there could follow up the election via the mass media. Paisanos had television channels in 
Spanish and read newspapers; therefore, they were informed citizens. They could, consequently, 
cast their vote even though the campaign meetings in the overseas were forbidden (EFE, 2005a). 
President Fox congratulated Congress for passing an electoral reform that would provide access 
to Mexicans abroad to participate in the 2006 elections. He estimated that paisanos had access to 
international information and the Mexican channels (Notimex, 2005). Several cable companies 
around the United States carry the signal of several Mexican channels. In addition, dish 
companies do have a special additional package that users could purchase in order to have access 
to the signal of several Latin American channels. 
Even though paisanos had to rely on U.S. Latino major television newscasts such as 
Univisión, Azteca América, and Telemundo to remain informed. In addition, paisanos had to 
face many administrative obstacles in the Mexican consulates in order to be registered. Austin’s 
Mexican Consulate intern Amanda Dávila (2006) explained that there was no formal training 
about the registration procedure. There was misinformation and confusion about the paperwork 
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that a citizen should fill out (M. Flores, personal communication, March 4, 2006). Perhaps, the 
difficulty was the double task that Secretary of the Exterior personnel had since the functions of 
this agency and IFE are completely different. 
A research organization in the United States conducted a public opinion poll with 
Mexican citizens living in the United States to identify their opinions regarding the 2006 election 
and their opportunity to vote. The Pew Research Center national telephone survey of Mexicans 
living in the United States on Absentee Voting in Mexican Elections in a sample of 987 
participants found paisanos favored PAN by 36%, followed by PRD and PRI with 14% each 
(Suro & Escobar, 2006). Pew predictions were correct. According with IFE, paisanos supported 
the PAN candidate. From a total of 33,131 abroad votes, 57.40% (19,016) favored PAN; 33.47% 
(11,088) PRD; 4.10% (1,360) PRI; 2.68% (887) Convergencia; and 0.39% (128) New Alliance 
(Dirección Ejecutiva de Organización Electoral IFE, 2006). The numbers indicate that the 
overseas participation was respectable taking into consideration all the difficulties that IFE, the 
secretary of exterior, and paisanos had to overcome. The postelectoral conflict was not centered 
on the abroad vote; apparently, it was not a critical topic. The aftermath disagreement center of 
attention was the lack of a set of laws to regulate the political advertising and the role of the 
media during electoral periods. The following chapter presents a detailed overview of the 2007 
Mexican electoral reform with a focus on the regulation of private and public radio and 
television stations as well as advertising during election primaries and general campaign periods. 
The 2007 electoral reform began a very restrictive political communication policy by prohibiting 
candidates from advertising their image and drastically reducing candidates’ time exposure on 
electronic media outlets.  
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Clearly, the 2006 election aftermath marked a historical moment in Mexican history. The 
high point in the electoral dynamic was the use of negative political advertisement. However, 
Mexico had no law to regulate such an unprecedented development. Mexico had regulated 
elections for 183 years, since the writing of the 1824 constitution. The electoral law has focused 
its attention on the media after the 1994 election. Before 1994, there was not a clear set of rules 
and regulations for the media, with the exception of newspapers, which are regulated by the Ley 
de Imprenta. However, many of those laws are not up to date with the current technology.  The 
2006 election brought to the table the discussion of electoral advertisements in the media as well 
as media’s electoral coverage. Unlike all previous elections in Mexico, presidential candidates 
devoted most of their budget to political advertisement, especially television. This fact denoted a 
high interest of presidential candidates in the media. But did their investment provide them with 
the return that they were expecting? This study measures the intermedia agenda-setting effect of 
television news stories and political ads, pointing out their interplay during each month of the 
presidential campaign.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
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Methodology 
The research discussed here focused broadly on the intermedia agenda setting effects between 
national television news programs and between these programs and political television 
advertising by presidential candidates. Intermedia agenda setting effects are understood as the 
dynamic process in which one medium of communication strongly influences the agenda of 
other media by suggesting which topics are important to cover (McCombs, 2004).  
News organizations have a practice of reading, listening, and viewing other media outlets 
to compare news coverage of events, topics, and breaking news covered by other news 
organizations. By comparing news coverage, news organizations ensure comprehensive coverage 
of important as well as mundane news events. They gain also a sense of validation for their news 
judgment. Consequently, intermedia agenda setting seeks to determine which media garners an 
elite position among all media. More broadly, the key question that establishes the intermedia 
agenda setting assessment is “Who sets the media’s agenda?” McCombs (2004) stated that are 
three possible answers to this question: first, journalistic news norms; second, other news media 
outlets; and third, external news sources. In the case of the 2006 Mexican election, the 
intermedia agenda-setting question was answered in terms of all three of the possible answers as 
McCombs suggested. Comparison of news content on Televisa and TV Azteca was used to 
address, the “news norms.” Analysis of the intermedia agenda setting effect between presidential 
candidates’ political television advertising and television news media addressed the “other news 
media.” Spearman’s Rho correlations were calculated between political advertising and 
television news to evaluate the “news sources” approach by measuring the caudillismo cultural 
attribute. 
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Research Hypotheses 
Six hypotheses guided this research on agenda setting. Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 of this study 
address the “news norms” perspective. Hypothesis 4 discusses “news sources.” Hypotheses 5 and 
6 focus on “other news media,” that is, intermedia agenda-setting. 
H1. Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts presented the same election campaign issues 
agenda to their viewers during the 2006 presidential election. 
H2. Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts presented the same presidential candidate 
attribute agenda to their viewers during the 2006 presidential election. 
H3. Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts favored a particular presidential candidate 
through their non-election coverage of public issues during the 2006 election. 
H4. Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s caudillismo cultural attribute prevailed over Felipe 
Calderón’s caudillismo cultural attribute in political advertising and television news. 
H5. Television news coverage of a presidential candidate’s issue platform and   personal 
attributes is similar to coverage those presented in presidential candidates’ television 
advertising.  
H6. Television news influenced television political advertising during the 2006 
presidential election. 
Method 
This study used content analysis as its primary method of analysis. Two distinct content analysis 
data sets were necessary for this research: one for television newscasts, and another for political 
advertisements. The content analyses were conducted by American and Mexican researchers 
who combined their investigative skills in the Mexico 2006 Panel Study led by political science 
professor Chappell Lawson of Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  
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The Mexico 2006 Panel Study, Television Content Analysis, research team included: 
Chappell Lawson (Principal Investigator), José Carlos Lozano, María de los Angeles Flores, and 
Maxwell McCombs. Funding for the study was provided by the National Science Foundation 
(SES-0517971), the University of Texas at Austin, St. Edward's University, Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, and The Center for Communication and Information Research at the 
Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey (Monterrey Tech).  
The television content analysis data set came from a systematic random sample of 
Mexican prime time television news programs broadcast during the official Instituto Federal 
Electoral’s (Federal Electoral Institute) presidential campaign period that ran from January 19 to 
June 28, 2006. The Mexican television newscasts analyzed were: Televisa’s El Noticiero con 
Joaquín López Dóriga that aired from 10:30 to 11:15PM (Central Mexican Time) on Channel 2, 
and TV Azteca’s Hechos de la Noche that aired at the same time on Channel 7. Both newscasts 
were broadcast nationwide from Monday to Friday.  
This systematic random sample was structured on the basis of a constructed week taken 
from each three week internal from January 19 to June 28. The constructed week included only 
weekdays; weekends were omitted from this analysis. Each three-week periods contains 15 
weekdays and using a skip-interval of three days results in each of the five weekdays falling into 
the sample once (i.e., a constructed week). The specific dates coded were January 19, 25, 31; 
February 6, 10, 16, 22, 28; March 6, 10, 16, 22, 28; April 3, 7, 13, 19, 25; May 1, 5, 11, 17, 23, 
29; and June 2, 8, 11, 20, 26. That is, a total of 29 days per network, for a total of 58 newscasts. 
This yielded a total of 1,348 news stories: 812 (60%) by Televisa, and 536 (40%) by TV Azteca. 
Both networks combined aired 222 election news stories, representing 16% of their total news 
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content. Televisa aired 123 stories that represented 15% of its newscast content, and TV Azteca 
broadcast 99 news stories that represented 18% of its news coverage. 
McCombs, Flores, and Lawson developed the codebook “News” (Appendix A) for the 
project. Lozano reviewed the codebook and made suggestions for revisions. The unit of analysis 
was each news story broadcast during Televisa’s and TV Azteca’s newscasts. Several restrictions 
were imposed on the unit of analysis in order to balance the analysis in terms of content such as 
the different forms of editorial formats (humorous as well as commentary). Sports and celebrity 
news were omitted because both networks did not regularly offer those stories in their daily 
newscasts. For example, Televisa broadcast a comical editorial segment only on Fridays. The 
constructed week design minimized the opportunities to code all newscasts aired on Fridays; 
therefore, the editorial section was excluded from the coding.  
Three unprecedented events occurred during the newscasts data collection period. Those 
events were the immigration reform issue in the United States, the new Federal Radio and 
Television Law of Mexico that peaked in March, and the 2006 Soccer World Cup celebrated in 
Germany during the month of June. The results most likely resulted in a significant increase of 
news coverage on those topics during the months of March and June. The use of a constructed 
week minimized the impact of those unprecedented events, because each event had an average of 
one-month duration.  
Communication master’s students6 who worked as research assistants in the Center for 
Communication and Information Research at the Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores 
de Monterrey coded the Televisa and TV Azteca main newscasts. Flores trained the coders and 
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conducted weekly conference call meetings with them along with weekly calibration testing. The 
calibration testing required that the entire group code 10 minutes of the same newscast to 
compare results. Lozano supervised the coders in Monterrey. Spanish was the coders’ primary 
language. Therefore, the codebook and the data enter web site were in Spanish. The PHP 
surveyor software was used to collect the data generated by coders for submission online. 
Intercoder reliability was measured using the coefficient of reliability. Because of the 
complexity of this content analysis, coders were divided into teams. Each team was in charge of 
a specific network. An intercoder reliability test was conducted for each team. However, all 
coders were tested on the same newscasts dates. For example, if March 1 was assigned to be the 
intercoder test day, all coders analyzed this newscast date, but according to their own network 
assignment. All teams had an intercoder test each month. Some of the newscasts used for this 
purpose were actual coding dates, and some others were not. All teams obtained an average 94% 
Coefficient of Reliability (Poindexter & McCombs, 2000). 
The television content analysis data was the primary data set for this study. The Mexico 
2006 Panel Study also conducted the political advertising content analysis (Appendix B). MIT 
political science doctoral student Rachel Gisselquist and MIT professor Chappell Lawson 
produced this dataset. They conducted a census of all the political spots that the three main 
presidential candidates aired on Televisa and TV Azteca during the official IFE campaign period. 
This data set consisted of a total of 97 television political spots, including Felipe Calderón-PAN 
(55), Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO)-PRD (27), and Roberto Madrazo-PRI (16). Data 
was not weighted; that is, all ads were treated equally as if they were new ads each time a new 
                                                                                                                                                             
6 Special thanks to Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey students, Citlalli Sánchez 
Hernández, Esmeralda González Coronado, Eduardo García Reyes, Andrea Menchaca Trillo, and Paola Gabriela 
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spot version was aired (Gisselquist & Lawson, 2006). Rachel Gisselquist and Ariel Ivanier—
both doctoral students—were the coders for the television political ads study. In order to test the 
intercoder reliability, both coders conducted a content analysis of eight ads. The correlation 
coefficient was +.73.  
H1: Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts presented the same election campaign issues 
agenda to their viewers during the 2006 presidential election. 
The operational definition of “election campaign issues agenda” was all news stories that 
reported on the presidential race and were broadcast during the IFE’s election campaign period. 
The list of topics that television journalists covered in election news was labeled as the TV news 
agenda. The SPSS statistical software was used to conduct all data analyses. Election campaign 
news was analyzed with a cross tabulation between the variable “television network” and the 
variable “news story main topic.” The table produced a list of news topics that each television 
network aired. After carefully reviewing the list, themes relating to the election were identified 
and organized into the category “election news,” which consisted of 44 topics; sub-
categorizations were created to group similar themes. Nine subcategories were generated: (1) 
Hugo Chavez, (2) PAN campaign strategy, (3) IFE, (4) democracy, (5) voting, (6) debates, (7) 
public opinion polls, (8) candidate negative attributes, and (9) issues. This list of topics is the 
election campaign issue agenda. 
The subcategory of “candidate negative attributes” encompassed news stories that 
highlighted negative attributes of a candidate. “Issues” news was stories in which a candidate 
addressed a particular public issue during his or her campaign meeting. “PAN campaign 
strategy” referred to news stories about the PAN political advertising campaign. The “public 
López Arnaut for their assistance with the coding conducted for this research. 
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opinion polls” subcategory referred to those stories that presented the survey results on the 
attitude of Mexican voters toward the electoral process. “Debates” included stories about the 
organization, location, expectations, and aftermath of each debate. There were two presidential 
debates in 2006: the first on April 25, and the second on May 23. The subcategory “voting” 
addressed news that focused on the voters and different forms of voting such as the overseas 
vote, the hard vote, and the useful vote among others. “Democracy” was defined as stories about 
Mexico’s state of democracy, and “IFE” news included any information that featured IFE as the 
primary source of information, communication, or reports about IFE assemblies, as well as IFE 
press releases. After the results were obtained, the percentages were rank ordered, and a 
Spearman’s Rho correlation was calculated. Table 3, which is presented in the next chapter, was 
created to represent Televisa’s and TV Azteca’s election campaign issue agenda.  
To measure the flow of intermedia influence of the election campaign issues agenda 
between Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts during the 2006 Mexican election campaign period, 
three cross-lagged correlation analyses were conducted. In these analyses, two opposing 
hypotheses about the time order of influence are juxtaposed. The first cross-lagged correlation 
analysis corresponds to a 3-month period. That is, the total presidential campaign timeframe of 6 
months was divided into 3-month periods that compared the news content of Televisa and TV 
Azteca. Time 1 represents the news content aired during the months of January, February, and 
March; and time 2 represents the months of April, May, and June.  
The second set of cross-lagged correlations are comparisons of each 2-month period. 
Therefore, time 1 corresponds to the content presented by Televisa and TV Azteca during the 
months of January and February. Time 2 represents the news content aired during the months of 
March and April; and time 3 represents the months of May and June.  
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The third set of cross-lagged correlations was conducted to observe the intermedia flow between 
the television networks in the greatest detail. Therefore, each of the periods corresponds to a 
constructed week. Constructed week 1 corresponds to newscasts aired on January 19, 25, 31; 
February 6 and 10. Constructed week 2 corresponds to newscasts aired on February 16, 22, 28; 
March 6 and 10. Constructed week 3 corresponds to newscasts aired on March 16, 22, 28; April 
3 and 7. Constructed week 4 corresponds to newscasts aired on April 13, 19, and 25; May 1 and 
5. Constructed week 5 corresponds to newscasts aired on May 11, 17, 23, 29; and June 2.
Constructed week 6 corresponds to newscasts aired on June 8, 11, 20, and 26. Five of the six 
constructed weeks consist of five newscasts. The last constructed week consists of 4 newscasts. 
In all three sets of analyses, the differences between each pair of correlations were analyzed by 
comparison with the Rozelle-Campbell baseline, a statistic that indicates the value expected by 
chance alone. The purpose of these cross-lag correlations was to explore all the alternatives in 
the flow of communication between television news and candidate’s television political spots. 
The aim was to scrutinize several periods in order to examine the influence from a general 
perspective (3 months or 2 months) into a specific (month by month) perspective.  
H2: Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts presented the same presidential candidate 
attribute agenda to their viewers during the 2006 presidential election. 
The operational definition for “presidential candidate attribute agenda” was the list of 
presidential candidates’ personal characteristics portrayed on news stories broadcast by Televisa 
and TV Azteca. The codebook presented two variables per candidate to measure each 
presidential candidate attributes, one variable for the positive and another one for the negative.  
The positive candidate attributes consisted of leadership, experience, personality, 
intellectual capacity for position, strong moral values, eloquent, trust, interest in population’s 
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well being, military experience, ability to work with Congress, ability to fight crime, ability to 
administer the economy, ability to fight corruption, support for democracy, honesty. The 
negative attributes for candidates were the following: lack of leadership, lack of experience, lack 
of charisma, without strong moral values, lack of public speaking ability, lack of military 
experience, lack of credibility, inability to work with Congress, inability to fight crime, inability 
to fight corruption, inability to manage the economy, does not support democracy, corrupt, lack 
of intellectual capacity for the position.  
Two tables present the descriptive results for the presidential candidates’ positive and 
negative attributes on the Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts. Table 4 reports the positive and 
negative presidential candidate attributes presented by Televisa. Table 5 illustrates the same 
results for TV Azteca. Two independent Spearman’s Rho correlations comparing Televisa and 
TV Azteca were calculated; one for the positive attributes and the other for the negative 
attributes.  
To sort out the flow of intermedia influence for the positive and negative presidential 
candidates attribute agendas between Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts during the 2006 
Mexican election campaign period, three cross-lagged correlation analyses were conducted. The 
design of these three cross-lagged correlation analyses used to test H2 regarding the attribute 
agenda were identical to the cross-lagged correlation analyses used to test H1 regarding the issue 
agenda.  
H3: Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts favored a particular presidential candidate 
through their non-election coverage of public issues during the 2006 election. 
The concept of the fairness doctrine of equal time coverage for presidential candidates is 
new to election news coverage in Mexico. It is imperative to find out what each television 
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network’s favored tendency was during the 2006 election and whom the networks indirectly 
supported through their non-election coverage of public issues. The operational definition for 
“non-election coverage of public issues” was defined as all news stories that did not explicitly 
cover the presidential election. That is, their main topic of the report was something other than 
the 2006 election, such as the economy, crime, environment, and politics, among other things. 
The purpose of this analysis was to identify coverage that could indirectly favor a particular 
presidential candidate.  
An initial analysis of the variable “news story main topic” produced a list of 182 issues. 
Those topics were recoded into 16 general categories: (1) economy, (2) election, (3) FIFA 2006, 
(4) politics, (5) immigration, (6) crime, (7) health, (8) war, (9) EZLN, (10) environment, (11) 
culture, (12) education, (13) human rights, (14) religion, (15) media, and (16) other. Additional 
analysis produced a list of coverage topics per television network. Table 6 presents these non-
election issues for Televisa and TV Azteca, and a Spearman’s Rho correlation was calculated.  
Following this analysis, a comparison was made between each of the television agendas 
and each candidate’s political platform. In order to determine the candidate’s political platform, 
the author reviewed his or her official proposals presented to IFE in order to fulfill the 
requirements for registration as a presidential candidate. IFE posted those political platforms on 
their website (www.ife.com). Political platforms were evaluated to identify key issues presented 
by candidates; then an agenda of public issues was constructed (see Tables 8-12).  
Each candidate’s agenda was correlated with the television agenda in order to identify 
which contender was indirectly favored by non-election news. After the results were obtained 
using the frequency of appearance analysis, Table 7 was constructed to illustrate the comparison 
between the television agenda and each candidate’s agenda. The “other” category was created in 
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order to produce a more accurate comparison between the television and candidates agendas. The 
category of the candidate agenda included the following topics: justice system, housing, family, 
foreign relations, military, poverty, infrastructure, and gender equity.  
Andrés Manuel López Obrador-PRD (2006) presented his agenda in 50 Compromisos 
para Recuperar El Orgullo Nacional. AMLO’s agenda, the 50 commitments, were merged into 
12 categories. The highest attention of AMLO’s 50 issues agenda was place on the economy, 
followed by education, political system, culture, and infrastructure. For the purpose of 
comparison between the AMLO’s agenda and the television’s agenda and to ensure that the 
agendas were balanced, the “other” category of AMLO’s agenda does include the following 
topics: infrastructure, poverty, military, and foreign relations. 
When Patricia Mercado officially registered to IFE as part of her registration process, she 
presented her political proposal in writing, based on her 113-page document Plataforma 
Electoral 2006. Mercado presented a 14-category agenda; economy and education were her top 
priority issues, as Table 8 illustrates. Mercado believes that education is the motor of 
development. A total of five public issues were competing for the third place in Mercado’s 
agenda: (1) health, (2) culture, (3) foreign relations, (4) political system, and (5) human rights. 
Mercado was the only candidate who had the mass media on her agenda. She acknowledges that 
the media have a fundamental role in the consolidation of democracy, because an informed 
citizen has more possibilities to vote.  
Roberto Madrazo’s agenda was constructed from the Coalición Alianza por México 
Plataforma Electoral, the document submitted when he registered with IFE as PRI’s presidential 
candidate. The Alianza por México proposal was divided into three major sections—the country 
that we want, the society we desire, and the government we require. His agenda consisted of 15 
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public issues. Economy ranked at the top of his list. The two public issues that ranked in second 
place in Madrazo’s agenda were political system and environment.  
New Alliance candidate Roberto Campa presented a 33-page election agenda, Plataforma 
Electoral Partido Nueva Alianza Elección Federal 2006. At the top of his agenda was the 
political system issue; the second issue on Campa’s agenda was the economy. The third issue on 
Campa’s agenda was education. The New Alliance candidate introduced a new topic into the 
presidential competition, which was immigration. Campa considers that a regulated agreement 
between the United States and Mexico should be created in order to administer the flow of 
immigrants and avoid frictions between both countries’ authorities.  
PAN candidate Felipe Calderón also included immigration as a topic on his agenda. For 
him, to defend Mexican immigrant rights abroad was crucial. In addition, Mexico should insist 
on finding a permanent solution to the immigration issue. However, the immigration issue was 
not at the top of his agenda. Like the other presidential candidates in early January, Calderón 
presented a 60-page political agenda titled Plataforma Política del Partido Acción Nacional. His 
agenda consisted of 15 public issues. The top priority on Calderón’s agenda was the economy. 
Education was the second item on Calderón’s agenda. The third public issue for the PAN 
candidate was human rights. 
H4: Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s caudillo cultural attribute prevailed over Felipe 
Calderón’s caudillo cultural attribute in political advertising and television news.  
The operational definition for caudillo was how effective presidential candidates were in 
presenting themselves as a public opinion leader. In Mexican culture, caudillo is considered to be 
a personal attribute of strong man, somebody who possesses leadership charisma. That is, a 
person who has the power to listen to voters and solve their problems. This caudillo attribute is a 
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“must have” personal attribute for Mexican politicians because voters are not loyal to a particular 
political party. As a rule of thumb for politicians and voters alike, a candidate’s leadership 
charisma was more important than loyalty to a particular political party. The great majority of 
Mexican voters are not loyal to a certain political party unless they are obligated by economic 
pressure from their employers. Voters favor the candidates who possess a leadership charisma, a 
candidate who voters consider to possess a caudillo personal attribute. In history, caudillos are 
social leaders who were viewed as strongmen, role models, and person in charge.  
In this study, for a candidate to posses the caudillo personal attribute, she/he should be 
frequently present in the media, because the constant participation of candidates as news sources 
improves their image in society. Candidates have two opportunities to build up their caudillo 
characteristic. One of them is through the news media, by being constantly cited by journalists. 
In this context, candidates do not have the control. Another opportunity to build up the caudillo 
characteristic is by the candidate’s controlled exposure in political advertisements. In this 
context, each candidate had the power to choose to directly speak for themselves to voters via 
asound bite or to just use a voice over in their political spot. 
It just as agenda setting theory suggests that frequent news coverage of a particular public 
issue raises its importance to the public (McCombs, 2004). The same effect can be observed for 
candidates. That is, the more frequently a particular candidate appears on the news as a source, 
the greater the importance of the candidate. Therefore, in order for a presidential candidate to 
become a social leader or caudillo, he or she should be frequently presented in the media. 
Frequent visibility of candidates as news sources improves their image in two directions: first, by 
obtaining the opportunity to directly speak to voters; and second, by positioning in the voter’s 
mind the idea of the candidate’s leadership role. The same logic was applied to each candidate’s 
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television spots. Each candidate, as well as his or her political party, had the opportunity to 
closely supervise the production of each political spot. The candidates had the power to choose 
to directly speak for themselves to voters via sound bite or to just use a voice over in their spot.  
The analysis was performed in two phases. The first was to measure the candidate’s 
participation in television newscasts, and the second was to measure the candidate’s appearance 
in his or her own political advertisement television spots. Analysis of the television newscasts 
began by calculating the frequency of appearance for each candidate in news stories by each 
television network. After the results were obtained, Table 13 was created to illustrate the number 
of news stories about presidential candidates broadcast on each network.  
Comparison of the prominence of the candidates’ participation was necessary, so an 
analysis was conducted for up to nine news sources per story was required. Table 14 was created 
to show the frequency of news sources by network. Table 15 illustrates the frequency by which 
presidential candidates appeared on news stories and the frequency count of the sources. The 
results obtained were used to determine the number of times a presidential candidate appeared in 
a news story as a news source and then contrasted with the total number of stories that television 
newscast aired on each candidate. The findings indicated the number of times presidential 
candidates only appeared as an image and the actual percentage of time that each candidate 
spoke to voters. The candidate with the highest rank was considered the caudillo in the newscast.  
The political advertising data set also was used to identify the caudillo. First an analysis 
determined the total number of political spots aired on television. Then, a frequency count 
analysis identified which political party purchased the highest number of political 
advertisements. Finally, another analysis determined which candidate devoted more time to 
“speak” to voters. That is, identifying which candidate included the greatest number of personal 
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sound bites in his or her television spots determined caudillo in the political spots. After the 
results were obtained, Table 15 presented the frequency with which each candidate participated 
as a source on his or her television political ads.  
H5. Television news coverage of a presidential candidate’s issue platform and personal 
attributes is similar to coverage presented in presidential candidates’ television ads.  
The operational definitions for the candidate issue platform as well as candidate attributes 
are explained for previous hypotheses (H1 and H2). H1 explains the public issues, and H2 
identifies the presidential candidates’ attributes. In addition, the results for both hypotheses 
provide the television news issues agenda and the television news presidential candidate 
attributes agenda. As a consequence, the analysis focused on identifying the ads’ issues and 
presidential candidates attributes agendas. The ads data set contained information on the major 
three candidates: Calderón, Madrazo, and López Obrador. An analysis identified the list of issues 
that were presented on television political ads. After the results were obtained and put in rank 
order, the ads issue agenda was created, as Table 17 illustrates. To balance the ads and news 
categories of each agenda for a comparison, three categories from the television news agenda 
were merged, because in the TV ads agenda the category public services included three 
categories from the TV news agenda. The categories of education, environment, and health were 
combined into one broader category. Another category that had to be modified was the “other” 
category of the TV news agenda. The “other” category incorporated the following categories—
immigration, war, EZLN, FIFA Germany 2006, media, and human rights—in order to make 
these similar to the advertising agenda. Regarding the advertising agenda, the “other” category 
included the following categories: infrastructure, family, nationalism, and social groups. A series 
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of Spearman’s Rho correlations were calculated between the television news issue agenda and 
the ads issue agenda (Tables 18-21). 
The next step was to determine the advertising attribute agenda fpr the personal 
characteristics of Calderón, López Obrador, and Madrazo. Table 22 illustrates each of the 
candidate’s lists of attributes. Then, a series of Spearman’s Rho correlations were calculated 
between the television news presidential candidates attribute agenda and the ads presidential 
candidates attribute agenda (Tables 23-27). 
H6: Television news influenced television political advertising during the 2006 
presidential election. 
Previous agenda-setting research has documented that in U.S. elections, the effect of 
political advertisements is generally low when compared to news (Zhao & Chaffee, 1995). Could 
Mexico be following a similar pattern? Cross-lag comparisons were used to determine the 
pattern influence between television news and television political ads. Therefore, based on IFE’s 
official campaign period, which was 6 months in duration, the author divided those months into 
two groups. All television news as well as television political ads aired during the first 3 months 
— January, February, March — of the campaign period were “time one.” News and ads 
broadcast later on—April, May, and June—during the campaign were “time two.” Tables 28 and 
29 illustrate each of the time periods along with the list of topics aired per television network.  
Next, a cross-lagged correlation analysis demonstrated the flow of the television news and 
television ads influence. The purpose of these cross-lag correlations is to explore all the posible 
alternatives in the flow of communication process between television news and a candidate’s 
television political spots. The aim was to scrutinize several periods in order to examine the 
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influence from a general perspective (3 months or 2 months) into a specific (month by month) 
perspective.  
This chapter presented the measurement procedures used to test the hypotheses about 
television news and political ads. This contributes to the agenda setting body of research because 
traditionally agenda setting studies have focused mainly on news or advertising, but rarely on 
both. The following chapter presents the results for these hypotheses.  
Chapter 8 
Television News vs. Television Political Advertising 
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Current conventional attitudes held by many political consultants, political marketers, and 
politicians are that news coverage has no effect on political elections. The intent of this research 
was to investigate the relationship between national television news and television political 
advertising during the 2006 Mexican presidential election. This investigation expands upon the 
body of agenda setting theory by documenting the intermedia agenda setting relationship 
between news and advertising in an international setting.  
The results are presented in this chapter according to the order of the hypotheses. Six 
hypotheses guided this research on intermedia agenda setting. The fundamental question about 
the intermedia agenda setting effect is: “Who sets the media agenda?” This question could be 
answered from three perspectives: news norms, news sources, and other news media. Hypotheses 
1, 2, and 3 of this study address the “news norms” perspective. Hypothesis 4 discusses “news 
sources.” Hypotheses 5 and 6 focus on “other news media outlets.”  
H1: Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts presented the same election campaign issues 
agenda to their viewers during the 2006 presidential election 
The results presented in Table 3 confirm the intermedia agenda setting effect of election 
campaign issues agenda between both television networks as predicted by H1 and were 
significant (rho = +.742); the Spearman’s Rho test indicated that each television network 
essentially presented to its viewers the same election news campaign issues. Televisa devoted 
23% of its total news content to coverage of the electoral campaign, and TV Azteca dedicated 
18% of its total content to election news. As Table 3 shows, the topics that ranked at the top of 
Televisa’s agenda were: (1) candidate negative attributes, (2) issues, and (3) debates. TV 
Azteca’s agenda included: (1) issues, (2) candidate negative attribute, and (3) PAN campaign 
strategy. The two top public issues on both networks agenda were practically the same. 
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Table 3: Intermedia Agenda Setting Effect Televisa and TV Azteca—Election Issues  
Issues Televisa             n=187 TV Azteca        n=93 
 #stories            %         rank #stories            %         rank 
Public Opinion Polls 3                      2             (7) 4                       4                         (5) 
Debates 16                    9             (3) 5                       5                         (4) 
Vote 0                      0             (9) 1                       1                       (8.5) 
Democracy 2                      1             (8) 3                       3                       (6.5) 
IFE 15                    8             (4) 3                       3                       (6.5) 
Negative Attribute  74                   39            (1) 31                     34                       (2) 
PAN Campaign Strategy 11                    6          (5.5) 7                       8                         (3) 
Hugo Chavez 11                    6          (5.5) 1                        1                      (8.5) 
Issues 55                   29            (2) 38                     41                       (1) 
Total                       100%                        100% 
Spearman’s Rho correlation = +.742 
 
After the intermedia agenda-setting effect between Televisa and TV Azteca was 
confirmed at a general level, analysis that is more detailed was needed to determine the causality 
behind this effect. To sort out the flow of intermedia influence of the election campaign issues 
agendas between the television networks newscasts during the 2006 Mexican election campaign 
period, three cross-lagged correlation analyses were conducted. The first cross-lagged correlation 
corresponds to a 3-month period. As Figure 1 illustrates, the correlation between Televisa at time 
1 and TV Azteca at time 2 (rho = +.82) is stronger than the correlation between TV Azteca at 
time 1 and Televisa at time 2 (rho = +.66) with a Rozelle-Campbell baseline of .67. The results 
specify that Televisa strongly influenced TV Azteca’s agenda in a 3-month scale analysis.  
Another cross-lagged correlation was conducted using a 2-month period scale. As Figure 
2 shows, during time 1 (January/February) and time 2 (March/April), the cross-lagged 
correlation of TV Azteca at time 1 and Televisa at time 2 (rho = +.52) was stronger than the 
other way around (rho = +.49). The Rozelle-Campbell baseline was +. 39. There is little 
difference in the two correlations, and both exceeded the baseline. In contrast, the cross-lagged 
correlation between time 2 and time 3 (May/June) indicated a stronger influence of Televisa over 
TV Azteca’s agenda. The cross-lagged correlation between Televisa at time 2 and TV Azteca at 
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time 3 (rho = +.88) was considerably stronger than the other way around (rho = +.57). The 
Rozelle-Campbell baseline for time 2 and time 3 was +. 56.  
To zoom into greater detail, as Figure 3 shows, a cross-lagged analysis of each 
constructed week was conducted. The study sample had a total of 6 constructed weeks; each of 
those constructed weeks represents one time period of the cross-lag analysis. During the analysis 
of the first and second time period, the cross-lagged correlation between Televisa at time 1 and 
TV Azteca at time 2 (rho = +.79) was stronger than the other way around (rho = +.64). The 
Rozelle Campbell baseline was .61. As a consequence, Televisa strongly influenced TV Azteca 
presidential candidates’ negative attribute agenda. The same pattern was observed between time 
2 and time 3. The cross-lagged correlation between Televisa at time 2 and TV Azteca at time 3 
(rho = +.80) was stronger than TV Azteca at time 2 and Televisa at time 3 (rho = +.58). The 
Rozelle Campbell baseline was .60. In contrast, an opposite pattern was observed during time 3 
and time 4. The cross-lag correlation between TV Azteca at time 3 and Televisa at time 4 (rho = 
+.86) was stronger than the other way around (rho = +.69). The Rozelle Campbell baseline was 
.59. For the period of time 4 and time 5 a reverse result was observed. The cross-lagged 
correlation between Televisa at time 4 and TV Azteca at time 5 (rho = +.97) was stronger than 
TV Azteca at time 4 and Televisa at time 5 (rho = +.54). The Rozelle Campbell baseline was .61. 
This pattern of flow reversed for the last period. The period of time 5 and time 6: the cross-lag 
correlation between TV Azteca at time 5 and Televisa at time 6 (rho = +1) was perfect, and a 
tiny bit stronger than Televisa at time 5 and TV Azteca at time 6 (rho = +.96). There is little 
difference in the two correlations, and both exceeded the baseline. The Rozelle Campbell 
baseline was .96. Overall, Televisa strongly influenced TV Azteca’s election campaign issue 
agenda 3 constructed weeks, and TV Azteca strongly influenced Televisa during 2 constructed 
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weeks. As a consequence, we can conclude that Televisa set TV Azteca’s election campaign 
issue agenda. 
To summarize the results in Figure 3, three of the five analyses indicate a reciprocal 
relationship between Televisa and TV Azteca. However, in two of the time periods, the second 
and the fourth, there is evidence that Televisa’s election issue agenda influenced TV Azteca. At 
the general level, the flow of communication analysis provides evidence of how Telvisa 
influenced TV Azteca. This result was expected because Televisa is the major television network 
in the country. Nevertheless, it is crucial to investigate the flow of communication in detail in 
order to deeply understand the influence dynamic between both television networks. In the two 
months breakdown it is surprising to detect how in the first half of the presidential campaign 
period TV Azteca clearly influenced Televisa’s news content. This means that we should be 
careful not to overlook TV Azteca’s news reporting. Sometimes due to the fact that TV Azteca at 
the corporate level (commercialization, profit, ratings) is located blow Televisa we have the 
tendency to think that it should be the same case for news content. In contrast, this study clearly 
shows that in terms of news content, the corporate pattern is not followed because for three 
consecutive months TV Azteca dictated what news in Mexico was. For the second half of the 
presidential campaign period, Televisa set the national television agenda.  
The month by month breakdown analysis clearly shows evidence that during the two 
most crucial moments of the election campaign TV Azteca influenced Televisa. Those were: (1) 
during the third month of the campaign when the Televisa’s law was discussed in congress and 
(2) during the last month when the post second debate controversy took place after AMLO 
accused Calderon of having a brother in law in charge of creating IFE’s software that would be 
used to count the votes on election day. This event was the starting point of Calderon’s downhill 
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popularity which eventually leads him to a limited vote turnout. Again, during the most critical 
moments of the election campaign TV Azteca was the media agenda setter for national television 
news. Overall, it is important to be the news leader, but to be the news chief during crucial times 
adds up to a tremendous amount of social, civic, democratic responsibility and love for their 
country to those persons in charge of TV Azteca news.  
This study is one of the few which investigates the national television networks 
relationship across the election campaign. This study shows that ratings and content leadership 
are not the same and are not directly related to each other. Ratings are good for sales, but content 
leadership is directly related with the duty that the media has to keep voters informed. Content 
leadership is directly related to democracy, to make an effort to construct a more democratic 
nation. This practice of constructing a more democratic nation is necessary for young 
democracies like Mexico. The democratic practice of television election journalism in Mexico 
was the main difference between Televisa and TV Azteca. As Table 3 illustrates, Televisa chose 
to concentrate their efforts on reporting about the negative attribute television ads campaign and 
presidential candidate’s reactions, which is a good strategy if ratings were the news executives’ 
priority. In contrast, TV Azteca devoted their efforts to report on public issues that perhaps 
sacrificed ratings – which their news executives are aware are not always at the top – for content 
leadership which leads to a more democratic election news coverage. Nevertheless, Televisa 
produced a higer amount of election news stories (187) than TV Azteca (93) and the intermedia 
agenda setting effect between both networks was significant (rho = +.742). As the flow of 
communication indicated, TV Azteca produced a higer democratic value news content than 
Televisa did. To conclude, do not asumme that the leader network is necessarily the network that 
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presents to voters the most democratic election news content, watch out for the second place 
news organization which has less to lose and more freedom to try out innovative news content.  
H2: Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts presented the same presidential candidate 
attribute agenda to their viewers during the 2006 presidential election. 
Candidates’ attribute news coverage is fundamental for Mexican democracy. Voters are not loyal 
to political parties. Voters have the tendency to favor strong and charismatic leaders.  Therefore, 
the way that journalists portrayal presidential candidate is important in Mexican election 
journalism. This hypothesis was answered from two perspectives: the negative and positive 
candidate attribute agendas. In terms of the overall negative candidate attributes agenda, the 
hypothesis was confirmed. Televisa and TV Azteca had a perfect Spearman’s Rho correlation of 
rho = +1. In the presentation of negative attributes (Tables 4 and 5), both television stations 
ranked the presidential candidates exactly in the same order: (1) AMLO, (2) Calderón, (3) 
Madrazo, and (4) Mercado and Campa.  
Nevertheless, the results indicate that Televisa concentrated the majority of its negative 
comments on one presidential candidate: AMLO. The outcome showed that the percentage 
difference in candidates’ negative attributes between the top runners was large. As Table 4 
illustrates, AMLO received the largest number of negative attributes mentions—70%—in news 
stories on Televisa. Felipe Calderón received 23% of the negative attributes, and Madrazo 
received 7% negative attributes. Neither Mercado nor Campa received any negative attributes on 
Televisa. These results show a difference of 47% between both AMLO and Calderón. This 
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Figure 1: Election Campaign Issues Agenda: Three Months Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
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Figure 2: Election Campaign Issues Agenda: Two Months Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
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TV Azteca TV Azteca TV Azteca 
Rozelle Campbell baseline = .39               Rozelle Campbell baseline = .56 
Figure 3: Election Campaign Issues Agenda: Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
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means that AMLO obtained 3 times as many negative mentions as Calderón and 10 times more 
negative mentions than Madrazo. The main negative attributes for each candidate were for 
AMLO— inability to fight corruption, for Calderón—lack of credibility and corruption, and for 
Madrazo—corruption, as well as a lack of credibility. The fact that Televisa centers its negative 
attribute reporting in the direction of one presidential candidate and the differences with the 
other candidates is significant indicates a clear tendency to damage AMLO’s personal image. 
However, this tendency could take place without being purposely planed by the network news 
executives. Although the fact that the percentage difference between the first (AMLO) and 
second (Calderon) is enormous does implicate an unequal election coverage that severely 
damaged AMLO’s image. Sadly, this unequal reporting is not leading to a democratic 
journalism. In addition, it is violating Televisa’s civic duty to keep their viewers informed by 
presenting a clear negative tendency in their news content. Therefore it represents a huge step 
back for Televisa in their social responsibility as a media outlet to contribute to the 
democratization of Mexico. The election journalism tendency in Mexico is changing. In the 
past, political candidates from opposition parties were aabsent from the national television 
media. They were practically invisible, but the 2006 election marks a new trend in election 
journalism to over emphasize negative candidate attributes in order to eliminate the opposition 
candidates by portraying them as outrageous persons. This kind of election journalism is 
preventing Mexico from moving forward into a developed democratic society. The media has 
an enormous responsibility in assist society by keeping their citizens informed and presenting a 
sense of balance to voters.  
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Table 4: Presidential Candidate Attribute Agenda—Televisa 
Candidate Positive Negative
Mentions         %          rank Mentions        %           rank 
Felipe Calderón 31 24            (3) 7 23             (2) 
Roberto Madrazo 38 29            (2) 2 7             (3) 
Andrés M. López Obrador 44 34            (1) 21 70             (1) 
Patricia Mercado 7 5            (5) 0 0          (4.5) 
Roberto Campa 11 8            (4) 0 0          (4.5) 
Total 131 100 30 100 
Negative Candidate Attribute Spearman’s Rho correlation + 1 
Positive Candidate Attribute Spearman’s Rho correlation + .675 
Table 5: Presidential Candidate Attribute Agenda—TV Azteca 
Candidate Positive Negative
Mentions          % Mentions         % 
Felipe Calderón 37 27           (1) 16 32            (2) 
Roberto Madrazo 26 19           (3) 12 24            (3) 
Andrés M. López Obrador 36 26           (2) 18 36            (1) 
Patricia Mercado 20 14        (4.5) 2 4         (4.5) 
Roberto Campa 19 14        (4.5) 2 4         (4.5) 
Total 138 100 50 100 
In contrast, TV Azteca presented more equivalent portrayals of the candidates’ negative 
attributes in its news coverage of the main three contenders—Calderón, Madrazo, and López 
Obrador. TV Azteca presented the same order of ranking that Televisa did, resulting in a 
perfect correlation. The difference between the networks is the percentages of negative 
coverage devoted to each candidate. As Table 5 illustrates, in TV Azteca, AMLO ranked on 
top (36%), followed by Calderón (32%) and Madrazo (24%). The two candidates who received 
fewer negative attributes in their news reports were Campa and Mercado (4%). This means that 
the percentage difference between candidates was smaller than in Televisa. The percentage 
difference between AMLO and Calderón was only four points. Furthermore, the variation 
between Calderón and Madrazo was eight points. Both candidates of the smaller parties—
Mercado and Campa—had the same percentages (4%), which was a 32-percentage difference 
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with the leader AMLO. To sum up, in TV Azteca there was not a clear tendency to hold back a 
particular candidate with its news reporting as Televisa did with AMLO. This characteristic of 
TV Azteca’s election journalism presented a more balance news content for voters. Although 
the difference between the three major runners and the two presidential candidates of the small 
parities is vast, the fact that all five candidates received covereage is a good step forward in the 
history of Mexican election journalism. 
In terms of the second perspective to answer this hypothesis, the positive candidate 
attributes, the hypothesis also was confirmed. The intermedia agenda setting effect was more 
moderate, rho = +.675. Interestingly, AMLO ranked at the top for both positive and negative 
attributes on Televisa. However, the data indicated that in the positive candidate attributes 
coverage, AMLO had 44%, in comparison to 70% that he obtained on the negative candidate 
attributes coverage; that is a 26% discrepancy between the positive and negative candidate 
attributes. As Table 4 shows, in Televisa, AMLO (34%) ranked on the top followed by 
Madrazo (29%), Calderón (24%), Campa (8%), and Mercado (5%). These results indicated that 
AMLO received 5% more positive coverage than Madrazo did. The PRI candidate was just 5% 
over Felipe Calderón. Regarding the small parties’ candidates, Campa received 3% more 
positive coverage than Mercado did. On Televisa, the main positive attributes of each 
candidate were for AMLO—population well-being, Calderón—honesty, Madrazo—support to 
democracy and respect to law, Campa—honesty as well as support for democracy, and 
Mercado—well skilled for the position. The positive candidates’ attribute news coverage 
presented more balanced reporting between presidential candidates. In addition, the two 
candidates from the “small” parties received some positive attribute coverage and were 
invisible in the negative attribute coverage. Televisa did elevate their quality of election 
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reporting on their positive attribute coverage more than they did on the negative attribute 
coverage. The major Mexican network constructed democratic coverage by reporting on each 
one of the presidential candidates and by keeping their frequency of coverage of candidates 
relatively close to each other, which limits the possibility of favoring or hurting any one 
candidate. This quality of election coverage represents a huge positive step for Televisa and 
Mexican election reporting. Also, TV Azteca presented high quality election reporting by 
keeping their percentage difference between candidates small. As a consequence, the 
possibility of favoring a candidate was low. In this case, Calderon (27%) received the highest 
amount of positive coverage on TV Azteca followed by AMLO (26%), Madrazo (19%), 
Mercado (14%) and Campa (14%). The coverage of small candidates was also higher in TV 
Azteca than in Televisa. Like in the case of the public issues, TV Azteca’s positive candidates’ 
attributes news reporting directly contributed to the construction of democracy. This fact 
represents another good step forward to help mature Mexico’s young democracy.  
Although Televisa and TV Azteca presented the same presidential candidate negative 
attribute agenda to their viewers by obtaining a perfect (rho = +1) Spearmen’s Rho correlation, 
a more detailed analysis of causation was required. To sort out the flow of intermedia influence 
of the presidential candidates’ negative attribute agenda between Televisa and TV Azteca 
newscasts during the 2006 Mexican election campaign period, three cross-lagged correlation 
analyses were conducted. The first cross-lagged correlation corresponds to a 3-month period. 
As Figure 4 illustrates, the cross-lagged correlation between Televisa at time 1 and TV Azteca 
at time 2 (rho = +.80) was stronger than the other way around (rho = +.71), but both exceed the 
Rozelle-Campbell baseline of .67.  
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Another cross-lag analysis (see Figure 5) was conducted with a 2-month scale. The 
cross-lag correlation of time 1 and time 2 indicated that the stronger correlation was between 
Televisa at time 1 and TV Azteca at time 2 (rho = +.55), not the other way around (rho = +.45). 
However, both of these results were above the expected value of chance alone indicated by a 
Rozelle-Campbell baseline of .41. However, this pattern changes over time. The cross-lag 
correlation between TV Azteca at time 2 and Televisa at time 3 (rho = +.92) was stronger than 
the other way around (rho = +.80). The cross-lag correlation between Televisa at time 2 and 
TV Azteca at time 3 falls below the Rozelle Campbell baseline of .82. Overall, the results 
indicated a reciprocal relationship during the first half of the campaign period, but that during 
the second half of the presidential election TV Azteca strongly influenced Televisa’s 
presidential candidates’ negative attribute agenda.  
To zoom in to a detailed analysis, as Figure 6 shows, a cross-lagged correlation of each 
constructed week was conducted. During the first and second time period, the cross-lagged 
correlation between Televisa at time 1 and TV Azteca at time 2 (rho = +.50) indicated a 
stronger influence than the other way around (rho = +.38). The correlation between TV Azteca 
at time 1 and Televisa at time 2 falls below the Rozelle Campbell baseline of .47. The same 
pattern of influence was observed in the second constructed week. The cross-lagged correlation 
between Televisa at time 2 and TV Azteca at time 3 (rho = +.48) was stronger than TV Azteca 
at time 2 and Televisa at time 3 (rho = +.40). The second correlation falls below the Rozelle 
Campbell baseline of .41. Again, the same pattern of influence was observed for time 3 and 
time 4. The cross-lag correlation between Televisa at time 3 and TV Azteca at time 4 (rho = 
+.60) was stronger than the other way around (rho = .+40). Once again, the second correlation 
falls under the Rozelle Campbell baseline of .46. The same pattern of communication flow 
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continued for the period of time 4 and time 5. The cross-lagged correlation between Televisa at 
time 4 and TV Azteca at time 5 (rho = +.80) was stronger than TV Azteca at time 4 and 
Televisa at time 5 (rho = +.60). Both of these results were above the Rozelle Campbell baseline 
of .47. Nevertheless, the flow of communication between the television networks reversed for 
the last period. The cross-lag correlation between TV Azteca at time 5 and Televisa at time 6 
(rho = +.85) was stronger than Televisa at time 5 and TV Azteca at time 6 (rho = +.53). Both of 
these results were above the Rozelle Campbell baseline of .29. Overall, the results show that in 
4 out of 5 cross-lag correlations, the pattern of influence was the same. That is, Televisa 
strongly influenced the TV Azteca presidential candidates’ negative attribute agenda. However, 
the most vulnerable time of the 2006 presidential campaign period was the second debate 
aftermath when the national television agenda was strongly influenced by TV Azteca. This last 
period illustrated the most crucial moment of the election—the last month before election day. 
These series of cross-lag correlations serve the purpose of analyzing the flow of 
communication and providing scientific evidence to point out which network was influencing 
the other one and the exact periods of such effect. Again, as we discussed before, ratings are 
not the same as news content quality. Overall, Televisa strongly influenced TV Azteca as it 
was predicted because Televisa is the major television network in Mexico. However, like in the 
case of public issues, TV Azteca influenced Televisa during one of the most critical period 
during the six months of election campaign. In terms of negative candidates’ attributes, TV 
Azteca dominated the flow of communication over Televisa during the last three months of the 
campaign right before election day. Moreover, during the month by month analysis, the results 
showed that in the month previous to casting the ballots TV Azteca influenced Televisa. These 
results raise the question of media leadership. How useful could it be to be the dominate 
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television media if by the climax of the election campaign the tendency of media direction 
shifts around completely? In terms of agenda setting theory, the present study serves as an 
example to comprend the importance of finding not just evidence of the presence or not of the 
agenda setting effect in a particular context, but to point out the magnitude that the effect takes 
by analyzing the flow of communication. The cross lag correlations show scientific evidence to 
understand which media outlet initiated the influence over the other media outlet(s) which 
answer the core question of media agenda setting that is: Who sets the media’s agenda? 
In terms of presidential candidates’ positive attributes, the intermedia agenda-setting 
effect was confirmed, and analysis of its causality was needed. To sort out the flow of 
influence between Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts during the 2006 Mexican election 
campaign period, the same three cross-lagged correlation analyses were conducted again. The 
first cross-lagged correlation corresponds to a 3-month period. As Figure 7 illustrates, the 
cross-lagged analysis results fall below the Rozelle-Campbell baseline of 1. As a consequence, 
the causality relationship of the 3-month period turns out to be nonsignificant.  
The second cross-lagged analysis corresponds to a 2-month period. The cross-lag 
correlation between time 1 and time 2 was below the Rozelle-Campbell baseline of .17; this 
first half of the presidential campaign period turns out to be nonsignficiant. However, the 
second half indicated a strong influence of Televisa at time 2 over TV Azteca at time 3 (rho = 
+.87). In contrast, the result of the cross-lag correlation between TV Azteca at time 2 and 
Televisa at time 3 (rho = +.42) turns out to be equal to the Rozelle Campbell baseline of .42. 
Overall, the results point out that Televisa influenced TV Azteca. 
To zoom in to a detailed analysis, as Figure 10 shows, a cross-lagged correlation of 
each constructed week was conducted. The cross-lag correlation between TV Azteca at time 1 
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and Televisa at time 2 (rho = +.80) was stronger than Televisa at time 1 and TV Azteca at time 
2 (rho = +.50). Both of these results were above the Rozelle Campbell baseline of .58. In 
contrast, the cross-lag correlation between Televisa at time 2 and TV Azteca at time 3 (rho = 
+.88) was stronger than the other way around (rho = +.68). The second correlation falls under 
the Rozelle Campbell baseline of .71. Nevertheless, the results shifted again for the time 3 and 
time 4. The cross-lag correlation between TV Azteca at time 3 and Televisa at time 4 (rho = 
+.68) was stronger than the other way around (rho = +.15). The last correlation falls under the 
Rozelle Campbell baseline of .25. For the next time period of time 4 and time 5, the results 
shifted again favoring Televisa. The cross-lag correlation between Televisa at time 4 and TV 
Azteca at time 5 (rho = +.80) was stronger than TV Azteca at time 4 and Televisa at time 5 
(rho = +.38); both results were over the Rozelle Campbell baseline of .23. This same pattern of 
influence was observed for the last constructed week. The cross-lag correlation between 
Televisa at time 5 and TV Azteca at time 6 (rho = +.88) was stronger than TV Azteca at time 5 
and Televisa at time 6 (rho = +.53); the Rozelle Campbell baseline was .66. Overall, TV 
Azteca influenced Televisa’s presidential candidates’ positive attributes agenda during the 
2006 presidential election. After obtaining evidence of a moderate agenda setting effect (rho = 
+.675), the need to understand the causality of the flow of communication became necessary. 
Televisa clearly influenced TV Azteca’s news content. The month by month analysis indicated 
that TV Azteca’s flow of communication over Televisa occurred only during the first and third 
month of the campaign period. The third month was when the Televisas law was being 
discussed in congress. It’s surprising to observe that during this crucial time Televisa was not 
influencing TV Azteca, if in real life events all the news was about Televisa’s piece of 
legislation.  
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To summarize, in regard to the candidates’ negative attributes, Figure 6 shows a 
detailed analysis of causation of the flow of intermedia influence. Four of the five analyses 
indicate a reciprocal relationship between Televisa and TV Azteca. However, in the last time 
period, there is evidence that TV Azteca’s agenda influenced Televisa when it came to the 
negative attributes of the candidates.  
As for the candidate’s positive attributes, Figure 9 shows a detailed analysis in regard to 
the causation of the intermedia influence. Three of the five analyses indicate a reciprocal 
relationship between Televisa and TV Azteca. However, in two of the time periods, the first 
and the third, there is evidence that TV Azteca’s agenda influenced Televisa when it came to a 
candidate’s positive attributes. 
Scholars Laura Islas Reyes and Luis Miguel Carriedo argued that television networks 
indirectly and directly favor a particular presidential candidate. From their view, Televisa 
supported Calderon and TV Azteca supported AMLO. This research provides scientific data to 
prove that in terms of the presidential negative attributes their appreciation about Televisa were 
correct because the network focus their attention on one candidate. In order for a country to 
develop a strong democracy their media needs to stop practicing this favoritism type of 
journalism practice to concentrate on presenting a more balanced exposure of all presidential 
candidates with reports written from a neutral prospective. The scholars appreciation regarding 
TV Azteca is not accurate because the network presented a more balance negative attribute 
coverage. That is, the different in the percentages between presidential candidates was too 
close to each other to observe a tendency in favor or against a specific candidate. In regards to 
the positive candidates’ attribute television coverage both networks presented reasonable 
journalistc coverage, minimizing the tendencies to favor a particular presidential candidate. 
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Figure 4: Candidates’ Negative Attributes: Three months Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
 
                        Televisa                                                                                                       TV Azteca 
 
 
                          
                         TV Azteca                 TV Azteca 
                                                            Rozelle-Campbell baseline = .67 
 
 
.73
.71
.80
     
.73
.83
.72
  255
  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Candidates’ Negative Attributes: Two Months Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
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Figure 6: Candidates’ Negative Attributes: Constructed Week Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
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Figure 7: Candidates’ Positive Attributes: Three months Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
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Figure 8: Candidates’ Positive Attributes: Two months Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
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Figure 9: Candidates’ Positive Attributes: Constructed Week Cross-Lagged Correlation of Televisa (upper) and TV Azteca (lower). 
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H3: Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts favored a particular presidential candidate 
through their nonelection coverage of public issues during the 2006 election 
This hypothesis was confirmed. However, the degree of indirect support that each 
candidate received from the newscast’s nonelection coverage varies according to each 
candidate’s personal political agenda. Different from expected outcomes, the candidate who 
received the highest indirect support from national television networks agenda was a candidate 
who emerged from a small party: Roberto Campa. AMLO was very close to Campa. Roberto 
Madrazo, and Felipe Calderón registered nonsignificant correlations. The contender who 
obtained the lowest indirect support was Patricia Mercado. 
The nonelection news content that Televisa and TV Azteca presented to their viewers 
was basically an identical public issues agenda, as Table 6 illustrates. The intermedia agenda 
setting effect between both television networks was strong (rho = +. 93). The strong 
Spearman’s Rho correlation indicates that both networks presented almost the same type of 
information and in the same rank of importance to their viewers. Televisa and TV Azteca aired 
a total of 1,335 news stories during the presidential campaign period. Televisa broadcast the 
highest amount of news (61% = 808 stories), while TV Azteca produced the lowest number of 
reports (39% = 527 stories). The public issues that ranked at the top of both networks’ agenda 
were: (1) crime, (2) the election, (3) the economy, and (4) politics. The difference between the 
election and politics categories was that election news presented a topic explicitly about the 
election, and politics stories covered political matters that were not related to the election 
process.  
Crime was the most important problem of concern in Mexico presented to those voters 
who chose either Televisa or TV Azteca newscasts as their source of information. This topic 
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directly relates to Calderón’s crime-fighting campaign slogan, Mano Dura (strong hand). The 
fact that both television newscasts presented an “unsafe reality” could create the appropriate 
psychological environment for people to quickly and easily respond positively to a candidate 
who promised voters to protect them from danger. Calderón focused his attention on 
reinforcing the judiciary system to protect citizens and prevent crime. In addition, the use of 
fear arousal to bolster news ratings could have been as much a factor in generating public 
concerns about crime as any presidential campaign.  
Table 6: Intermedia Agenda Setting Effect of Televisa and TV Azteca—Issues 
Issues Televisa     n=808 TV Azteca     n=527 
 #stories        -%-           rank #stories        -%-           rank 
Economy 115               14             (3) 79                 15               (3) 
Election 187                23            (2) 93                 18               (2) 
FIFA Germany 2006 10                    1       (13.5) 9                     2             (10) 
Politics 64                    8            (4) 41                   8               (4) 
Immigration 42                    5            (6) 33                   6               (6) 
Crime 216                27            (1) 156               30               (1) 
Health 13                    2       (10.5) 20                   4               (8) 
War 16                    2       (10.5) 8                     2             (10) 
EZLN 2                     .2          (15) 2                    .4          (13.5) 
Environment 39                    5            (6) 28                   5              (7) 
Education and Culture 39                    5            (6) 36                   7              (5) 
Human Rights 20                  2         (10.5) 8                     2            (10) 
Religion 16                  2         (10.5) 2                     .4        (13.5) 
Media 21                    3            (8) 9                      2          (9.5) 
Other 8                      1        (13.5) 3                      .6          (12) 
Total                       100%                       100% 
Televisa and TV Azteca Spearman’s Rho correlation =  + . 93 
 
In order to find out which candidate was indirectly favored by the combined Televisa 
and TV Azteca agenda, a Spearman’s Rho correlation between the television agenda (Televisa 
+ TV Azteca) and each candidate’s political agenda was calculated. The results indicated that 
Campa (rho = +.48) had the strongest correlation followed by AMLO (rho = +.45), Madrazo 
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(rho= +.34), and Calderón (rho = +.28). Mercado (rho = +.0) received the weakest correlation. 
The details of each comparison are presented in Tables 8 – 12. 
However, comparison of the candidates’ agenda with the television’s agenda indicated 
an inconsistency in the level of importance that the networks assigned to public issues listed on 
each candidate agenda. For example, as Table 5 illustrates, the highest-ranking public issues 
categories on both television stations were: (1) crime, (2) election news, (3) economy, and (4) 
politics. The variation on the television agenda began only at the fifth position. In contrast, on 
the candidates’ agenda, crime was at the lower end of their list of items. As a matter of fact, 
only three candidates –AMLO, Madrazo, and Mercado—had crime on their agenda. Another 
example is the second topic on the television agenda—the economy. This issue ranked at the 
top on all the candidates’ agendas. Consequently, the economy was a topic that was crucial on 
both agendas, and therefore, television reporting on the economy favored all five candidates. 
Economy was the number one agenda item for AMLO, Calderón, Madrazo, and Mercado. For 
Campa, the economy was the second issue on his agenda.  
In addition, coverage about the state of the Mexican political system indirectly favored 
all candidates. For Campa, the political system was the top priority on his agenda. As Table 1 
illustrates, the political system ranked second for Madrazo, third for AMLO, fourth in 
Calderón’s agenda, and at the middle in Mercado’s agenda. 
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Table 7: A Comparison of the Issues on Television’s Agenda vs. Candidate’s Agenda 
Issues TV Agenda Candidates’ Agenda 
 #                 %                   rank #                %             rank 
Economy 194             15                  (3) 63              27             (1) 
Election 280              21                 (2) *                  0        (13.5) 
FIFA Germany 2006 19                  1            (11.5) *                  0        (13.5) 
Politics 105                8                 (4) 24              10             (4) 
Immigration 75                  6                 (5) 5                    2         (9.5) 
Crime 372               28                (1) 5                   2         (9.5) 
Health 33                    2             (10) 9                   4            (8) 
War 24                    2             (10) *                    0      (13.5) 
EZLN 4                     .3             (14) *                    0      (13.5) 
Environment 67                    5               (6) 13                  6        (5.5) 
Culture 37.5                 3            (7.5) 12                  5           (7) 
Education  37.5                 3            (7.5) 29                12           (3) 
Human Rights 28                    2            (9.5) 14                  6        (5.5) 
Religion 18                   1           (11.5) 1                   .4        (12) 
Media 30                   2             (10) 2                     1        (11) 
Other 11                   .8             (13) 56                24          (2) 
Total 1335 233 
* Topics silent on candidates’ agenda  
Spearman’s Rho correlation =  +.40 
 
Table 8: Television’s Agenda vs. AMLO’s Agenda 
Issues TV Agenda AMLO 
 #                   %            rank #                %           rank 
Economy 194               15             (3) 20             40              (1) 
Election 280               21             (2) **                0           (12) 
FIFA Germany 2006 19                   1        (11.5) **                0           (12) 
Politics 105                 8             (4) 5                10             (4) 
Immigration 75                   6             (5) **                0           (12) 
Crime 372               28             (1) 2                  4             (7) 
Health 33                   2          (8.5) 2                  4             (7) 
War 24                   2          (8.5) **                0           (12) 
EZLN 4                    .3          (14) **                0           (12) 
Environment 67                  5             (6) 2                  4             (7) 
Culture 37.5               3           (7.5) 3                  6             (5) 
Education  37.5               3          (7.5) 7                14             (3) 
Human Rights 28                  2          (9.5) **                0            (12) 
Religion 18                1       (11.5) 1                 2            (9) 
Media 30                2         (9.5) **               0          (12) 
Other 11                .8         (13) 8               16            (2) 
Total 1335 50 
** Topics silent on AMLO’s agenda Spearman’s Rho correlation = +.45 
 
As Table 7 shows comparing the television agenda with the combined candidate 
agendas, the results indicated a weak Spearman’s Rho correlation (+. 40). The comparisons 
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with the individual candidate agendas reported above are more revealing. The top priority of 
the PRD candidate was the economy followed by education. In contrast, crime ranked as the 
top issue with television newscasts followed by general election coverage. The public issues 
which the AMLO candidate and television newscasts agree with the most were politics, health, 
the environment and the FIFA 2006 World Cup in Germany. The biggest disparities between 
the priorities of the AMLO candidate and television newscast agendas were in crime, education 
and other. 
Table 9: Television’s Agenda vs. Mercado’s Agenda 
Issues TV Agenda Mercado’s Agenda 
 #                %           rank #               %           rank 
Economy 194            15             (3) 11             19             (2) 
Election 280            21             (2) *                 0         (13.5) 
FIFA Germany 2006 19                 1       (11.5) *                 0         (13.5) 
Politics 105               8            (4) 3                 6           (7.5) 
Immigration 75                 6            (5) *                 0         (13.5) 
Crime 372             28            (1) 2                 4           (9.5) 
Health 33                 2         (9.5) 4                 7              (5) 
War 24                 2         (9.5) *                 0          (13.5) 
EZLN 4                  .3          (14) *                 0          (13.5) 
Environment 67                 5            (6) 3                 6            (7.5) 
Culture 37.5              3         (7.5) 4                 7               (5) 
Education  37.5              3         (7.5) 9               17               (3) 
Human Rights 28                 2         (9.5) 4                 7               (5) 
Religion 18                 1       (11.5) *                 0          (13.5) 
Media 30                 2         (9.5) 2                 4            (9.5) 
Other 11                 .8          (13) 12             22               (1) 
Total 1335 54 
* Topics silent on Mercado’s agenda  
Spearman’s Rho correlation =  .00 
 
The public issues which Patricia Mercado and the television newscasts agreed with the most 
were the economy, EZLN, the environment and the media. Mercado’s top priority was other 
followed by the economy and education. The television newscasts ranked crime at the top 
followed by general election coverage. The biggest disparities between Mercado and the 
television newscasts agendas were in crime, health, and other. 
 265
Table 10: Television’s Agenda vs. Madrazo’s Agenda 
Issues TV Agenda Madrazo’s Agenda 
#               %         rank #                %          rank 
Economy 194     15  (3) 10        21             (2) 
Election 280     21  (2) **          0           (13) 
FIFA Germany 2006 19         1     (11.5) **          0           (13) 
Politics 105       8  (4) 5           11         (3.5) 
Immigration 75         6  (5) **     0          (13) 
Crime 372     28  (1) 1       3         (8.5) 
Health 33         2        (8.5) 1       3         (8.5) 
War 24         2        (8.5) **     0          (13) 
EZLN 4          .3         (14) **     0          (13) 
Environment 67         5   (6) 5           11         (3.5) 
Culture 37.5      3         (7.5) 2       4            (7) 
Education  37.5            3         (7.5) 3       6         (5.5) 
Human Rights 28         2         (9.5) 3       6         (5.5) 
Religion 18         1        (11.5) **     0          (13) 
Media 30         2         (9.5) **     0          (13) 
Other 11         .8          (13) 17         36           (1) 
Total 1335 47
** Topics silent on Madrazo’s agenda    Spearman’s Rho correlation = +.34 
Madrazo’s top priority was other followed by the economy, the environment, and 
politics. Television newscasts ranked crime at the top followed by general election coverage. 
The public issues which Madrazo and television newscasts agreed with the most were the 
economy, politics, health, EZLN, education, religion, and culture. In contrast, they disagreed 
on immigration, crime, the war on terror, human rights, the media, and the environment. 
The top priority of the New Alliance candidate was politics followed by the economy 
and education. In contrast, television newscasts ranked crime at the top followed by general 
election coverage. Roberto Campa and television newscasts agreed the most on economy, 
immigration, health, the war on terror, the environment and religion. The biggest disparities 
were in politics, crime, education, and other. 
Table 11: Television’s Agenda vs. Campa’s Agenda 
Issues TV Agenda Campa’s Agenda 
#                 %          rank #                 %             rank 
Economy 194      15           (3) 4          25              (2) 
Election 280      21           (2) *            0         (11.5) 
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FIFA Germany 2006 19          1      (11.5) *            0         (11.5) 
Politics 105        8           (4) 6           38       (1) 
Immigration 75          6           (5) 1       6           (5.5) 
Crime 372      28           (1) *       0         (11.5) 
Health 33          2        (9.5) *       0         (11.5) 
War 24          2        (9.5) *       0         (11.5) 
EZLN 4           .3         (14) *       0         (11.5) 
Environment 67          5           (6) 1       6           (5.5) 
Culture 37.5       3        (7.5) *       0         (11.5) 
Education  37.5       3        (7.5) 2           13           (3.5) 
Human Rights 28          2        (9.5) *        0        (11.5) 
Religion 18          1      (11.5) *        0        (11.5) 
Media 30          2       (9.5) *        0        (11.5) 
Other 11          .8        (13) 2            13          (3.5) 
Total 1335 16
• Topics silent on Campa’s agenda.  Spearman’s Rho correlation = +.48
The public issues which Felipe Calderón and television newscasts agreed on were the 
economy, politics, immigration, health, EZLN and culture. Calderón’s agenda differs with the 
newscasts agenda on crime, the war on terror, education, religion, the media, human rights and 
other. Calderón’s top priority was the economy followed by education. Television newscasts 
ranked crime at the top followed by general election coverage. 
In summary, this analysis indicates that for Televisa and TV Azteca, crime was the 
most important problem that the country faced during the election campaign period, which 
coincided with Calderón’s crime-fighting campaign slogan, Mano Dura (strong hand). 
However, Televisa and TV Azteca’s non-election news coverage favored Roberto Campa 
during the 2006 election, an unanticipated result. Campa was followed by the AMLO candidate 
by the slight difference of 0.3 decimals. A comparison between each presidential candidate’s 
agenda and the networks’ agenda revealed the contrast in the importance of public issues. At 
the top of the television’s agenda was crime, while four out of the five candidates ranked 
economy at the top. Nonelection news coverage analysis is rare in agenda setting effect studies. 
The majority of the previous research focuses on election news (direct support) not on 
nonelection news (indirect support). However, for this election the Mexican media were 
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constantly monitored by IFE. In the event that any of the two major television network wanted 
to help a specific presidential candidate it was going to be difficult, but nonelection news were 
not monitored by IFE. Therefore, this kind of reporting offered a new opportunity to express 
support from the television media to presidential candidates.  
This hypothesis illustrates how useful agenda setting theory could be in identifying 
indirect support that presidential candidates could receive from news organizations. The study 
of the 2006 Mexican election dynamic shows that agenda setting researchers should not focus 
their attention on the major candidates because a bigger picture could be missing. In this case, 
one of the small party’s candidates received the highest amount of nonelection coverage. In 
addition, this hypothesis establishes the magnitude of the impact that nonelection news can 
have on voters and its decisive role in election journalism. This finding is great contribution to 
election studies in Mexico because for many years only the official PRI candidate agenda was 
supported by Televisa’s newscasts. After the 2006 election, researchers now must keep close 
attention on all candidates. On the whole, the results point out a strong agenda setting effect 
(rho=+.93) between Televisa and TV Azteca, but after analyzing each candidate in particular it  
was easy to observe a clear tendency to favor Campa. This result has no direct relationship 
with any of the previous hypotheses. Campa did not appear as a main player on any of them.  
Table 12: Television’s Agenda vs. Calderón’s Agenda 
Issues TV Agenda Calderón’s Agenda 
#          %           rank #               %          rank 
Economy 194     15     (3) 18       27    (1) 
Election 280     21     (2) **         0  (13) 
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FIFA Germany 2006 19         1        (11.5) **         0  (13) 
Politics 105       8     (4) 5           7    (5) 
Immigration 75         6     (5) 4           6    (6) 
Crime 372     28     (1) **         0   (13) 
Health 33         2  (8.5) 2           3  (8.5) 
War 24         2  (8.5) **         0   (13) 
EZLN 4          .3   (14) **         0   (13) 
Environment 67         5     (6) 2           3  (8.5) 
Culture 37.5      3  (7.5) 3           5    (7) 
Education  37.5            3          (7.5) 8         12    (3) 
Human Rights 28         2  (9.5) 7         10    (4) 
Religion 18         1        (11.5) **         0   (13) 
Media 30         2         (9.5) **         0   (13) 
Other 11         .8          (13) 17       26     (2) 
Total 1335 66
** Topics silent on Calderón’s agenda Spearman’s Rho correlation =  +.28. 
H4: Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s caudillismo cultural attribute prevailed over  
Felipe Calderón’s caudillismo cultural attribute in political advertising and television  
news. 
H4 in terms of political advertising was rejected, because PRI candidate Roberto Madrazo had 
the highest frequency of participation as a source in his political ads in contrast to Calderón and 
AMLO who preferred to use a male voiceover as the primary speaker in their television 
commercial spots. H4 concerning television news was also rejected. In the news, Felipe 
Calderón had more opportunities to directly speak to voters by means of a direct statement than 
any other presidential candidate. In addition, Calderón was frequently mentioned in election 
news stories aired by Televisa and TV Azteca.  
The results for both television networks were similar, as Table 13 illustrates. A total of 
227 election stories was aired between the two networks— 122 on Televisa and 105 on TV 
Azteca. Felipe Calderón (26%) captured the most television news media attention on both 
networks, closely followed by Roberto Madrazo (25%) and AMLO (25%). Mercado (11%) 
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received the least attention from the media among presidential candidates. However, she 
received relatively more coverage on TV Azteca (14%) than on Televisa (8%). Roberto Campa 
(13%) also obtained more coverage from TV Azteca (17%) over Televisa’s (10%). These 
results indicate that TV Azteca devoted more time to the small parties’ candidates than 
Televisa did. 
Table 13: Frequency of Presidential Candidates Appearance on Election News 
Candidate Televisa TV Azteca Both networks 
Mentions             % Mentions             % Mentions              % 
Felipe Calderón 34           28 26           25 60      26 
Roberto Madrazo 33           27 23           22 56      25 
AMLO 33           27 23           22 56      25 
Patricia Mercado 10     8 15           14 25      11 
Roberto Campa 12           10 18           17 30      13 
Total 122       100 105       100 227    100 
The table 13 shows the number of stories in which a presidential candidate appeared, 
but does not indicate if the candidate had an opportunity to speak or was quoted by the 
reporter. News source was also analyzed to determine the number of times a candidate’s sound 
bite occurred in a news story. The order of occurrence of the sound bite was also considered. 
Table 14 illustrates the order of source appearance in news stories by television network. 
Televisa broadcast a total of 812 election news stories, and 15% (124 stories) of the stories 
incorporated candidates’ sound bites. This was the same percentage as TV Azteca. Of the 536 
reports aired on TV Azteca, 15% also featured a presidential candidate as the news source. 
Moreover, as Table 14 illustrates, Televisa frequently used a single source in the majority of its 
reports, and TV Azteca aired more news stories that used two sources. As a consequence, 
candidates had more opportunity to “speak to voters” on TV Azteca than they did on Televisa. 
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Perhaps, the difference in sources used could rise from the election coverage strategy 
that TV Azteca implemented, which was to produce a daily 2-minute package report on all five 
presidential candidates, according to former TV Azteca, Hechos de la Noche, news director 
Oscar Salcedo (M. Flores, personal interview, May 4, 2006). The content analysis revealed that 
TV Azteca kept the presidential candidates in the news election package regardless of the 
candidate’s topic of the day. As Salcedo explained, in the event that a particular candidate had 
no public event scheduled on a particular date, the television report on TV Azteca should 
mention that the candidate had private agenda activities (M. Flores, personal interview, May 4, 
2006). News coverage of presidential candidates during newscasts was a major step forward 
for political communication in Mexico. However, the frequency analysis results (see Table 15) 
indicated that both networks devoted more broadcast time to the campaigns of major 
candidates than the small party candidates. 
Table 14: Frequency of Networks and News Stories Sources 
Source Televisa TV Azteca Both Networks 
 Mentions           % Mentions           % Mentions            % 
1st 72                     58 27                     33 99                      49 
2nd 29                     23 35                     43 64                      31 
3 th  8                         6 7                         9 15                       7 
4th 7                         6 9                        11 16                       8 
5th  4                         3 1                          1 5                         2 
6th  1                         1 1                          1 2                         1 
7th  2                         2 0                          0 2                         1 
8th  0                         0 2                          2 2                         1 
9th  1                         1 0                          0 1                         0 
Total 124                  100 82                     100 206                   100 
 
Nevertheless, the 2006 election represents a step forward in terms fairness of television 
coverage for all presidential candidates because for the first time all contenders received 
coverage. This was an important accomplishment in the Mexican political communication 
 271
arena. The next step is to concentrate on the development of a higher quality of candidates’ 
exposure on election news. Perhaps, the fairness doctrine is not quite defined in the sense that it 
does not represent the same journalist value to all media outlets and reporters. It is imperative 
that Mexican media unite their efforts with a clear and specific definition of electoral coverage. 
Perhaps, for television networks as well as reporters, the fact of presenting a visual image of 
presidential candidates was their definition of fair electoral coverage.  
Table 15: Frequency of Presidential Candidates on Television Election News as Sources 
Sources Calderón AMLO Madrazo Mercado Campa 
Mentions  % Mentions  % Mentions  % Mentions  % Mentions  % 
1st 30            46 26            48 27             46 7              59 9             52 
2nd 21            33 13            24 22             37 4              33 4             24 
3 th  4 6 4 7 7               12 0 0 0               0 
4th 4 6 8              15 2 3 1 8 1               6 
5th  3 5 1 2 0 0 0 0 1               6 
6th  1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0               0 
7th  1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1               6 
8th  0 0 1 2 1 2 0 0 0               0 
9th  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1              6 
Total 64          100 54           100 59           100 12           100 17          100 
An analysis also was conducted on the frequency of candidate appearance as a news 
source in election news in order to understand direct exposure in newscasts to voters. As Table 
15 indicates, out of the 206 sound bites that both networks included in their news packages, 
Calderón (31%) received the highest frequency of news source participation followed by 
Madrazo (29%), AMLO (26%), Campa (8%), and Mercado (6%). Therefore, Calderón was the 
presidential candidate who had more opportunities to directly speak to voters in television 
election news. The frequency of participation and the order of participation do create an impact 
on voter perception of a candidate’s social leadership. The fact that Calderón was quoted more 
frequently than AMLO did give him the title of television news media’s caudillo and not to 
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AMLO, as the hypothesis stated. Calderón participated as a news source 64 times; he was 
frequently presented as a first (46%) and second (33%) news source. Madrazo was a news 
source 59 times, usually as first source (46%) of a news story. AMLO participated 54 times in 
news stories, 48% as first source. Campa appeared 17 times in a news story, about 52% as first 
source. Finally, Mercado had a say in 12 news stories, 59% as first source. She was the 
presidential candidate who had fewer opportunities to speak directly to voters. 
Nevertheless, the next step into the fairness doctrine is to offer all contenders the same 
amount of time to directly speak with voters. That is, the same number of sound bites should be 
made for each candidate; then a complete state of fairness doctrine would be reached. The fact 
that a candidate has the chance to participate as source in a news story means that he/she had 
the opportunity to speak for himself/herself directly to voters; and the frequency that those 
candidates participate in news stories as source does create an impact on society about the 
important role that the candidate has in his or her community. 
In terms of the television political spots, the hypothesis also was rejected. A frequency 
analysis of the “main speaker” in the television political advertisements indicated that the 
television political advertisement’s caudillo was Roberto Madrazo (41%). The other two 
presidential contenders (Calderón 29% and AMLO 15%) had limited participation as sources 
in their commercial spots, as Table 15 indicates. Instead of directly speaking to voters, 
Calderón and AMLO used a male voiceover in their advertising spots. In political advertising, 
candidates paid for their messages and had the advantage of full control over the information 
disseminated to voters. It is interesting to observe that PAN and PRD candidates decided to 
minimize their opportunity to directly speak to voters. 
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Table 16: Frequency of Television Political Advertising’s Main Speaker 
Main Speaker Calderón López Obrador Madrazo 
Mentions          % Mentions          % Mentions          % 
Candidate 19       29 5         15 14      41 
Other candidate 0           0 0           0 0          0 
Supporter  1           2 1           3 0          0 
Public figure 9         14 2           6 0          0 
Character in ad 2           3 6         18 4        12 
Anonymous male voice 21       32 10       29 13      38 
Anonymous female 
voice 
5           8 2           6 0          0 
Other 8         12 8         23 3          9 
Total 65      100 34      100 34     100 
H5:  Television news coverage of presidential candidates’ issue platform and personal 
attributes are similar to those presented in presidential candidates’ television ads. 
The answer to this hypothesis is presented from two perspectives: (1) a comparison between 
the public issues agenda presented on television news and the candidate political television 
spots,  (2) a comparison between the candidate’s attributes agenda presented on television news 
and television ads, and (3) the qualitative evaluation of the infotainment “news” that candidates 
bought on TV, an innovative approach in the practice of political communication in Mexico.  
In terms of public issues agenda, the hypothesis was rejected because the Spearman’s 
Rho correlation between the television news public issue agenda and the television ads public 
issue agenda was weak (rho = +.09). This means that the public issues information presented 
on television news consisted of a completely different list of items then thoes represented on 
the candidates’ political television spots. The television news coverage of public issues and 
presidential candidates’ personal attributes were previously discussed. The frequency of public 
issue appearance was based on “first issue mentioned” to obtain the list of issues that each 
candidate promoted in his or her television spots. As Table 17 illustrates, a total of 10 
categories comprised the advertising issue agenda. Those were: (1) political system, (2) crime, 
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(3) economy, (4) public services, (5) energy, (6) social groups, (7) nationalism, (8) cultural 
themes, (9) external policy, and (10) campaign. The contenders had five out of the 10 issues in 
common. These were: economy, social group, nationalism, family, and moral values. The three 
major themes on Calderón’s ads were: social groups, cultural themes, and nationalism. 
AMLO’s were the political system, economy, and social group. Madrazo’s three top issues 
were crime, social groups, and family. Crime was a top issue for Madrazo as well as for the 
networks.  
Table 17: Public Issues Portrayed on Television Political Spots 
Issues Calderón López Obrador Madrazo 
 Mentions             % Mentions             % Mentions             % 
Political system 42                        8 31                       14 *                          0 
Crime 31                        6 *                          0 46                       23 
Economy 46                        9 31                       14 25                       13 
Public Services *                          0 14                         7 *                           0 
Social Groups 98                      20 30                        14 40                       20 
Nationalism 80                      16 18                          9 21                       11 
Cultural Themes 83                      17 *                            0 *                           0 
Campaign 29                        6 *                            0 *                           0 
Moral Values 55                      11 29                        14 17                        9 
Family 31                        6 15                          7 31                    16 
Infrastructure *                          0 23                         11 *                       0 
Other *                          0 20                           9 16                      8 
Total 495                    100 211                     100 196                  100 
 
 
 
 
Table 18: Public Issues Presented on Television Political Spots and Television News 
Ads Issues Ads Issue Agenda TV Issues Agenda 
 #              %        rank #               %         rank 
Political system 73             8           (6) 105           8            (6) 
Crime 77             9        (4.5) 372         28            (1) 
Economy 102         11        (2.5) 194         15            (3) 
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Public Services 14             2           (8) 137.5      10            (5) 
Cultural Themes 83             9         (4.5) 37.5           3           (7) 
Campaign 29             3            (7) 280           21          (2) 
Moral Values 101         11          (2.5) 18               1          (8) 
Other 423          47            (1) 191            14          (4) 
Total 902 1335
Spearman’s Rho correlation = +.09 
Table 19 : Public Issues Presented on Calderón’s Political Spots and Television News 
Ads Issues Calderón Ads Agenda TV Issues Agenda 
#              %     rank #           %     rank 
Political system 42            8           (5) 105       8       (6) 
Crime 31            6        (6.5) 372      28      (1) 
Economy 46            9           (4) 194      15      (3) 
Public Services 0              0           (8) 137.5   10      (5) 
Cultural Themes 83          17           (2) 37.5       3      (7) 
Campaign 29            6         (6.5) 280      21      (2) 
Moral Values 55           11           (3) 18          1      (8) 
Other 209          43          (1) 191       14      (4) 
Total 495     100 1335 
Spearman’s Rho correlation -.43 
Table 20: Public Issues Presented on AMLO’s Political Spots and Television News 
Ads Issues AMLO Ads Agenda TV Issues Agenda 
#           %     rank #             %      rank 
Political system 31        15        (2.5) 105          8       (6) 
Crime 0            0           (7) 372        28       (1) 
Economy 31        15         (2.5) 194        15       (3) 
Public Services 14           7           (5) 137.5     10       (5) 
Cultural Themes 0             0           (7) 37.5         3       (7) 
Campaign 0             0           (7) 280        21       (2) 
Moral Values 29          13          (4) 18            1       (8) 
Other 106        50         (1) 191         14      (4) 
Total 211     100 1335 
Spearman’s Rho correlation -.17 
The Spearman’s Rho correlation between the combined issue agendas of TV ads and 
TV news was very weak (rho = +.09). The analysis indicated that on the TV news agenda 
crime was the top priority, but on the TV ads agenda crime ranked in the middle. A more 
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detailed analysis between each of the three main presidential candidate’s public issues agenda 
presented on television political spots and the television news issues agenda was conducted. 
The results indicated (see Tables 19 to 21) that Roberto Madrazo (rho = +.42) had the strongest 
correlation while the correlations were negative for Andrés Manuel López Obrador (rho = -.17) 
and Felipe Calderón (rho = -.43).  
Table 21: Public Issues Presented on Madrazo’s Political Spots and Television News 
Ads Issues Madrazo Ads Agenda TV Issues Agenda 
#           %     rank #           %     rank 
Political system 0           0        (6.5) 105       8       (6) 
Crime 46          23        (2) 372      28      (1) 
Economy 25          13         (3) 194      15      (3) 
Public Services 0          0         (6.5) 137.5   10      (5) 
Cultural Themes 0          0         (6.5) 37.5       3      (7) 
Campaign 0          0         (6.5) 280      21      (2) 
Moral Values 17        9            (4) 18          1      (8) 
Other 108      55          (1) 191       14      (4) 
Total 196     100 1335 
Spearman’s Rho correlation +.42 
Candidates’ Attribute Agenda 
The second perspective measured candidate’s attributes agendas between television news and 
political television spots was accepted, because the Spearman’s Rho correlation was moderate 
(rho = +. 54). This result indicated that the portrayal of presidential candidates attributes was 
somewhat similar on television news and on political television spots. As Table 22 illustrates, 
the ads candidate attributes agenda consisted of 14 personal characteristics. Those were: 
character, honesty, popular support, capacity, ability to create jobs, ability to reduce poverty, 
ability to reduce crime, ability in economic policy, knowledge, experience, empathy, family 
personal values, nationalism, and other. The top three attributes in the Calderón ads were 
popular support, honesty, and experience. AMLO’s political ads portrayed him as honest, well 
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prepared for the position, and an experienced politician. Madrazo was represented by his 
political ads as compassionate, knowledgeable, and an honest politician. The sum of each 
candidate’s personal attributes created the political ads attribute agenda. 
Table 22: Candidates Attributes Presented on Television Political Ads 
Attributes Calderón López Obrador Madrazo
Mentions         % Mentions         % Mentions         % 
Character 0 0 13 5 22 11 
Honesty 78 13 45 17 30 15 
Popular Support 220 35 34 13 17 9 
Capacity 0 0 31 12 0 0 
Ability to create jobs 32 5 0 0 10 5 
Ability to reduce poverty 0 0 13 5 0 0 
Ability to reduce crime 0 0 0 0 18 9 
Ability in economic  51 8 18 7 0 0 
Knowledge 49 8 41 15 34 17 
Experience 83 13 34 13 28 14 
Empathy  56 9 37 13 35 17 
Family personal values 42 7 0 0 0 0 
Nationalism 10 2 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 9 3 
Total 621               100 266 100 203 100 
The correlation between the television ads presidential candidates attributes agenda and 
the television news presidential candidates attributes agenda was moderate (rho = +.54). In the 
television political ads agenda, the top three categories of the candidates’ personal 
characteristics were: popularity, other, and honesty. The news presidential candidates attribute 
agenda showed very similar results; other, honesty, popularity, and ability to develop the 
economy ranked at the top of the agenda.  
Table 23: Television News Candidate Attributes Agenda 
Attribute Madrazo Calderón AMLO Mercado Campa
Men          % Men          % Men          % Men          % Men          % 
Popularity 10   15 9    9 6    9 3    11 0   0 
Personality 3   5 2    2 1    2 2    7 0   0 
experience 3    5 5    5   3    5 0   0 0   0 
Knowledge 4    6 4    4 1    2 2   7 1   4 
Family 1   2 2    2 1    2 0   0 0   0 
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Societal 
wellbeing 
4   6 6    6 9   15 5    19 2   7 
Eloquent 1   2 1    1 1    2 1    4 0   0 
Prod roots 1   2 1    1 0   0 0   0 0   0 
Ability congress 0   0 2    2 1    2 1   4 0   0 
Ability combat 
crime 
4   6 4    4 0   0 0   0 1   4 
Ability combat 
poverty 
4   6 10    10 4   6 1   4 2   7 
Ability economy 6   9 10    10 9   15 0   0 2   7 
Ability 
corruption 
0   0 4   4 3    5 3    11 0   0 
Support 
democracy 
7    11 4   4 6    9 3    11 5    19 
Respect law 6   9 7   7 4    6 2    7 1   4 
Honest 2   3 16   16 6    9 2    7 4   15 
other 9   13 12   12 7    11 2    7 9   33 
Total 65   100 99   100 62   100 27   100 27   100 
Table 24: Candidate’s Attributes Television Political Ads vs. News 
Attributes Ads Agenda News Agenda
Mentions  %          (rank) Mentions     %         (rank) 
Character 35       3    (8) 8       3          (9.5) 
Honesty 153    14      (3) 30         11       (2) 
Popularity 271    25      (1) 28         10          (3.5) 
Ability reduce poverty 13        1          (10.5) 21     8       (6) 
Ability reduce crime 18        2       (9) 9       3           (9.5) 
Ability economic 69        6       (6) 27          10          (3.5) 
Knowledge 124     11      (5) 12      4          (7.5) 
Experience 145      13             (4) 11      4          (7.5) 
Family  42          4             (7) 6        2           (11) 
Nationalism 10     1        (10.5) 25      9       (5) 
Other 210        19           (2) 103        37       (1) 
Total 1090 280
Spearman’s Rho correlation = +.54 
These results indicated that the content presented in the political ads was similar to the 
content portrayed in the news stories. None of the categories obtained the same rank order. The 
“other” category of the television news candidate’s attribute agenda encompassed the 
following categories: respect law, ability to work with Congress, eloquent, society well-being, 
and ability to combat corruption. The “other” category of the television political ads 
presidential candidate attributes agenda included empathy, ability to create jobs, and capacity 
for the position. As Tables 25 to 27 demonstrate, each one of the main presidential candidates’ 
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personal attributes agenda was correlated with the news candidates attributes agenda. The 
results show that AMLO (rho = +.69) had the strongest correlation, followed by Calderón (rho 
= +.58) and Madrazo (rho = +.28).  This means that AMLO’s political television spots were 
more similar in representation of his attributes to those presented in the news agenda. As a 
consequence, the agenda setting effect was stronger between AMLO and television news 
agenda. The fact that AMLO obtain the highest correlation indicated that his campaign was 
paying close attention to election news reports aired on television.  
Table 25: Calderón’s Attributes Television Political Ads vs. News Attributes Agenda 
Attributes Calderón Ads Agenda News Agenda 
Mentions      %       (rank) Mentions      %        (rank) 
Character 0            0             (9) 8        3          (9.5) 
Honesty 78        13          (3.5) 30          11            (2) 
Popularity 220      35             (1) 28         10          (3.5) 
Ability reduce poverty 0            0             (9) 21     8            (6) 
Ability reduce crime 0            0             (9) 9            3           (9.5) 
Ability economic 51          8          (5.5) 27        10          (3.5) 
Knowledge 49          8          (5.5) 12          4         (7.5) 
Experience 83        13          (3.5) 11          4         (7.5) 
Family  42          7             (7) 6           2  (11) 
Nationalism 10          2             (8) 25         9   (5) 
Other 88        14             (2) 103     37  (1) 
Total 621    100 280     100 
Spearman’s Rho correlation +.58 
Table 26: AMLO’s Attributes Television Political Ads vs. News Attributes Agenda 
Attributes AMLO Ads Agenda News Agenda 
Mentions     %          (rank) Mentions       %       (rank) 
Character 13     5          (7.5) 8        3          (9.5) 
Honesty 45          17       (2) 30          11       (2) 
Popularity 34          13          (4.5) 28          10          (3.5) 
Ability reduce poverty 13     5           (7.5) 21      8            (6) 
Ability reduce crime 0       0            (10) 9        3         (9.5) 
Ability economic 18     7        (6) 27         10         (3.5) 
Knowledge 41         15        (3) 12          4          (7.5) 
Experience 34         13           (4.5) 11         4  (7.5) 
Family  0       0            (10) 6          2    (11) 
Nationalism 0       0            (10) 25        9     (5) 
Other 68          25       (1) 103   37    (1) 
Total 266      100 280      100 
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Spearman’s Rho correlation +.69 
Table 27: Madrazo’s Attributes Television Political Ads vs. News Attributes Agenda 
Attributes Madrazo Ads Agenda News Agenda 
Mentions     %        (rank) Mentions           %     (rank) 
Character 22          11           (5) 8         3        (9.5) 
Honesty 30          15           (3) 30     11    (2) 
Popularity 17      8           (7) 28     10        (3.5) 
Ability reduce poverty 0        0         (9.5) 21       8     (6) 
Ability reduce crime 18      9            (6) 9         3         (9.5) 
Ability economic 0        0          (9.5) 27     10         (3.5) 
Knowledge 34     17      (2) 12       4         (7.5) 
Experience 28     14      (4) 11       4         (7.5) 
Family  0        0          (9.5) 6         2         (11) 
Nationalism 0        0          (9.5) 25       9     (5) 
Other 54     27      (1) 103   37     (1) 
Total 203        100 280      100 
Spearman’s Rho correlation +.28 
The infotainment “news” 
When Andrés Manuel López Obrador was head of Mexico City government, he scheduled a 
press conference every weekday very early in the morning at 6:00, as part of his strategy to set 
the media’s agenda. Typically, press conferences were scheduled between 9 in the morning and 
noon. His strategy was that in order for him to establish the media’s agenda, he should be the 
first politician to speak with the media and establish the most important topic of the day, at 
least in Mexico City, and ensure a story in the national, regional, and local newscasts. In other 
words, journalists who attended the press conference in the morning were able to turn in their 
story early. This strategy to set the news media agenda made sense not only because reporters 
were able to start their day early, but because AMLO established himself as a public opinion 
leader, guaranteeing press coverage for him every day. The result was that most of the 
reporters, after getting AMLO’s point of view, went to look for a reactionary or endorsement 
voice; therefore, AMLO was the one calling the shots because he was not only setting the 
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media’s agenda, but the policymakers’ agenda as well. AMLO’s media communication 
strategy worked so well that he became the most popular politician in public opinion polls in 
2003, even above President Fox. According to newspaper journalist Denise Dresser (2003), 
López Obrador became the most popular politician in the country. His public works projects, 
fundraising, and strategic alliance with powerful businesspersons such as Carlos Slim [one of 
Mexico’s richest men] helped demonstrate López Obrador’s ability to govern (Gaddis Smith, 
2003). Moreover, Mexico expert Jorge Buendía of the Autonomous National Technological 
Institute (ITAM) said that in a nationwide telephone poll on a theoretical 2006 race for 
president, “López Obrador has the highest name recognition among presidential contenders: 84 
percent. That number also was matched by Fox’s wife, Martha Sahagún, who some have 
suggested should run for president. His positive rating was 57 percent, while hers was 59 
percent” (Gaddis Smith, 2003, p. 1). For some experts, this was the starting point of the 
AMLO/FOX conflict, because Fox could not accept that someone else was more popular than 
him. 
The PRD campaign team wanted to replicate AMLO’s success on setting the agenda for 
the media and politicians. They produced the television program La Otra Versión (The Other 
Version) expressly for that purpose. TV Azteca broadcast nationwide a 30-minute program via 
Channel 13 for 23 consecutive weeks. La Otra Versión aired Monday through Friday at 6:00 
AM. The PRD presidential candidate contracted 115 episodes of a 30-minute program with TV 
Azteca network. The political party paid 20 million pesos for the airtime; that is, 137,000 pesos 
per episode (Notimex, 2006b). La Otra Versión was produced live by Detrás de la Noticia, a 
communication business owned by journalist Ricardo Rocha. In 1997, he created the 
journalistic concept of Detrás de la Noticia. After leaving Televisa in 1999, Rocha converted 
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his concept into a news agency. The television program content was presented in a news 
magazine format hosted by Martha Zamarripa, a television journalist from Monterrey, Nuevo 
León. The show content included news reports about AMLO’s campaign activities, guest 
interviews, and a twice-a-week interview with Andrés Manuel López Obrador. Zamarripa 
(2006) explained that the media presented the PRD candidate painted in many different colors; 
and in doing so, they distorted his image delivering misinformation. Therefore, AMLO wanted 
to address voters and say to voters that there was another version of the facts; allowing voters 
to decide what they want to believe (Saúl, 2006, p. 1). 
For López Obrador, La Otra Versión represented a new and creative political 
communication strategy for disseminating his 50 compromisos (50 commitments), which were 
his main political platform,  
For a long time the mass media was used to selling any kind of product. 
Therefore, if sales went down, the solution was to invest more on advertising. 
That is, more spots and more money did the trick and the product would be in 
demand again. This type of thinking was transferred into politics, so now 
politics is about spots and money. The political message is not important in 
advertising; this is the key difference between advertising and propaganda. 
Propaganda must have a clear political message, because in propaganda you are 
selling ideas. The purpose of [La Otra Versión] the television program is to 
disseminate our political platform and speak directly to voters, because 
sometimes I am presented [in the media] incorrectly. (El Universal, 2006e, p. 1) 
AMLO has a point; the media constantly reported that he hated wealthy people and that for 
him, the needs of poor people were his top priority. López Obrador said that he was 
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misunderstood, that “he is not against some man that as a product of his hard work and 
observation of Mexican Laws builds up a patrimony; on the contrary, the person who invests 
and generates employment deserves support and protection” (El Universal, 2006e, p. 1). 
AMLO was concerned with the 20 million people who live on with 20 pesos (20 cents) per 
day, and the needs of the poor were his top priority. Nevertheless, he was against those people 
who took their wealth outside of the country and “those are the same people who are 
supporting a negative campaign against my persona” (El Universal, 2006e, p. 1).  
For the first time in Mexico’s political communication history, an opposition candidate 
had his own television program. Not long ago media access was extremely difficult for an 
opposition candidate. The situation was that generally only the PRI presidential candidate 
received coverage by mainstream media. In the 2000 election, this changed a little bit, but the 
change came more from Fox’s personality than from following the idea of journalistic ethics of 
equal candidate coverage, or by an official mandate. Since Fox had knowledge of marketing 
and advertising techniques, along with his own personal nontraditional political way of 
speaking, it made reporters’ work easier. As a consequence, he was able to have the 
opportunity to speak for himself to voters, because usually reporters included sound bites of 
him in their stories. Fox’s media accomplishment was historical.  
In 2006, López Obrador created his own media space to disseminate his political 
platform to voters. Nevertheless, the PRD candidate was not the only one who implemented 
new political communication strategies. According to journalist Salvador García Soto (2006), it 
was Ricardo Salinas Pliego, TV Azteca owner, who proposed to AMLO the idea of a daily 
program on his main national channel with the purpose of presenting, with liberty, his political 
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platform (García Soto, 2006). By this time, Televisa had shown sympathy for the PAN 
candidate. After a few days, López Obrador accepted Salinas Pliego’s proposal.  
The challenges faced by AMLO as major of Mexico City during his morning press 
conference were very different from those he faced with La Otra Versión. Journalist Ricardo 
Alemán (2006) noted that La Otra Versión worked from a setting that lacked political power. 
“There is no doubt that the television program could be successful, but never in the same scale 
that the early press conference did. A head of state’s opinion affects everyone; in contrast, a 
presidential candidate’s opinion does not affect all citizens” (p. 1). He had a point; perhaps, the 
morning press conference political communication plan is a correct approach, but the change in 
AMLO’s political status could affect his level of influence. However, no one at this point of the 
election knew what the effect could be—negative or positive. Besides, previous public opinion 
surveys indicated that López Obrador was the favored presidential candidate. Therefore, the 
PRD candidate had a great potential for being heard by citizens. “I am not running this 
presidential election with a thought about winning, that is not the most important thing, but to 
transform the country. It is not the power for its own sake, the state office position is to 
historically transcend” (Notimex, 2006c, p. 1). Consequently, La Otra Versión was AMLO’s 
attempt to disseminate his proposal of how to politically transform Mexico.   
In summary, even if on the surface it appeared as if mass media products could 
construct a presidential candidate’s image, make him or her popular and victorious, the truth is 
that the mass media cannot substitute for the essence of a good politician, which is a 
candidate’s political ideology as well as that person’s position on public issues. Perhaps a 
candidate could win the election, but it would be very difficult for him or her to maintain 
popularity and leadership among citizens.  
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H6: Television news influenced television political advertising during the 2006  
presidential election 
 The previous hypothesis established an agenda setting relationship between television 
news and presidential candidates political ads. Therefore, the next step was to figure out the 
flow of communication between both of them. It is important to understand which political 
communication element caused the agenda setting effect. From a general prespective, a cross-
lag analysis between television news and television political ads indicated that the cross-lagged 
correlation between news at time one (TV time 1) and political advertising at time two (Ads 
time 2) was stronger (rho = +.71) than the other way around (rho = +.48). However, both 
correlations were above the Rozelle-Campbell baseline (.45). Therefore, from a general point 
of view television news had an agenda setting effec on candidates’ political spots. Nevertheless 
in order to identify which network caused the effect during the crucial times of the election 
campaign a more detailed cross-lag analysis is needed. 
As figure 11 shows, the second cross-lagged analysis corresponds to a 2-month period. 
The cross-lag correlation between news at time 1 and ads at time 2 was stronger (rho = .68) 
than the other way around (rho = .03).The cross-lag correlation between ads at time 1 and news 
at time 2 was below the Rozelle-Campbell baseline of .27. For this first half of the presidential 
campaign, clearly news influenced television political ads. However, a reciprocal pattern of 
influence was observed for the second half of the presidential campaign period. The cross-lag 
correlation between news at time 2 and ads at time 3 (rho = .63) was very similar to the 
correlation between ads at time 2 and news at time 3 (rho = .61); both correlation were above 
the Rozelle-Campbell baseline of .50. 
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To zoom in to an even more detailed analysis, as Figure 12 shows, a cross-lagged 
correlation of each constructed week was conducted. Across these five time intervals, the 
relationship between the news agenda and the political advertising agenda is very mixed. At 
the beginning and end of the presidential campaign, their relationship is reciprocal. However, 
in the early phases of the campaign, late winter and early spring (Times 2 to 3 and 3 to 4) the 
analysis indicates that the news agenda influenced the advertising agenda (rho = +.63 and +.81. 
respectively). Moving on toward Election Day, the advertising agenda influenced the news 
agenda from Time 4 to 5 (rho = +.82). 
Figure 10: Cross-lagged Correlations of Television News and Television Political Ads 
TV-Time 1      TV-Time 2 
 
               Ads-Time 1 Ads-Time2 
Rozelle-Campbell baseline = .45 
Table 28: Television News Agenda at Time One 
Issues January February March News Time 1
Issues Mentions        %     (rank) 
Economy 26 36 36 98             15         (3) 
Election 39 44 44 127           20         (2) 
Politics 11 28 21 60             9           (4) 
Immigration 8 9 10 27             4           (5) 
Crime 43 105 62 210           33         (1) 
Health 4 8 9 21             3           (6.5) 
War 6 0 4 10             2           (10) 
EZLN 0 0 1 1               0           (15) 
Environment 8 9 3 20             3           (6.5) 
Culture 4.5 6 4.5 15             2           (10) 
Education 4.5 6 4.5 15             2           (10) 
.60 .63
.56
.86
.48
.71
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Human Rights 0 11 3 14             2           (10) 
Religion 1 2 1 4               1           (13.5) 
Media 1 7 6 14             2           (10) 
Other 3 3 1 7               1           (13.5) 
Total 159 274 210 643
Table 29: Television News Agenda at Time Two 
Issues April May June News Time 2
Mentions %       (rank) 
Economy 15 46 35 96             15         (3) 
Election 42 57 54 153           22         (2) 
FIFA 2006 0 0 19 19             3           (8) 
Politics 14 16 15 45             7           (5) 
Immigration 9 27 12 48             7           (5) 
Crime 61 56 45 162           23         (1) 
Health 4 1 7 12             2           (12) 
War 1 6 7 14             2           (12) 
EZLN 0 3 0 3              0            (16) 
Environment 5 23 19 47             7           (5) 
Culture 5.5 10 7 22.5          3           (8) 
Education 5.5 10 7 22.5          3           (8) 
Human Rights 4 3 7 14             2           (12) 
Religion 13 1 0 14             2           (12) 
Media 6 8 2 16             2           (12) 
Other 2 1 1 4               1           (16) 
Total 187 268 237 692
Table 30: Television Ads Issue Agenda at Time One 
Issues January February March  Ads Time 1 
Mentions     %     (rank) 
Political system 0 0 0 0         0  (9.5) 
Crime 1 0 4 5         28  (1.5) 
Economy 0 1 2 3         17   (3) 
Public Services 0 0 0 0          0    (9.5) 
Social Groups 0 0 0 0          0    (9.5) 
Nationalism 0 0 0 0          0    (9.5) 
Cultural Themes 0 0 0 0          0    (9.5) 
Campaign 0 0 5 5          28          (1.5) 
Moral Values 1 0 0 1          6     (6) 
Family 2 0 0 2          11           (4.5) 
Infrastructure 0 1 1 2          11           (4.5) 
Other 0 0 0 0           0    (9.5) 
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Total 4 2 12 18
Table 31: Television Ads Issue Agenda at Time Two 
Issues April May June Ads Time 2 
Mentions     %     (rank) 
Political system 0 0 1 1            2         (7.5) 
Crime 3 4 3 10          15        (3) 
Economy 3 11 9 23          35        (1) 
Public Services 1 5 0 6            9          (4) 
Social Groups 0 0 0 0            0        (10.5) 
Nationalism 0 3 0 3            5          (5) 
Cultural Themes 0 0 0 0            0         (10.5) 
Campaign 1 7 12 20         30        (2) 
Moral Values 0 0 0 0            0        (10.5) 
Family 0 0 2 2            3          (6) 
Infrastructure 0 0 0 0            0         (10.5) 
Other 0 0 1 1            2        (7.5) 
Total 8 30 28 66
Table 30, cont.
  289
 
 
 
Figure 11: News vs. Ads: Two Months Cross-Lagged Correlation of News (upper) and Advertising (lower). 
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Figure 12: News vs. Advertisement: Constructed Week Cross-Lagged Correlation of News (upper) and TV Ads (lower). 
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In summary, this chapter answered the question: Who set the intermedia agenda during 
the 2006 election? This question was addressed from three standpoints: the “news norms,” “other 
news media,” and “news sources.” The first three hypotheses focused on the “news norms” 
perspective. From the results of those hypotheses, the intermedia agenda setting effect on 
election news between Televisa and TV Azteca was significant (rho = +.71). Televisa aired a 
higher number of election news (187) stories than TV Azteca (93); the content of those news 
stories were similar. However, TV Azteca’s priority was to report on election issues more than 
candidates’ negative attributes. Televisa focused its attention on candidates’ negative attributes 
more than public issues. In terms of candidate personal attributes, the intermedia agenda was set 
by the negative attributes, not the positive attributes. A perfect Spearman’s Rho correlation was 
registered for the negative candidate attributes, meaning that both networks negatively portrayed 
the presidential candidates the same way. Television news nonelection coverage favored Roberto 
Campa (rho = +.57), who obtained the highest correlation between his agenda and the networks’ 
agenda. That is, the intermedia agenda of the networks indirectly favored Campa. The candidate 
who obtained the lowest indirect support was Patricia Mercado (rho = +.34). The candidates of 
the three major political parties were at the midpoint. 
Moving on to the next intermedia agenda setting perspective, Hypothesis 4 focused on 
“news sources.” The results obtained pointed out that between television news and television 
political ads, television news set the intermedia agenda during the 2006 election. The candidate 
who had the maximum opportunity to directly speak to voters in the news was Felipe Calderón, 
and in the political ads was Roberto Madrazo. Hypotheses 5 and 6 focused on “other news 
media,” news and political ads, presented similar information (rho = +.53) describing candidates’ 
attributes rather than presenting the same public issues (rho = .+09). The last chapter presents a 
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discussion about the importance of the journalistic role during the 2006 election and what this 
finding signifies for Mexican political communication and news election coverage.  
Presidential candidates’ political communication strategy was based on one element, 
political advertisement. However, larger quantities of political spots in the media do not 
necessarily cause a strong influence on Televisa and TV Azteca news coverage. Several 
candidates invested a high amount of economic resources to purchase political advertising in 
television. However, this study illustrates that such a high investment did not pay off for 
presidential candidates. Advertisement has the advantage of the frequency factor that news do 
not have. In contrast, television newscasts have two or three (morning, noon, and evening) 
broadcast per day. Voters and journalists alike were exposed to high amounts of television 
political advertising but those messages did not influence the journalist’s agenda. Scholar Raul 
Trejo Delabre (2007) pointed out that politicians have stopped making politics by assuming that 
the mass media is their only possible space to expose their campaigns to voters. This research 
indicated that these assumptions do not reflect social reality in the case in Mexico. Culture is an 
important factor in political dynamics.  
The effect that political television ads produced in United States’ voters does not 
replicate on Mexican voters. A political culture and an advertisement culture is the fundamental 
factor which makes the difference. In consumerism societies such as the U.S., voters/citizens are 
used to being exposed to advertisements 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; in the U.S. political 
context negative campaigning is a very common element.. In Mexico, voters/citizens do not 
posses the same consumerism experience. The main political marketing consultants that some 
candidates followed are Americans and European. This means that perhaps this negative strategy 
does work in their countries, but this practice does not produce the same effects in other 
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countries. As communication scholar Juan Francisco Escobedo (2006a) stated, negative political 
campaigning does not work in Mexico. In the case of the Mexican election, the candidates’ 
political marketing strategy fail to create a context of acceptance, trust, respect, favorable voter 
turnout, and  freedom of speech. The lack of these elements during the campaign period is the 
evidence of the failure of their political marketing strategy.  
The results show that there is a misunderstanding of the role that political marketing has 
within the poltical communication arena. Political marketing is only one aspect of political 
communication that has been in fashion as a direct consequence of the current economic model 
of globalization. Globalization can be understood as a series of modifications in international 
economic practice that tend to create a single world market (Berger, 2000). Today’s world is 
experiencing a sort of commercial evangelization through the electronic media. Television is the 
main instrument of globalization. The fact that political marketing is in fashion does not 
necessary imply that this political communication element works the same way in all countries.  
In the case of Mexico, negative advertisments did not work. This type of political 
communication generated a context of confusion and uncertantly for voters. Never before had the 
citizen seen a political campaign waged to this extent in the Mexican media. The country became 
divided, disintegrating into political chaos before and after election day. The political 
polarization was the origin of a very serious post electoral conflict that still exists. Another signal 
of negative advertiment failure was voter turn out. In 2000, Fox’s media’s campaign was highly 
successful, but 6 years later, Caldron’s was not. Fox (42.52%) won with a 6.41 percentage 
difference over the second place Francisco Labastida-PRI (36.11%) (IFE, 2000). In contrast, 
Calderón was very close (less than 1%) to AMLO-PRD (IFE, 2006). In addition, Calderón faced 
vote fraud accusations and Fox received admiration for stopping 71 years of PRI rule.  
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Calderon had invested a high amount of money on electronic media political spots under 
the understanding that a greater amount of political advertising leads to victory. How does a 
political communication campaign so carefully designed end up in the middle of a fraud 
accusation? If Calderon followed each step of the political marketing recipe to victory, it just 
does not make sense to commit vote fraud. Nevertheless, why was the PRD vote fraud 
accusation so strong in society? The answer is the failures of negative advertisements which 
created a context of uncertainty and distrust.  
Why was the negative campaign effect in Mexico so quick to show up? There are three 
possible scenarios: (1) the second presidential debate aftermath, (2) IFE’s slow reaction to stop 
the presidential candidates’ negative campaign in the media as well as the voter-counting 
software scandal, and (3) President Vicente Fox’s public unconditional support for Felipe 
Calderón. All of those circumstances together created a context of distrust for Mexican voters.  
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Chapter 9 
Discussion 
This study of the 2006 Mexican presidential election expands the observation and measurement 
of intermedia agenda-setting effects beyond the U.S. context. This effort to internationalize 
intermedia agenda-setting theory allowed us to encounter new political, social, and cultural 
dynamics characteristics of the Mexican young democracy. This research continues the tradition 
of measuring and comparing the agenda-setting effects of national television news stories and 
national television political ads. Previous intermedia agenda-setting research (Bowers, 1977; 
Zhao & Chaffee, 1995; López-Escobar, Llamas, McCombs, & Lennon, 1998; Lemert, Wanta, & 
Lee 1999; Takeshita, 2002) came to the same conclusion as this study that overall the news is 
more significant than political advertising.  
At present in Mexico, there is a tendency to believe that the higher the financial 
investment candidates devote to their media campaign strategy, the easier it is for them to 
achieve election victory and voters’ legitimacy. Raúl Trejo Delabre (2007) argued that 
politicians have stopped making politics by assuming that the mass media is their only possible 
space to expose themselves to voters. However, Director of the Reforma survey division 
Alejandro Moreno (2003) indicated that the number one influence on Mexican voters is their 
family and friends, not television. Furthermore, his study indicated that the trust that citizens 
have in their national television newscasts is low. 
Political marketing is only one component of a political communication, not its core. 
Political communication is about creating a context of acceptance, trust, respect, legality, 
freedom of speech, and democracy. It seems as if political marketers are under the impression 
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that the audience will be persuaded to vote for a particular candidate by exposing the nominee as 
many times as they can in the media via political advertisements. However, the reality is that 
voters understand the content of political advertisement according to their own personal filters—
experience, system of beliefs, political ideology, family. Political advertising does not function 
as a great persuasive power working under the assumption that voters are tremendously 
susceptible to political spots. The use of negative campaigns during the 2006 election created 
uncertainty on the Mexican voters’ minds. According to communication scholar Juan Francisco 
Escobedo (2006a), negative political campaigning does not work in Mexico.   
The neoliberal economy has transformed the identity of the Aztec nation. The social 
focus has shifted from collective to individualistic goals; money is the basis for social reward as 
well as recognition and efficiency as the main human characteristic. The globalization dynamic 
involves drastic changes in economy, culture, symbolic products, and lifestyle. In terms of 
politics, the globalization era has demonstrated a tendency to shift political ideology to the right, 
also known as neoliberalism. In the globalized world, the key characteristic of the economic 
model is to sell a standardized product to all possible consumers around the globe. As a result, 
advertising is the central instrument of globalization, because it exposes products to potential 
consumers.  
Under this line of reasoning, a candidate is not looking for voters, but for a place of 
preference in a market that is interested in buying his or her attributes. As a consequence, a 
candidate’s top priority is to gain advantage over “other political products,” not necessarily to 
expose their political platform. If a candidate presents his/her issue position, it could work in 
his/her favor, but also in his/her disadvantage; however, if a political candidate presents his/her 
personal attributes, the candidate puts himself/herself on safer ground. Therefore, political image 
  297
specialists work to ensure the presidential candidate’s hair, clothing, teeth, glasses, even makeup 
are perfect in order to make it just the “right look for selling.” With the appropriate political 
image and a strong political marketing strategy, a candidate is ready to be in demand, to become 
a “hot commodity” for consumers; in other words, to be very much a candidate in demand by 
voters.  
 The study did have limitations. During the data collection period, a series of three events 
could have influenced the regular news agenda of Televisa and TV Azteca newscasts. The first 
of these events was the immigration reform issue in the United States in March, 2006. Congress 
was discussing an immigration reform package that could have allowed many undocumented 
people living in the U.S. to legitimize their immigration status. As a public petition to Congress 
to pass the reform, several Hispanic media outlets and Latino community leaders organized a 
mega march in major cities. On the same day, at the same time, millions of undocumented 
immigrants, as well as many legal citizens, walked downtown streets across the country. The 
Hispanic media was covering the event along with the international media. This event was a 
once-in-a-lifetime occurrence that tried to convince law makers about the urgent need for 
immigration reform. The Mexican television media covered the event, because many Mexicans 
and Mexican-Americans participated in it, generating a peak in their immigration reporting.  
 Turning to the second event, in that same month of March, the Mexican congress 
discussed the new Federal Radio and Television law, a major piece of legislation for the 
broadcast media industries. The new body of law regulates the conditions for broadcast media 
industries, how they operate, and renewing their licensees. This new law is also known as Ley 
Televisa, because several legislators pointed out that Televisa was the original author of this 
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legislative initiative. The congressmen who opposed this new law argued that such regulations 
damage cultural and communitarian radio and television stations.  
One of the most noteworthy consequences of the 2006 election was the rise of 
the need for an immediate review of the Electoral Law. In particular the law needed to adopt an 
adequate legal framework to regulate political communication in an extremely competitive 
electoral context. As a consequence, the political advertisement dynamics drastically changed. 
Political candidates or their parties can no longer purchase political advertisements on regular 
programming. Each of them will receive an equal amount of time to disseminate their political 
message to voters. This is the second time that the congress created an electoral law that 
addressed the mass media role during the election season. 
In the month of June 2006, a third event, The Soccer World Cup, was celebrated  in 
Germany. Mexico’s soccer team participated in this worldwide event. The team survived for 
several games until they lost to Argentina. The country was paralyzed every time the team 
played up to a point that presidential candidates were afraid of losing voter’s attention in front of 
such a titanic distraction. Several candidates resolved to wear the national team uniform to show 
their appreciation to Mexico’s soccer team as well as minimizing campaign activities on game 
days.  
The coverage of all three of these events by the national television newscasts 
undoubtedly had some influence their regular news agenda. As a consequence, this study’s 
content analysis results have some increment of news coverage on those topics during the 
months of March and June, a situation best regarded as measurement error affecting both 
Televisa and TV Azteca to an equal degree. 
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This study provides a launching-point for future investigations of agenda setting 
effects and political advertisements in Mexico. This area has been well documented in other 
countries of the world, but not in the Aztec nation, a country where each electoral year political 
candidates are increasing their political marketing budget under the assumption that high amount 
of political advertising automatically leads them to victory. Researchers must document those 
events in order to find out if the political candidates’ monetary investment is working for them or 
not. Arguably, this research is suggesting that the political marketing dynamic in a third world 
county is completely different than in industrial societies. 
 It would be interesting to find out if this agenda setting effect follows the 
same pattern for both news and political advertisements in newspapers, political 
magazines, and entertainment products such as comics, telenovelas, and films. The audience’s 
attention to news is decreasing, but audience attention to comedy shows that base their characters 
on political personalities are on the rise. Therefore, attention to political entertainment 
programming is a major area of research in political communication. In addition, it is important 
to explore the difference in effects in terms of local, regional, and national media. It is imperative 
to continue evaluating the social impact of political negative advertisments in Mexico and other 
third world countries. And, finally, it will be fascinating to compare Mexico with other Latin 
American countries. 
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Appendix A 
2006 Mexican Election Codebook 
 
 
a02 “television network”  
         (5) Televisa, (6) TV Azteca 
 
a3 “month in which the newscast was broadcast”  
(1) January, (2) February, (3) March, (4) April, (5) May, (6) June 
 
a14 “news story main topic”  
(1) economy, (2) election, (3) FIFA Germany 2006, (4) politics, (5) immigration, (6) crime, (7) 
health, (8) war, (9) EZLN, (10) environment, (11) culture, (12) education, (13) human rights, 
(14) religion, (15) media, and (16) other. 
 
b02 “Roberto Madrazo’s positive characteristics”  
(1) leadership, (2) experience, (3) personality, (4) capacity, (5) credibility, (6) moral values, (7) 
military experience, (8) honesty, (9) respets law, (10) other 
 
b03 “Felipe Calderón’s positive characteristics”  
(1) leadership, (2) experience, (3) personality, (4) capacity, (5) credibility, (6) moral values, (7) 
military experience, (8) honesty, (9) respets law, (10) other 
 
b04 “Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s positive characteristics”  
(1) leadership, (2) experience, (3) personality, (4) capacity, (5) credibility, (6) moral values, (7) 
military experience, (8) honesty, (9) respets law, (10) other 
 
b05 “Patricia Mercado’s positive characteristics”  
(1) leadership, (2) experience, (3) personality, (4) capacity, (5) credibility, (6) moral values, (7) 
military experience, (8) honesty, (9) respets law, (10) other 
 
b06 “Roberto Campa’s positive characteristics”  
(1) leadership, (2) experience, (3) personality, (4) capacity, (5) credibility, (6) moral values, (7) 
military experience, (8) honesty, (9) respets law, (10) other 
 
b07 “Roberto Madrazo’s negative characteristics”  
(1) lack of leadership, (2) lack of experience, (3) lack of personality, (4) lack of capacity, (5) lack 
of credibility, (6) lack of moral values, (7) no military experience, (8) dishonest, (9) do not 
respect law, (10) other 
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b08 “Felipe Calderón’s positive negative characteristics”  
(1) lack of leadership, (2) lack of experience, (3) lack of personality, (4) lack of capacity, (5) lack 
of credibility, (6) lack of moral values, (7) no military experience, (8) dishonest, (9) do not 
respect law, (10) other 
b09 “Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s negative characteristics”  
(1) lack of leadership, (2) lack of experience, (3) lack of personality, (4) lack of capacity, (5) lack 
of credibility, (6) lack of moral values, (7) no military experience, (8) dishonest, (9) do not 
respect law, (10) other 
b10 “Patricia Mercado’s negative characteristics”  
(1) lack of leadership, (2) lack of experience, (3) lack of personality, (4) lack of capacity, (5) lack 
of credibility, (6) lack of moral values, (7) no military experience, (8) dishonest, (9) do not 
respect law, (10) other 
b11 “Roberto Campa’s negative characteristics”  
(1) lack of leadership, (2) lack of experience, (3) lack of personality, (4) lack of capacity, (5) lack 
of credibility, (6) lack of moral values, (7) no military experience, (8) dishonest, (9) do not 
respect law, (10) other 
c01 “which candidate appeared on the news story”  
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5) Roberto Campa 
c02 “first source type” 
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5) Roberto Campa 
c12 “second source type”  
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5) Roberto Campa 
c22 “third source type” 
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5) Roberto Campa  
c32 “fourth source type” 
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5) Roberto Campa  
c42 “fifth source type”  
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5) Roberto Campa 
c52 “sixth source type” 
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5) Roberto Campa  
c62 “seventh source type” 
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5) Roberto Campa  
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c72 “eighth source type” 
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5)     
Roberto Campa  
 
c82 “ninth source type”  
(1) Felipe Calderón, (2) AMLO, (3) Roberto Madrazo, (4) Patricia Mercado, (5)     
Roberto Campa 
 
d01 “recoded issues”  
(1) economy, (2) election, (3) FIFA Germany 2006, (4) politics, (5) immigration, (6) crime, (7) 
health, (8) war, (9) EZLN, (10) environment, (11) culture, (12) education, (13) human rights, 
(14) religion, (15) media, and (16) other. 
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Glossary 
Acuerdo para la Neutralidad Democrática—Neutral Democratic Agreement  
AMLO-Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
Apelación—legal resource to request a superior court to review the sentence 
Chachalaca—a type of bird that never stops singing  
Desafuero—lost of legal immunity 
EMP—Presidential military guard 
IBOPE—Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics 
IFE—Federal Electoral Institute  
PAN—National Action Party 
PRD—Revolutionary Democratic Party 
PRI—Institutional Revolutionary Party 
PVEM—Green Party 
NA- New Alliance party 
SNTE—National Education Worker’s Union 
TEPJF— Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary 
TUCOM—an internal PRI political group formed to prevent Madrazo from becoming PRI 
presidential candidate 
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